NATIONAL REVIEW

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November 5, 1960

A JOURNAL OF FACT AND OPINION

"If I can only keep the Catholics who don't want to vote for me thinking they're renegades, and the non-Catholics who don't want to vote for me thinking they're bigots, maybe everybody will forget about whose vest-pocket I'm in!"

Articles and Reviews by . . . . RICHARD M. WEAVER

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

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NATIONAL REVIEW

A JOURNAL OF FACT AND OPINION

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NATIONAL REVIEW is published weekly by National Review, Inc. at 440 Post Road, Orange, Conn. (second class mail privileges authorized at Orange, Conn.). Copyright 1960 in the U.S.A. by National Review, Inc. All manuscripts, letters, subscription orders, changes of address and undeliverable copies should be sent to:

EDITORIAL AND CIRCULATION OFFICES
National Review
150 East 35th St., New York 16, N.Y.
Telephone OREgon 9-7330

RATES: $15.00 a year ($8.00 for the 32-page issues, and $7.00 for the 8-page issues published on the alternate fortnights). The 8-page issues are available separately at $10.00 a year. In all cases, add $1.00 for Canada, $2.00 for other foreign subscriptions.

The editors cannot be responsible for unsolicited manuscripts unless return postage, or better, a stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors.

In This Issue . . .

➔ we feature a dirge by Professor **Richard Weaver** of the University of Chicago on the emergence of a mass plutocracy. On the eve of the elections, the author of *Ideas Have Consequences* asks somberly whether the American people are as bad as one would deduce from a study of the rhetoric of their political leaders . . . And for those who expect a victory by Senator Kennedy we present a young man's views of the procedure President-Elect Kennedy will follow on the Day he Chooses His Cabinet. The parody is by **Robert Schuchman,** a student at the Yale Law School, and chairman of the newly-founded Young Americans for Freedom.

➔ **James Burnham** writes about the role of the UN in helping Lumumba, Moscow's man in the Congo, make his comeback . . . **Anthony Lejeune,** formerly editor of *Time & Tide,* now with Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express,* tells us probably not 10 per cent of the British population sympathize with Labor's Unilateralists who two weeks ago at Scarborough clamored for a genteel surrender to the Soviet Union . . . **Frank S. Meyer** digs down to find the philosophical meaning of the great debates between Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nixon, and notes that both men argued under the aspect of a single idea—contemporary American Liberalism, from which neither seems able to fight his way free . . . **Russell Kirk** tells hilariously of yet another hilarious extremity to which the educationists (this time in California) recently went.

➔ **Willmoore Kendall,** who is recovering in Madrid from a recent illness, writes about the startling new book on the American Negro by Nathaniel Weyl. Mr. Weyl, you may remember, came forward to corroborate Whittaker Chambers' charges against Alger Hiss. He had been a member of the same cell. He broke away in the middle 30s . . . **Vincent Miller** is a professor at Wofford College who reviews the reissue of Allen Tate's great novel, *The Fathers* . . . **Rodney Gilbert** calls attention to the new, short, and indispensable history of modern China by Professor David Rowe of Yale . . . And **Garry Wills,** having seen Sir Laurence Olivier star in Anouilh's *Becket,* suggests Sir Laurence be dis-knighted.

➔ And finally, we present with great pride our supplement, BEAR AND DRAGON. Conceived and edited by **James Burnham,** it is the most serious available examination of the relation between Moscow and Peking. Eight formidable scholars examine that relation, each in the perspective of his own scholarly discipline: and the result is an absorbing analysis which is bound to be useful to the nation's top strategists and political leaders. Extra copies are available at $1. Be sure to read the supplement, and to advertise its availability to anyone interested in the problem, which is to say everyone interested in world affairs . . . We shall report on our birthday party in the next issue—which will also comment on the new President of the United States.

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The WEEK

The Soviet Union and its satellites have served notice on the United Nations that they have no intention of paying their share of the cost of the UN's Congo operation. *Suggestion:* Why doesn't the United Nations, which is, after all, the greatest country club of them all, adopt the usual rules? A member who falls behind in dues will be posted. If he fails to pay up in fifteen days, he will be barred from the club's facilities.

● Prominent Republicans are privately urging Richard Nixon to name Congressman Walter H. Judd as Secretary of State, should he win the election. Others say he should make an announcement to that effect before the election; that by taking the initiative in such a way he would put pressure on Kennedy to name *his* choice for the post, and so face the disruptive Stevenson issue. The popular keynoter of the Republican National Convention would win over many staunch anti-Communist Catholics who are worried about the possibility of Kennedy's naming Stevenson to the post. A letter is being circulated among prominent persons, urging them to join the appeal behind "Walter Judd—doctor, medical missionary, legislator, statesman—[who] represents the very best our nation has to offer."

● On two of the most critical issues facing the American economy—featherbedding and automation—the West Coast waterfront employers have made a deal with Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen and Warehouse Workers Union that may become, for better or worse, a model for settlement in other industries. On the surface, at any rate, the terms define a hard-headed quid pro quo. The employers gain, or rather regain, freedom to set work rules in accord with efficiency of operation: *i.e.*, to eliminate featherbedding, archaic methods, and make-work. Within certain limits, they may install the new labor-saving machinery that has been developed for dockside use. In return, they will pay $27.5 million, over a five and a half year period, into an "automation fund." Although details have not been given, this money is supposed to be spent by the union to strengthen retirement and welfare funds, and to aid displaced workers. Since the employers obviously must believe that their saving, from the new methods and machines, will be more than enough to absorb the $27.5 million, this figure—for a single segment of one sector of the economy—gives some inkling of the colossal burden that featherbedding and obsolescent machinery impose on the economy as a whole: a burden which in this case is proved by the terms of the agreement to have resulted from the reactionary stand of monopoly unionism. The $27.5 million, even if defensible from a humane standpoint, is an added new cost diluting the benefits that the industry and the economy can derive from the new efficiency. It is not reassuring that this huge sum will be under the control of a man whose career proves that he normally puts the Kremlin's interests above America's.

● It appears that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has been scared off by Dr. Linus Pauling, who has refused to cooperate with it, having previously arranged for a full orchestration for his performance—full-page newspaper advertisements (signed by Liberals and pro-Communists, appearing cheek by jowl, as in the old days), editorials, columns, and the rest of it. Senator Thomas Dodd made an excellent answer to Dr. Pauling's charge that it was the intention of the investigating committee to visit reprisals on persons who had aided him in compiling the list of scientists who called for a suspension of nuclear tests. The Senator pointed out that the scientists' petition reflected, after all, the current views of the Administration. It is unlikely that a scientist will be harassed for having the same views as President Eisenhower (though he should be!). But then, strangely, Senator Dodd backed down. "Dr. Pauling has not committed contempt and the subcommittee has not discussed citing him for contempt." But Senator Dodd has himself pointed out that Dr. Pauling is in possession of information to which a duly constituted Senate committee charged with investigating Communist influence on American affairs has the right of access. The subcommittee is grievously mistaken in retreating from its duty merely because Dr. Pauling is a first-rate self-publicist. He is not immune from the law—again, as Senator Dodd himself pointed out—in virtue of his great scientific accomplishments. Either the subcommittee is or is not serious in desiring the information it has requested of Dr. Pauling. If it is not, it was inexcusable to have called Dr. Pauling in the first place.

● Last summer we accused Mayor George Christopher of San Francisco of yielding to the pressures of the Communist-led mob by denying future use of the City Hall to the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Mayor Christopher now writes that we misunderstood the meaning of his action, and we are glad to have his explanation. "I personally have high regard for the purposes of the Un-American Activities Committee and have so stated publicly. They will be welcome to come to San Francisco at any time and will receive our fullest protection

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in these public hearings, but certainly it is proper for the Mayor to suggest a more suitable location where public officials, as well as the general public, will not be endangered by falling down a flight of marble stairs [such as leads to the hearing room at City Hall] or otherwise being harmed. A Federal Government building should be used for these hearings so that . . . the willful rioters would then be subjected to Federal rather than only local prosecution. I am sure Communists would not so easily transgress on Federal properties for they are aware of the more severe penalties in a Federal Court."

● Nikita Khrushchev has never belonged to the "let the dust settle" school of diplomacy. The more dust the merrier, especially when it clogs up the eyes, ears and noses of his enemies. After an East River month of setting black clouds to swirl around "the colonial question," he has started blowing once more, from home base, on the thoroughly pulverized "German crisis." Never give a sucker a chance to catch his breath; now, while he is bogged down in the Congo, give him the old one-two on his eastern flank. In a talk with the West German Ambassador Hans Kroll, Khrushchev set April as this year's deadline for doing something about Germany. He can't wait beyond April to get Western agreement on a German treaty and Berlin. If the West doesn't respond—with a Summit meeting, it was suggested—he will have to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, and then (it was further suggested) the West may confront the choice of abandoning West Berlin or fighting for it. The West Germans have heard the words before, but the melody has changed to a more dulcet tune from the harsh notes about militarism, revanchism and resurgent Nazism that accompanied Kremlin utterances on the German problem for the past two years. This new sweetening of manner toward West Germany, interestingly enough, is in exactly inverse relation to the rapid souring of the Kremlin's attitude toward France. Last year Khrushchev wooed de Gaulle and denounced Adenauer. Today he begins to woo Adenauer as he ships tools and arms to the FLN in Algeria.

● It was a rather forlorn celebration of United Nations Day—October 24th, in case it's not red-lettered on your calendar—at Léopoldville's 40,000-seat stadium. Oh, the UN troops from Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mali and Ruritania were drawn up on the field, all right. Rajeshwar Dayal, Deputy Plenipotentiary of Generalissimo Dag Hammarskjold, was on hand to take what passed for the salute. The scores of UN flags—what patchwork quilts fly there!—were duly raised in the fetid air. Cleophas Kamitatu, Lumumba's sidekick who styles himself President of Léopoldville Province, sat in honor. But not many others sat with him in all those acres of seats. The drunken Congolese soldiery, raging, slashing and raping in the streets, did not permit their countrymen, such few as were indiscreet enough to try, to join their Liberators in the stadium. Even the Western ambassadors, watching the UN's stage-by-stage restoration of Moscow-backed Patrice Lumumba, found one pretext or another to sit it out at home.

● Senator Thomas Dodd has replied to Kenneth Tynan's charges (NR, October 22) that he was brutally used by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and don't we know better than to do such a thing to an Englishman? Mr. Tynan expressed outrage in *Harper's* Magazine at the suggestion that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, whose manifesto exonerating Castro he had signed, might have been a front for Castro himself; or, more broadly, for the Communist Party. Senator Dodd now reveals that the Fair Play committee's secretary, Miss Joanne Grant, "repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when . . . asked about her Communist affiliations and her associations with the Castro government." On other matters Senator Dodd accused Mr. Tynan of having "lapsed into the kind of fantasy that is difficult to explain on the basis of faulty recollection." Certain questions Mr. Tynan says he was asked by the committee were never put to him in any form, says the Senator. "Under ordinary circumstances, Mr. Tynan's testimony before the Subcommittee on Internal Security would probably not be published because it is admittedly fragmentary and inconclusive. Since Mr. Tynan has publicly broached the matter, however, I shall recommend that, in proper time, his testimony be printed together with all the other testimony on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee." Perhaps *Harper's* Magazine will print the relevant extracts from the Tynan testimony, to permit its readers to check the imagery of some of its poets against reality.

● American Telephone & Telegraph Company has applied to the Federal Communications Commission for permission to orbit a communications relay satellite system. The first commercial system will cost, the company figures, about $50 million—which is not so much when you learn that the company expects it to handle one hundred million overseas telephone calls per year by 1980. In an age when the unsettled Arctic and Antarctic belong to the United States Navy, and when all newly-born nations belong to Dag Hammarskjold, we are comforted to learn that private exploration is not dead. We just hope our cheer is not premature. Five hundred years ago, for instance, would the Maritime Commission have given a sailing permit to Columbus?

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Carey's Down

The outcome of the General Electric strike is being described as "a victory for the company." It is no less a victory for GE's employees, and for the nation. It is only James B. Carey, and his "brothers" (as they call themselves in ritual ceremonies) -in-bureaucracy, who have suffered a defeat. In that defeat as in the multiple victory, the rest of us have occasion to rejoice.

Carey's infuriated rhetoric—both the loudness and the coarseness of his tongue are legendary—is trying to project a picture of GE as a black-hearted Simon Legree, a union-busting employer crushing its starving slaves into whipped submission. No caricature could be more grotesque. It is important for other company managements as well as the public to understand that in its conduct of labor relations GE is turning the clock not back but notably forward. What happened in this encounter with the IUE is the result not of crude pigheadedness of the old Pullman and Homestead variety, but of sustained business statesmanship.

Shortly after the war, GE's management decided that it was not going to play the game that had become standard in labor relations circles. According to its accepted rules, there are three active players ("management," "labor," and "government") and three suckers (stockholders, employees, and public). "Management" pushes a phoney minimum contract onto the board. Labor calls for a phoney maximum contract. Management and labor "negotiate" furiously, with rapid-fire bulletins shot from both sides. "Government" steps in. Labor calls a phoney strike. Management "respects" the picket lines, and makes no attempt to operate. Grand Right and Left. Management, labor and government all join hands and dance in a square marked "compromise settlement." The active players get bonuses all around. Higher costs, lowered efficiency, declining profits and inflationary prices are tossed to the suckers.

The GE method has not been to refuse to negotiate or to repudiate collective bargaining, but rather to make labor relations and collective bargaining a continuous activity. Month by month, GE has acquainted its employees with the nature, problems and possibilities of the enterprise. In a sense it is continuously negotiating its successive labor contracts, in relation both to its own findings and to employee complaints and suggestions. Then, well before the date of a contract renewal, GE draws up a set of proposals stating just what it can offer on the basis of economic realities. The terms are circulated and explained to all employees.

This year's company offer, which included an immediate 3 per cent wage raise, with a second raise of 4 per cent due in 18 months, was remarkably favorable in the face of the mounting cost-price squeeze and a general business recession. The workers knew very well how favorable it was, and knew that GE wages were already at the top level of the scores of communities where GE plants are located. So in their majority the workers wanted to accept, and they opposed a strike. Carey, with the dictatorial arrogance that has become an occupational trait of labor bosses, used his control of the union's administrative apparatus to call the strike anyway. But within a few days, his members were voting against him with their feet. The Schenectady local, with 8,700 members, went back to work in a body, along with increasing percentages elsewhere. So Carey, grinding his teeth and cursing, signed up before his entire GE membership walked out on him.



"What you taxpayers fail to keep uppermost is that our government can't continue to penalize all the initiative and subsidize all the freeloading expected by a nation of this vast size and decadence, on peanuts!"

A single victory does not win a war. In this case there were special circumstances that militated in GE's favor: Carey's personal ineptitude; the presence of other unions (the IUE includes only a third of GE's employees); the psychological and economic effect of the recession and of GE's bulging inventory of appliances. Moreover, it would be an error to suppose that the GE method, which takes many years of effort and experience to bring off, can be duplicated by other managements merely by getting tough and refusing to budge. Nevertheless, the episode has proved that the acute problems posed for the economy and the nation by despotic monopoly unionism are not insoluble. In the degree that they are in fact solved, the nation as a whole, and its consumers and productive workers, will benefit.

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Let's Get Not Going!

When the subject of Cuba came up during the fourth television debate, Mr. Kennedy let go with a commendable vigor and announced in effect that it should be the resolve of the United States to bring down the government of Castro and that we should be prepared to devote all appropriate means to that end. Mr. Nixon replied with words that might have come out of the mouth of Adlai Stevenson. He called Kennedy reckless, and started to invoke, as reasons for doing nothing, all those barriers to purposeful national action which he and our major statesmen of the past two decades have labored so industriously to set up. What about the UN, he roared? And the OAS? And—we might add—the FCC, CIA, TVA, NSA and ADA?

What about the USA? If the Organization of American States is incapable of meeting such a menace to the American hemisphere as is posed by the Castro government, then it is a defective diplomatic instrument, and we should withdraw from it. We must not measure policy by how snugly it conforms to diplomatic convention; we must measure conventions by how well they serve the national policy. Will Mr. Nixon tell us in the days to come, if he is to serve us as President, that we cannot take steps anywhere in the world unless we win the man-

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There Is a Difference—Back Home

While conservatives can perhaps say there is not enough difference between the stands the two Presidential candidates take, it does not follow that "there is no difference between the parties." The following table, based on the study of the Americans for Constitutional Action, gives the voting record of each United States Senator. The percentage figure indicates the degree of conservatism for the individual. Republican names are in light type, and bold type indicates a Democratic senator. We believe the table speaks for itself.

Position	*%*	*Name*	*State*	*Position*	*%*	*Name*	*State*	*Position*	*%*	*Name*	*State*
1	99	Williams	Del.	33	58	Kuchel	Cal.	65	15	**Hill**	**Ala.**
2	98	Goldwater	Ariz.	34	**58**	**McClellan**	**Ark.**	66	13	**Young**	**Ohio**
3	93	Butler	Md.	35	57	Scott	Pa.	67	12	**Magnuson**	**Wash.**
4	93	Hruska	Neb.	36	54	Prouty	Vt.	68	12	**Muskie**	**Maine**
5	92	Bridges	N.H.	37	**53**	**Talmadge**	**Ga.**	69	12	**O'Mahoney**	**Wyo.**
6	**92**	**Byrd**	**Va.**	38	**51**	**Jordon**	**N.C.**	70	11	**Gore**	**Tenn.**
7	91	Curtis	Neb.	39	51	Smith	Maine	71	11	**Green**	**R.I.**
8	88	Cotton	N.H.	40	45	Young	N.D.	72	11	**Kennedy**	**Mass.**
9	87	Schoeppel	Kans.	41	**44**	**Ellender**	**La.**	73	11	**Sparkman**	**Ala.**
10	86	Dworshak	Idaho	42	44	Wiley	Wis.	74	11	**Williams**	**N.J.**
11	84	Bennett	Utah	43	43	Case	N.J.	75	10	**Engle**	**Cal.**
12	83	Hickenlooper	Iowa	44	**43**	**Ervin**	**N.C.**	76	10	**Johnson**	**Texas**
13	**81**	**Lausche**	**Ohio**	45	**38**	**Smathers**	**Fla.**	77	10	**Proxmire**	**Wis.**
14	**81**	**Robertson**	**Va.**	46	36	Aiken	Vt.	78	8	**Mansfield**	**Mont.**
15	79	Dirksen	Ill.	47	**33**	**Bible**	**Nev.**	79	8	**Randolph**	**W.Va.**
16	**78**	**Thurmond**	**S.C.**	48	33	Javits	N.Y.	80	6	**Church**	**Idaho**
17	77	Martin	Iowa	49	**33**	**Long**	**Hawaii**	81	6	**Kefauver**	**Tenn.**
18	74	Capehart	Ind.	50	**32**	**Anderson**	**N.Mex.**	82	6	**Yarborough**	**Texas**
19	73	Allott	Colo.	51	**30**	**Kerr**	**Okla.**	83	5	**Hartke**	**Ind.**
20	73	Mundt	S.D.	52	**29**	**Johnston**	**S.C.**	84	5	**Morse**	**Ore.**
21	72	Keating	N.Y.	53	27	Cooper	Ky.	85	5	**Murray**	**Mont.**
22	71	Case	S.D.	54	**27**	**Gruening**	**Alaska**	86	4	**Clark**	**Pa.**
23	69	Saltonstall	Mass.	55	**26**	**Fulbright**	**Ark.**	87	4	**Moss**	**Utah**
24	67	Bush	Conn.	56	**23**	**Byrd**	**W.Va.**	88	4	**McCarthy**	**Minn.**
25	67	Morton	Ky.	57	**23**	**Dodd**	**Conn.**	89	4	**Symington**	**Mo.**
26	63	Carlson	Kans.	58	**21**	**Bartlett**	**Alaska**	90	3	**Hennings**	**Mo.**
27	**62**	**Eastland**	**Miss.**	59	**21**	**Chavez**	**N.Mex.**	91	2	**Carroll**	**Colo.**
28	**62**	**Frear**	**Del.**	60	**20**	**Cannon**	**Nev.**	92	1	**Humphrey**	**Minn.**
29	**61**	**Russell**	**Ga.**	61	**18**	**Monroney**	**Okla.**	93	1	**Jackson**	**Wash.**
30	60	Beall	Md.	62	**17**	**Pastore**	**R.I.**	94	0	**Hart**	**Mich.**
31	**60**	**Stennis**	**Miss.**	63	**16**	**Hayden**	**Ariz.**	95	0	**McGee**	**Wyo.**
32	58	**Holland**	**Fla.**	64	**15**	**Douglas**	**Ill.**	96	0	**McNamara**	**Mich.**

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date of the nations that compose the General Assembly? Will he cavil, for fear of displeasing the cannibals of the Upper Volta, who may one day cast the critical vote in the United Nations?

Alas, we cannot count on Mr. Kennedy to translate his intuitive response to Castro's latest aggressions into effective American policy should *he* become President. Already he has been chastised by Walter Lippmann, in behalf of the brotherhood of appeasement, who has said to him, in almost as many words, "Look here Jack boy, you made a silly mistake in suggesting unilateral action, and I'm prepared to overlook it. But don't let it happen again." By the time President Kennedy's program for Cuba filters through his ideological entourage, it will come out as a program of Free Housing for all Cubans who were anti-Batista.

But it was a fine moment Senator Kennedy had.

What It Means to Be Pago Pagonese

Mr. L. K. Pollard, an official of the Ray-O-Vac company of Madison, Wisconsin, received a letter the other day from Mr. M. J. Sentor, Director of Education in American Samoa, a U.S. possession since 1899. Mr. Sentor informed Mr. Pollard that the Department of Education in Samoa was interested in sending bright students to the United States for college and graduate study in order to train them for teaching or administrative jobs upon their return to Samoa. One student from Pago Pago had received a tuition scholarship from Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin, but would be unable to accept it unless $1,000 could be raised to cover his travel and living expenses during his stateside schooling. (American Samoa is administered by the Department of the Interior which does not receive funds for projects of this kind.)

A foundation with which Mr. Pollard is connected was not—under its charter—able to give any assistance to the Samoan authorities, but Mr. Pollard was genuinely concerned with the problem. It occurred to him that since Wisconsin's two senators, Alexander Wiley and William Proxmire, are ardent supporters of the programs for educating Americans abroad, or foreigners here, at the expense of the federal government, they might turn their attention to the plight of the Pago Pagonese. So he wrote them.

Senator Wiley acknowledged Mr. Pollard's letter (which Senator Proxmire has not done) and wrote the State Department, too. In due course, Mr. Pollard received a letter from a Mr. John S. Hoghland, 2d, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, which contained the following information:

The legislation covering the government's educational and cultural exchange programs provides funds to enable U.S. citizens to study abroad (at the graduate level) and citizens of foreign countries to study in the United States. But since the Samoans are American nationals, but not citizens, they do not come under any provision of the law. Even if granted U.S. citizenship, Mr. Hoghland points out, they would be eligible only to receive funds to study somewhere else, not in the United States.

In order to get a prepaid higher education, the Samoans would seem to be faced with two alternatives: a) lobby for U.S. citizenship, or b) (and better still), mount an independence movement, set up as a free nation under United Nations sponsorship, and then get in line behind the Republic of the Congo for U.S. educational grants.

Mr. Pollard did not deem it advisable to suggest either of these alternatives to Mr. Sentor. But he was also considerate enough not to forward to Pago Pago a hefty pamphlet Mr. Hoghland had enclosed with his letter, entitled: "Two Decades of Government-Sponsored Cultural Relations." It might have seemed the unkindest cut of all to the gentleman who had closed his initial letter with the words—"kind regards from Pago Pago."

Ignore the Girls?

In the brouhaha over the relative sartorial achievements of Jackie and Pat we think we detect a sly and humorous conceit of the public mind. Is it possible that the public, having concluded that there is naught to be gained in attempting to differentiate between Jack and Dick, has turned its attention to the tickets' better halves?

The wives of politicians have after all always exerted an influence on the public life. One thinks, happily, of Portia and of Calpurnia; of Pompadour and Du Barry, whether happily or not, one is entitled to think; of Dolly Madison and Martha Washington in the golden years of our republic; after 1932, somehow, one thinks of Lady Macbeth; certainly we think differently of Ike because of Mamie. Even when the politician's wife refrains from overt participation in public affairs (and for the highest achievement in this line we gladly applaud good Bess), still the voter learns something about the man from a look at his spouse.

For a man's public conduct cannot be other than an immensely magnified copy of his private life, and the man's spouse stands as a symbol of his private conduct. The voting public, made up for the most part of millions and millions of spouses, surely knows

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that it is no small achievement for a man to woo and win a lady and then keep her happy for thirty years. It surely knows how a man's view of life expands when he undertakes to rear a virtuous child and maintain an orderly home. If there is a connection between a man's decent home life and his honorable public service, there is a still closer connection between indecent private behavior and unreliable public behavior. The mobs loved Mirabeau as much for his rhetoric as for his lechery, and both the mobs and Mirabeau got what they deserved.

We hope the American voter will continue this sane and salutary practice of admitting a man's private behavior into his calculations on Election Day.

Joseph Welch, RIP

We had meant to lay off Joseph Welch, for whom we wish eternal peace; but the obituary writers and the ideologues will not let us do so. If we let go by their rendition of the greatness of Mr. Welch, we shall have acquiesced in the launching of a myth; and one of the functions of NATIONAL REVIEW is to stand in the way of the mythmakers.

We are told that Mr. Welch's opposition to Senator McCarthy during the Army investigation was a historical act of courage. That is the sheerest nonsense. Welch was picked to do a lawyer's job. The Army could have had almost anyone it chose; indeed, almost anyone would have loved so flashy an assignment. In 1954, McCarthy was the villain, not the hero, of the ruling class, the class, *i.e.*, that most lawyers are pleased to serve. Mr. Welch was well qualified, for he had a sense of theater which matched McCarthy's own, a flair so obvious that Hollywood later put it to good use, thus giving all moviegoers great pleasure, and Mr. Welch both pleasure and profit—indeed, for Joseph Welch the collision with McCarthy turned out to be something on the order of hitting Treasure Island.

That flair caused Mr. Welch to make deftly his choice of weapons. McCarthy's voice had begun to rasp, he noted; and so he hewed the line of gentility, providing a sharp theatrical relief. On the celebrated encounter, in which Mr. Welch informed the Senator that he could never find it in his heart to forgive him the slur on the young lawyer associated with Mr. Welch's firm, we pronounce: Horsefeathers. If Mr. Welch was so sensitive to cruel visitations upon a man's character or background (McCarthy had reminded Welch that one of his own associates had belonged to the Communist-run National Lawyers Guild) he might have shown consistency by publicly identifying himself—as for instance did columnist Murray Kempton—as horrified by the excesses which were being directed against the Senator and his associates. At the time Mr. Welch expressed himself as forever unforgiving to Senator McCarthy, he was associated gladly with men who had publicly charged the Senator with taking up the cause of Cohn and Schine because of unusual sexual appetites.

We say: Welch was a good lawyer, politically deft, morally undistinguished: an entertainer, primarily. We are sorry to see him go, but his name should be remembered in our houses of entertainment, not in our tabernacles.

A Political Lexicon

Civil Rights. Certain claims to special privilege made on behalf of social minorities, with one exception: when a national minority is locally in the majority, then the claims are advanced on behalf of the local majority.

Clean Politics. Any speech not based upon fact.

Conservatism. A political philosophy placing emphasis on fiscal soundness, economic growth, human rights, civil rights, and states rights. Opposed to Liberalism (see below).

Containment. Policy of containing our military forces within predetermined geographical boundaries.

Dynamic Policy. Any policy not directly related to the matter at hand.

Farm Problem. Situation in which the federal government buys more food than it can eat. Usually blamed on farmers.

Human Being. Any poor person. Opposed to vested interests.

Human Rights. Certain claims to special privilege made on behalf of poor persons.

Liberalism. A political philosophy placing emphasis on fiscal soundness, economic growth, human rights, civil rights, and states rights. Opposed to Conservatism.

Principle. Any doctrine not likely to win approval at the polls.

Race, color, creed. A formula for testing the existence of a minority whose rights are not based on race, color, creed. The formula is not used on majorities.

Vested Interests. Property owners. Not human beings (see above).

War. Social condition in which nations use military force to achieve narrow, cowardly and unimaginative goals. Not indulged in by nations with broad, bold and dynamic (see above) goals.

W.F. RICKENBACKER

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For the Record

Republicans confident they will score net gain in House no matter what happens in Presidential race....Gallup says 2 per cent more Americans undecided on Presidential contest in mid-October than in late September (Great Debates or no Great Debates)....What about size of Catholic vote? About one in four voters is a Catholic, but Catholics tend to vote more regularly than other groups; Catholics are concentrated geographically....Newspaper polls in South Carolina show voters favoring Nixon 3-1. Local Democrats bitter that Senator Strom Thurmond has not endorsed national ticket....Henry Wallace refused to endorse either candidate but gives Nixon backhand support. Kennedy victory, says Wallace, would mean 50 per cent higher food prices.... Hubert Humphrey, who was leading his Republican opponent, Kenneth Peterson, by 20 points in August, holds two-point lead in latest Minnesota straw poll.... Lyndon Johnson's new slogan, say Texans, is: "Have fence, will straddle."

The CIA, says a prominent Cuban anti-Communist exile, looks favorably on two anti-Castro groups in Florida which are infiltrated by secret Communists.... Dominican businessmen in New York predict Trujillo will fall within six months; claim he will be replaced by violently anti-U.S. regime....U.S. firms in Venezuela fear Communist coup there; many studying problem of withdrawal.

Chiang Kai-shek had planned to fly to New York to address General Assembly. Decided not to when Quemoy, Matsu became campaign issue on grounds he did not want to interfere in U.S. domestic politics....At Chicago meeting of SANE (nuclear disarmament outfit) resolution was adopted stating no agreement on cessation of tests would be effective without "People's China." ....Chairman McCone of Atomic Energy Commission says he can think of no reason for recent major explosions in Soviet Union which Russia has described as "chemical explosions." McCone hints they could be nuclear tests. A second AEC member feels sure they are.

Muckracking? Governor Nelson Rockefeller pulled up first load of dirt in Hudson River bridge-building ceremony.

Memo:

From our Harlem Correspondent

Harlem's Hotel Theresa, rapidly replacing Arden House's American Assembly as a High Policy forum, was recently the scene of still another pilgrimage. While a cadre of Elijah Muhammad's black Muslims (a kind of Koon Klux Klan) hawked their leader's wares among the spectators, Robert Wagner, Soapy Williams, Carmine De Sapio, Billy Eckstine, Averell Harriman, Hulan Jack, and (to be sure) Mrs. Roosevelt made the scene to do honor unto both the Reverend Adam Clayton Powell Jr. and Senator John F. Kennedy, in that order. Although the latter pilgrim was officially there to address a hastily-gathered affair called "Senator John F. Kennedy's National Conference of Constitutional Rights and American Freedom," the Senator's real purpose was to anchor down the Harlem vote. But after Castro, Khrushchev, Nehru, Kadar, Nasser and Tito, not to mention Cabot Lodge, who had a few nights before promised a Negro in the Cabinet, Senator Jack's appearance at the Theresa was something of an anti-climax, and the show was all Powell's.

The Reverend never disappoints a crowd turned out to hear its spiritual leader in action. Alternately thundering at and sweet-talking his audience, Adam Powell gave the kind of performance that only he can give. The crux of his case was that Dick Nixon had failed to repudiate an endorsement by the Florida Ku Klux Klan, and had voted against FEPC, federal housing, and raising the minimum wage. But what really got Adam's goat was a document he had unearthed—"Don't ask me how. I got it"—purporting to be a restrictive covenant in which Dick and Pat Nixon promised not to sell their house to a "Negro or any member of the Semitic race, including Armenians, Jews, Hebrews, Syrians and Persians." (No Medes?)

Denouncing "Dick" as The Great Pretender, Powell sat down to a big hand all around. Jack then introduced his wife, who had been primed with a few pleasant inanities including something in Spanish about "*mi esposo.*" After Adam Clayton Powell (not to mention Fidel Castro), neither Jacqueline nor Jack—who discussed Emerging Africa, American Prestige, and New Frontiers —looked very exciting. The one bright spot in the candidate's remarks was a sententious *gaffe* having to do with how many children in Africa were named after Adam Clayton Powell, which drew chuckles all around. (The Reverend has quite a rep as a Lothario.) Tripping down from the platform, Kennedy was off for another short stop in Harlem, a few blocks down from the Theresa, where he sat in with Harry Belafonte. (At no time was there any sign of Kennedy campaign adviser Sammy Davis Jr.)

Meanwhile, back at the plantation, Billy Eckstine regaled the audience with "People [*sic*] All Work on the Mis-sis-sippi." There was somewhat more enthusiasm for "Mr. B." in Harlem than there was for Kennedy —who will, if he does carry Harlem, be heavily in debt to Adam Powell (a most Imperious Wizard, De Luxe Plan).

Q.

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

but she set the production record

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

At the Crack of Khrushchev's Whip

JAMES BURNHAM

Patrice Lumumba proves to have nine political lives, like a political cat—a jungle cat, of course. He falls, drops, or is thrown, time and again, from his swaying vine, but he always lands on his feet.

How can this be? Lumumba is Moscow's Man in the Congo, is he not? The UN, Dag Hammarskjold commanding, is in charge of the Congo, isn't it? The UN entered the Congo to preserve independence, peace, neutrality . . . to prevent its becoming "a pawn in the Cold War." St. George UN thwarted the Red Dragon from gobbling up the Congo, drove out the Dragon's agents. The Dragon smoked and roared at UN headquarters, demanded Dag's head. . . . So, at any rate, goes the story they tell around the TV campfires.

NATIONAL REVIEW, which is often compelled to prick these popular fancies with a spoilsport pin, explained a good many weeks ago how the UN and its Secretary General, though seemingly locked in bitter battle with Moscow, were at the same time being exploited by Moscow as tools. "Even granted the best will in the world on the part of the UN secretariat," we wrote, "the UN mode of intervention could not avoid aiding Lumumba."

Marriage of Convenience

1. Patrice Lumumba has indeed been Moscow's man: not that there is a total commitment either on his part or Moscow's, but in the very practical sense that each has seen the other as the best bet under the circumstances. Lumumba judged Communist support to be his surest boost to a consolidation of his own power. The Communists, reciprocally, judged Lumumba an easy, though by no means indispensable, channel for the penetration of Central Africa.

Thus, the terms for a marriage of convenience have been present. In the Congo itself, in the UN and on a world scale, the Communists have given Lumumba every sort of aid: arms, pilots, trucks, planes, technicians, money, propagandists, and a diplomatic barrage. Lumumba, from his side, appointed Party agents as ministers and aides. He consulted with the Soviet and Czech missions until these temporarily withdrew. The letters discovered in his briefcase during his three-hour arrest by Mobutu—only one of them (the letter from Nkrumah) published in this country, though the text of all of them was printed in Léopoldville—prove that he has been collaborating deliberately with the Kremlin.

2. It is a fact that the UN operations have aided Lumumba. The UN accepted Lumumba as the legitimate ruler. His prestige was polished by a triumphal personal reception at UN headquarters. In the field, UN help was poured through him. He was allowed to distribute the UN food and money, and to "confiscate" UN planes. And his opponents, in particular Moise Tshombe, were prevented from building independent political bases.

After the break between Lumumba and President Kasavubu and the subsequent attempt of Mobuto—a nationalist, but Christian and friendly to the West—to set up an emergency regime based on his army and the college-graduate commission, the UN's Lumumba-bias continued. Lumumba would have disappeared long ago if he had not been protected, physically and politically, by the UN troops and policies. He would have been arrested, sentenced, quite probably executed, perhaps eaten for breakfast by his opponents. Or he would have been assassinated—indeed, it is a foolish, or cowardly, oversight on the part of his opponents that he has not been. The UN guard's bias was openly symbolized by its habit of intervening physically to protect Lumumba and his followers from assault, but standing quietly aside while they carried out their mayhems on others. The UN guard, usually of Ghanaian and Guinean troops, gave Lumumba sanctuary, allowed him to continue political activity, confounded his enemies, while supporting his friends (like Kamikatu), and enabled him to prepare his comeback.

Hammarskjold and Lumumba

But why has the UN acted so, on behalf of Moscow's man, Lumumba?

3. Lumumba's political party (the Congolese National Party) is the only one in the Congo that professes (not altogether accurately) to stand on a non-tribal foundation for a non-tribal, centralized, "modern" nation. This immediately makes Lumumba and the CNP the choice of all the progressive ideologues of the UN, the Western nations (including the United States), and the native African Liberators. You have got to have a "modern nation," don't you, these days, not a federation that would take tribal divisions into account? Even though, it seems, a federation might be far better adapted both to the realities of the region and the interests of the West. And maybe Lumumba can be bought.

4. Most leaders of the ex-colonial countries, and especially the more strenuous African leaders—Nkrumah, Touré, Nasser, Mboya—look on Lumumba as the symbol of Congolese anti-colonialism, Liberation, etc.; and almost all of these leaders are suspicious of, when not actively hostile to, the great Western powers. Now these attitudes, combined with the shrewdly focused Communist billingsgate, bring it about that Dag Hammarskjold's political fate has become intertwined with Patrice Lumumba's. Dag can prove his "neutrality," can demonstrate to his UN constituents that he is not, as Khrushchev shouted, "a tool of the West," only if Patrice Lumumba comes out on top in the Congo.

As an addendum, let us observe that for the West the correct political alternative to this road to defeat was, as NATIONAL REVIEW pointed out at the beginning, firm support to Moise Tshombe, and the construction of a federated Congolese nation around Katanga plus southern Kasai as center of gravity. But this would have required "unilateral action outside the framework of the UN"? Quite.

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Mass Plutocracy

Nobody knows how to be poor any more, the author observes. It isn't wealth, but the preoccupation with it, that is denaturing the American character.

RICHARD M. WEAVER

In the course of some rambling about the country, and in response to the generally deteriorating news from the various political fronts, I have been moved to ask more than once, What *is* the matter?

My deepest suspicion is that the American people as a whole have now adopted (or perhaps it would be fairer to them to say they have been given) the qualities and the outlook of a plutocracy. Plutocracy is defined in its root meaning as the rule by those having wealth. Interpreted slightly, it means rule through the power of money. Some nations have at some stages in their history been ruled by classes whose chief claim to distinction was their wealth. The character of this kind of rule is viewed very skeptically by classical political science. When Solon was forced to undertake the reform of the Athenian state, things having arrived at an impasse, one of the significant steps he took was to ban luxury. He did not try to make everyone equally opulent; his reform was in the direction of insisting upon a certain plainness of life even among those who had it to spend. Luxury, we infer, he regarded as something politically harmful. His idea was to press down from the top, so that there would be no examples of extravagance and high living to excite the emulation of the commonalty.

The solution of our political wise men is precisely the contrary of Solon's. It is to make everyone a plutocrat and to enable everyone to engage in the display of luxury. They begin at the other end, not with the tempering of desire, but with the satisfaction and even the artificial inflation of desire. A principle that was inherited from Greece and was spiritualized by Christianity has been thrown to the winds. Evidently we are in a new world.

In looking for the root of our trouble, let us remember that a rich man is not necessarily a plutocrat. Plutocratism is a state of mind and a moral outlook which in the past some men of wealth have evinced and some have not. A man of wealth need not be plutocratic in his thinking. The plutocrat is distinguished not by the possession of money but by belief in its talismanic power. To him money is the axis on which the world turns. He trusts it to bring security and happiness almost automatically. And trusting in it this way, he believes that little if anything else is needed. We must be clear upon the point that some men of wealth are too intelligent to be plutocratic in their outlook, whereas men of little wealth and little sense may easily be so. The existence of individuals of large private means can be a good thing for society, and even a few genuine plutocrats may do no very extensive harm. But the situation changes when the mentality of a whole society, from top to bottom, becomes plutocratic.

Postwar Delusion

There are many signs to show that the plutocratic mentality has spread tremendously in this country since the Second World War. Unless I misread the evidence here is the greatest danger to the American nation today. Its values and judgments, from the millionaire at the top to the little fellow at the bottom who is struggling to meet his monthly payments to the loan company, are to a large extent tinctured with plutocratism. This fact alone explains many of the discouraging aspects of our foreign and domestic politics.

The evil may well have begun at the top, for the most marked symptoms of a virulent plutocratism appear in our foreign aid programs. Since the Second World War, in one form and another, and often in response to statesmanlike-sounding appeals and propaganda campaigns and fanfare we have poured out many billions of dollars. It has gone all over the world, for this and for that, and the defense has been that it is buying peace and security. My complaint is not against the sacrifice to Americans, but against the main strand of thinking which seems to underlie the great donation.

Almost the whole of the lend-and-give-away program looks unmistakably like the reverie of the plutocrat, who feels sure that money will do all, so that the harder ways of effecting ends need not be bothered with. Money has been thrown up as a barrier against military menace and ideological penetration. Look at it as you will, the governing assumption has been that we can win friends and make the indifferent love us by the inducement of money. Now it is perfectly true that loans, subsidies, and bribes have from ancient times been used effectively in diplomacy and war. They have been used to buy neutrality, to equip allies in need, to supply the sinew for struggle where that was wanting. But in practically all cases these were specific grants for specific purposes, which could be noted as fulfilled or not. It was hardheaded policy, which got the respect that hardheadedness receives in business and war.

Now the giving seems to be in the spirit of largesse. The money is bestowed not for doing something, but for doing nothing. It is conceived as a sort of blanket pacifier. Often the claim to the benefit is regarded not as something to be earned but as a right existing initially. The old axioms of statecraft that there is no such thing as gratitude between nations (*n.b.* Russia and China today fifteen years after their rescue from the Germans and the Japanese), that

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you cannot buy friends though you may buy services and that the real safety of a nation lies in its ability to command respect and not in its ability to buy off robbers and blackmailers have been surrendered in favor of the plutocratic delusion. A clique of post-New Dealers and New Republicans with great means at its disposal but out of touch with history, and therefore with reality, has inaugurated a new mode of insuring the nation's safety.

It is frightening to realize how many of our policies of the most important and far-reaching kind are being predicated upon a thinking which is thus narrow. Most of the "aid" phase of our foreign effort is based upon the supposition, and tends to further encourage at home the supposition, that if we will but feed, house, and clothe the world, the world will become amiable, and we will not even have problems to worry about. Of the exponents of this type of thinking Nelson Rockefeller seems to be the most fatuous. Now he has broached a scheme for an Inter-American Housing Authority, the object of which will be to provide every Latin American with decent housing in the North American sense. This is being put forward as a foundation for hemispheric solidarity. It is the politics of subsidy again, without the necessary element of knowledge and realism. Some years ago Professor William S. Stokes wrote a remarkable article entitled "The Drag of the Pensadores" in which he demonstrated that the reason the Latin American countries are behind the United States industrially is not that they are too poor or too illiterate or too unstable politically; it is simply that industrialism does not consort with the way of life which cultivated Latin Americans—who are among the most cultivated people in the world—envisage as the best for man. The whole trend and emphasis of their culture is in more aesthetic, more hedonistic directions. There is no assurance in history that industrialism and its kind of prosperity would make them any happier or any more inclined to love us. I think of the expression of *wantlessness* which I once saw in Mexico on the face of a peasant in from the hills. There is dignity in that too. And I think of what Japan did with industrialism about fifty years after the Western nations had made her an almost enforced gift of it.

Some while ago I was discussing a problem not unrelated to this with a college professor, and a professor of English, of all people. Without flourish or ado, he injected into the discussion this question: "Can you think of any business class in history which has ever tried to do anything except pay off when it felt itself threatened?" The question came like a judgment. When I tried, I could not think of such a class, though I muttered something about not everything having been seen yet and the possibility that businessmen too could be educated. But the evidence was on the other side—the mass give-away programs of the last decade and a half, and on the domestic front the timidity of businessmen about putting up any kind of theoretical opposition to creeping socialization. Let the state take its 52 per cent of the profits, the mood seems to be; we can live with that sort of arrangement and still have a good bit left. The thought that a government which takes 52 per cent of the profits is in effect a 52 per cent owner is not raised in the form of an issue of principle.

Political Thought Excluded

All of this is connected with the way in which at home issues have been withdrawn from politics. The revealing character of the plutocratic mentality is that it avoids like the plague solutions which require other than plutocratic thinking. It is a very current complaint, needing no reiteration here, that there are no longer any real differences between the two major parties. The old clashes over substantive alternatives are no more; both parties are so nearly for the same things that the voter looking for a reason for his choice is lucky if he can find as much as a distinction of emphasis. The explanation is that both parties are now dominated by a plutocratic element (and this is the element which was so anxious to get rid of Taft) which has insisted upon retiring these matters from discussion so that both can try to win the electorate by the plutocratic method of bribery; that is, by promising every group everything right out of the federal treasury. What is being done on the international scene is thus being done on the domestic scene in other forms and guises. The sclerosis which has attacked political thinking and traditional party controversy has its origin in the belief that if enough money is offered, people will be placated, and this is the new science of politics.

I have many times read newspaper articles about candidates, frequently hundreds of words in length and obviously intended to describe and introduce the candidate to the public, in which there was not a single phrase to indicate what the man stood for or believed in. His parentage, his children, his education, his lodge membership, his hobbies, and perhaps his nominal Republican or Democratic affiliation, but as for what the man thought positively about policy in these days of complexity and crisis—nothing. As far as one could infer from the story, the writer considered that an irrelevance. Or perhaps he merely thought it would be boring to the readers. And indeed political candidates today are of the faceless type. A stencil has been prepared. The candidate must be "youthful" (why not older and presumably wiser?), handsome or at least personable (what has happened to the unhandsome, gnarled, or hardbitten type, whose very angularity of feature was thought to express character and firmness of conviction?), "forward-looking" (toward what?), and "liberal" or at least "moderate," which is the utmost concession made toward recognizing a conservatism of principle. It is an empty type, far more suggestive of the entertainment world than of that world where life and death problems furrow brows and through which geniality is not the passkey. Small wonder the writer of the story does not ask him his politics; it would be like asking a popular band leader to declare himself in the midst of a program. The plutocratic mind is not looking for issues, and the politician can not afford to be a square.

The most insidious inroads of the plutocratic habit of mind, however, are in the world of education. Increasingly we have been propagandized to the effect that money is the cure-all for what ails our schools. Bigger and more elaborate plants, higher salaries, and more gadgetry

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seem to spell for educators and politicians alike the remedy for what are quite serious educational shortcomings. Now this has its evil fruit in the campaign to put education on the federal payroll. Once there, the problems of the educationists, as they visualize them, will be solved, for it will be impossible ever to get it off again. People have got to realize that federal aid to education is inevitable, one educator recently remarked smugly in a public address, because only the federal government has adequate taxing power. There we are in on a secret. The fact that a proliferation of what are called facilities is already in many instances getting in the way of true educational accomplishment makes no impression upon these brethren. Education too has learned how to featherbed.

Education's Purpose Missed

The same tendencies are showing up in the thinking of students, for it is no longer the style to look upon the period of education as a time when the body lives abstemiously so that the mind can be active. Recently an official of the University of Texas declared that while it would be possible to plan for a university that would accommodate 40,000 students, it would not be possible to plan for one that would accommodate 40,000 automobiles. Recently also I saw a study made in a high school showing the correlation between academic performance and ownership of or access to an automobile. The correspondence was perfect; the students who had little or no access to an automobile made the highest marks; those who had one at their disposal made the lowest, with the intermediate marks being distributed *pro rata.*

Then one thinks of the time much less than a century ago when in the colleges, and in the academies too, the students rose at six o'clock, made their own fires, washed in cold water, and marched off to face a curriculum composed of Greek, Latin, and mathematics, with English and history as the lighter subjects, and one begins to smell rottenness again. The idea that Mark Hopkins at one end of a pine bench and a student at the other can constitute a university is not part of the plutocratic consciousness.

Thus the educators are beginning at the wrong end just as are our social engineers. It used to be axiomatic that education concerns what inheres in the mind and the personality. The relationship of things to these was incidental and peripheral. The purpose of education was acknowledged to be the enlargement of the capacities of the individual, for which some discipline, self-regulation, and even self-denial were considered necessary. Now considered necessary is a mounting pile of things which obscure the true role of education as a regimen. Qualities may be a source of discomfiture in that they remind us that we do not have them or do not have them in enough measure. But it is treason to the very idea of education to be complacent toward the pupil as he is. I realize that much of this has come in via the road of progressive education, but not a little can be blamed upon the accumulation of material comforts and the belief that these somehow ought to take the pain out of education. Students have been encouraged to feel that there are many things of the material kind which have a rightful claim to large allocations of their attention. My simple query is, what can be the fate of discipline and concentration in these circumstances? The flabbiness which has overtaken so much of our cultural life has its source in the neglect of those matters which appertain most closely to character. Character develops in response to inner and outer checks, and a check is always in the form of a negative. But in the new climate of yea-saying to all wants, negatives are not popular.

"Well, it's no crime to be poor," I heard a lady observe a good many years ago. This proposition is now definitely dated. Only lately I saw in a leading woman's magazine an article which was one long commiseration with the people of the Southern mountains because their annual income is considerably below the national average. The author was going all out to be friendly and sympathetic, but it was evident that the crime of the Southern hillmen was being relatively poor, and of course something must be done about crime! When I thought of the traditional qualities of these people—their pride and independence, their dislike of being beholden to anyone and especially to the government, their sturdy love of country, their contempt for danger, and the contributions they have made to our martial history from Davy Crockett to Alvin York—and then thought of what he wanted to do to them, I felt a sense of outrage. The intention was well-meaning but the assumption was blind; a saccharine plutocratic Liberalism was out to conquer one of our last strongholds of virility and individualism. Jacob Burckhardt, who discerned in the nineteenth century so many things which have grown to plague us in the twentieth, summed it up this way: "Nobody knows how to be poor any more."

The Economic Obsession

It is odd how in these plutocratic dreams both at home and abroad we seem to have assimilated unconsciously one or more of the premises of our great enemy. Philosophically the most basic tenet of the Communists is that economic activity is the primary activity; ideas and institutions are little more than epiphenomena, bubbles cast up by the stream of economic process. Therefore all effective thinking about human affairs starts from this and in fact never leaves it. Any event is referable to an underlying economic situation, and is indeed contained by it and explained through it. Consequently if we attend to economic wants, all other things will be given to us. Our only difference is that we say capitalism, with the aid of a lot of state management, can achieve the same goal. The difference for the Soviets is that they have their perverted idealism to give them a perverse strength. They are not surfeited with goods, and the prospect of their world crusade produces tonicity instead of flabbiness.

The question becomes one of survival. The choice lies between assuming that a plethora of goods will prepare a nation for victory in struggle, and assuming that the development of qualities—what the Romans comprehended in their word *virtus*—is not and never will be dispensable. The oracles of secular Liberalism and statism have concluded that the simple broadcast of wealth is the answer to life's challenges. Our mas-

(Continued on p. 290)

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Letter from London

Britain and the Bomb

ANTHONY LEJEUNE

If I were an American with a moment to spare from the Presidential elections, I'm sure I should be feeling considerably worried about recent events in Britain. The most spectacular of these events was, of course, the Labor Party conference. It seems to mean that Britain's Opposition Party, the alternative government which might theoretically come into power at any time has declared for immediate unilateral nuclear disarmament and the abolition of American bases; an alarming enough prospect in all conscience. It isn't actually as bad as that. For one thing, the Party conference cannot commit the Parliamentary Labor Party, and the majority of Labor Members of Parliament are certainly not "unilateralists." And the decisions of the Party conference are themselves arrived at in a very odd way. The results are determined by "block votes" wielded by the trade union leaders in proportion to the size of their unions. Which way the block vote shall be cast has itself already been decided by small groups of trade union politicians meeting in secret: the members are not consulted. So the real significance of this unilateralist vote remains highly doubtful.

What cannot be in doubt is its shattering effect on the Labor Party as a political entity. The quarrel about nuclear weapons is only one aspect of the great rift which has now unmistakably appeared: a rift between the Marxist side of the Party and those who are merely Social Democrats. No single party can honestly contain such incompatible elements. And no party which tries to do so can possibly be fit to govern. People have begun to realize this.

But, though the Socialists' chance of power is still receding most satisfactorily, this kind of performance is undeniably worrying. Nor is it an isolated phenomenon. When NATO Supreme Commander General Norstad tried to address a meeting in Coventry, he was howled down by hooligans shouting "Ban the bomb" slogans and stamping their feet on the floor. Only a few days before, that elderly *enfant terrible,* Bertrand Russell, announced a campaign of civil disobediance in favor of nuclear disarmament.

How serious is all this? How widespread is the pacifism or fellow traveling or sheer woolly thinking which the agitators are trying to exploit? I can't tell you. Nobody knows. But there are pointers.

The Working Man's View

We can be sure, I think, that the cause of nuclear disarmament is in no sense a spontaneous working class movement. In many ways the British working class stands to the right, not only of the left-wing Socialists, but of the left-wing conservatives. Your typical British working man heartily supported the government over Suez; has no wish to grant equality to Africans, and retains an old-fashioned prejudice in favor of keeping Britain powerful. In a recent poll of working class newspaper readers, over 90 per cent wanted to keep nuclear weapons as long as Russia had them, and a sizable number wanted to keep them even if Russia abandoned them.

Many trade unionists are very worried about the use to which the block vote system is being put. Frank Cousins, the arch-unilateralist, seems more interested in power politics than in down-to-earth trade union affairs: and his politics are not theirs. During a holiday in Yugoslavia he expressed his admiration for the Yugoslav system of nationalization, which means state ownership of every business employing more than five people. Not many of the members of his own union would want that.

In the London district of St. Pancras, I saw last month the worst rioting I have ever seen in England, with cars overturned, barricades, police baton charges and broken heads. The organizers were Communists and professional agitators. But it had nothing to do with banning the bomb. It was a protest against an attempt to reduce the subsidy enjoyed by tenants of council-owned apartments. The mob was young and ugly; this was the bad side of the British working class; but it was specifically not the sort of mob that marches regularly to the rocket base at Aldermaston. The St. Pancras rent rioters would have felt entirely out of place among the schoolmasters and students, the beards and the blue jeans.

The danger comes, then, not from any broad-based feeling among the British people but from a nucleus of Marxist politicians and agitators working inside a large amorphous group of left-inclined intellectuals. Here we find the playwrights of the dustbin school, the critics who sign petitions in favor of Castro's Cuba, the boycotters of South African goods; and, surrounding this group again, an even wider, woolier brand of middle-class anti-Americanism.

The whole movement is a *trahison des clercs,* for reasoned argument finds very little place there. It is an emotional, a sentimental movement, born of idealistic frustration and impelled by simple fear; and the fear is perhaps the most respectable part of it in an island as vulnerable as Britain.

It happens that the problem of nuclear weapons is one of the very few subjects on which Hugh Gaitskell talks unexceptionable sense. Ironically, it looks like the subject which will destroy him. But, as the Colonial Secretary said at the Tory conference, "The Socialists may scheme, and the Liberals may dream, but we have work to do." We are dealing here not merely with a party squabble but with the security of Britain; and ineluctably connected with the security of Britain is the security of the Western Alliance as a whole.

What are the prospects? Not too bad, I think. Genuine conservatives may fret at the Tory Government's sins of commission and omission but Harold Macmillan remains, in Randolph Churchill's phrase, "very much on our side." And, thanks to Mr. Cousins and his friends, the Tory Government should be in power a long while.

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The Hundred Days are Here Again!

It's Kennedy, in a landslide. And the New Frontiersmen are on the move. Want a job? They're up for auction, what are we bid?

ROBERT SCHUCHMAN

ANNOUNCER: *Ladies and gentlemen, we are privileged to present tonight the event which will determine the course of America's future in the years to come. As he promised the American people on the eve of his election last month, President-elect Kennedy will inaugurate the Era of the New Frontier by selecting the men who will constitute his cabinet according to the principles of true social democracy—the great principles of true social democracy—the great principles of Lincoln, Bryan and Chester Bowles.*

We can see many hundreds of courageous Frontiersmen here in the Grand Ballroom of the Conrad Hilton. Our new President is about to be introduced by the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. We now take you to the rostrum, where Senator Jackson is speaking. . . .

JACKSON: . . . and in the immortal words of Franklin Roosevelt: "We must be on our way!" And now, here is the moment we have all been waiting for. Without further ado, I give you the next President of the United States, John F. Kennedy.

KENNEDY: Thank you, Senator Jackson, for your fine introduction. Americans, we stand on the launching pad of a New Frontier. With unity and purpose, we may find the courage to conquer disease, poverty, pluralism and drift. Security, not opportunity, is the pressing need of our time. We must find the men who can best inspire our nation to great heights of sacrifice. The good will not suffice: only the best will do. This truly is a time for greatness.

Will the candidates for Secretary of Agriculture please come forward?

ANNOUNCER: *Former Secretary Charles F. Brannan has just leapt upon the stage, closely followed by Governors Docking of Kansas and Loveless of Iowa.*

KENNEDY: Let us roll on to the New Frontier. Gentlemen, what am I bid for the post of Secretary of Agriculture?

DOCKING: I bid 80 per cent of parity!

KENNEDY: What! Do you want to destroy the family farmer? How can the tiller of the soil maintain his self-reliance with destructive lack of interference like that?

LOVELESS: I bid 90 per cent of parity!

DOCKING: I bid 100 per cent of parity!

BRANNAN: Gentlemen, gentlemen, you have not faced up to the issue. It is the selfish unwillingness of the urban masses, in their savage disregard for the just interests of the farmer, to consume a fair and equitable quantity of food which has created the present plight. I propose that each citizen be allocated a required food consumption quota.

KENNEDY: Sold to Mr. Brannan! I feel confident that under your inspired leadership, the family farmer may once again become the backbone of the American economy.

And now, who will bid for Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare?

Down with Traumas

ANNOUNCER: *Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan is ascending to the stage, closely followed by Mr. Oscar Ewing of New York, and the noted expert on Soviet affairs, Mr. Walter Reuther of Detroit.*

EWING: Mr. President, I bid a plan for national relief, a plan which will win the eternal war against poverty, hunger and work. In all of our welfare plans to date, the underprivileged have been forced to undergo the psychological trauma which results from the belief that other people are supporting them. We must rescue them from this dangerous trauma.

I bid that all recipients of relief shall be entitled to a sum which will be 25 per cent higher than the median income of those fortunate enough to be taxpayers. This is to compensate these unfortunate victims of a society which puts a greater premium upon work than upon need.

REUTHER: This is fine for the unemployed, but how will it help us catch up with the Russians? We must not ignore the field of education. We must surpass them on every front. In the Soviet Union, 98 per cent of the engineers graduated from the universities are fully conversant in Russian. We must match and surpass them. By 1967, 99.7 per cent of *our* engineers must speak Russian.

How, Mr. President, are we to do all this? I bid a National Education Recovery Administration. Teachers will be invited to write their own ticket. Tuition will be set democratically—by the student body. But, most important of all, academic freedom must be preserved! I propose that all teachers, students and school board members be required to take a *Dis*loyalty Oath, as evidence of their devotion to academic freedom and the tradition of dissent!!

ANNOUNCER: *The audience has again broken out into loud applause, this time led by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the First Lady of the Galaxy, who has just made an inconspicuous appearance.*

WILLIAMS: Mr. President, with due regard for the fine proposal of Mr. Ewing, I would like to withdraw my bid and throw my support to my colleague from Michigan, who has just offered this breathtaking and courageous plan. I will settle for Secretary of Labor.

KENNEDY: Sold to the highest bidder —Mr. Reuther, our next Secretary!

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Now, the post of Secretary of the Treasury is up for auction.

ANNOUNCER: *The noted economist, Dr. Paul Samuelson, is approaching the stage. He is followed by the prolific novelist, Professor John Kenneth Galbraith, and the famous American humorist, Mr. Leon Keyserling.*

SAMUELSON: I bid 5 per cent growth each year!

KENNEDY: Come, come now, Paul, that won't get us to the New Frontier!

KEYSERLING: Well, Jack, I mean, Mr. President, I bid 10 per cent growth.

SAMUELSON: I bid 12 per cent growth —and with no rise in prices.

KENNEDY: Now, gentlemen, we can't catch up with the Russians until 1970 at that rate!

KEYSERLING: I bid 25 per cent growth —and a cut in taxes!

A Liberal's Hour

GALBRAITH: My dear friends, I must interrupt you in order to stop this restatement of the Tradition of Despair. We who search for a New Frontier must depart from the Conventional Wisdom. We must advance from the Monetary Illusion of our predecessors and remove the shackles of supply and demand which have hindered effective economic planning in the past.

I bid, as an interim measure, a growth rate of 50 per cent a year, with stable prices, annual tax cuts and an annual budget surplus to retire the national debt. This program may be expensive—as progress is always expensive—and it will call for courage and sacrifice. But continued growth will pay for the program, and in the end it will cost us nothing—because we owe it to ourselves!

KENNEDY: What brilliant economic statesmanship! The post of Secretary of the Treasury goes to Professor Galbraith. As a consolation prize, Mr. Keyserling will be appointed Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

ANNOUNCER: *A scream has just been heard from the audience, ladies and gentlemen! It has been announced that Senator Byrd has just cut his throat!*

KENNEDY: And now, my fellow Americans, the most important post in my new administration must be filled. We must find a new helmsman for the Department of State. Under the previous administration, Cold War borders remained the same, under a static and sterile foreign policy. By contrast, under the dynamic statesmanship of President Truman, millions of square miles changed hands. We must return to dynamic forward-looking principles.

Will the bidders for the office of Secretary of State please come forward?

ANNOUNCER: *Congressman Chester A. Bowles of Connecticut is approaching the stage, closely followed by a surprise entry, Senator Thomas Dodd, also from Connecticut. It appears that they are the only contenders for the post—but—just a moment, ladies and gentlemen. There is a disturbance in the hall and—my goodness!*

This is spectacular, ladies and gentlemen! Thousands of doves are now flying into the ballroom! They are pulling a huge golden chariot, and the aroma of incense fills the hall. The chariot is carrying—yes, ladies and gentlemen—it is carrying ADLAI STEVENSON*!!!!*

Governor Stevenson is dressed in the official uniform of the Indian Congress Party. He is also wearing the fez given to him for this occasion by President Sekou Touré. The Governor is now tossing olive branches to the wildly cheering throng, as he progresses to the stage. He has just dismounted, and is being kissed and embraced by the First Lady of the Galaxy. This is just magnificent.

We now return you to the rostrum, where the President is speaking.

Stevensonian Coup

KENNEDY: Welcome to you all. Now, who will make the first bid?

DODD: I bid that we strengthen our defensive alliances throughout the world, that we attempt to counter Communist propaganda everywhere with a Crusade for Truth, and that we plan a liberation of . . .

(*Interrupted.*)

KENNEDY: (*Aghast.*) Brinkmanship!!!

STEVENSON: (*Banging his shoe on the table.*) Disqualified, disqualified! He wants to win! He wants to win!

BOWLES: If we are to return to sanity, I bid that we give away Formosa!

STEVENSON: (*Excited.*) Well, Chet, I bid that we give away Berlin!

BOWLES: I bid that we gave away *all* of Asia—except India, of course. She is too valuable an ally.

STEVENSON: (*More excited.*) I bid we give away Western Europe!

BOWLES: I bid we give away Africa.

STEVENSON: (*Jumping up and down.*) I bid we give away—America!!!

ANNOUNCER: *A tumult of cheering, applauding and dancing has broken out here in the ballroom. President Kennedy is gavelling for order, while Congressman Bowles congratulates Governor Stevenson. The New Frontier team is assembling on the platform, and the strains of "Happy Days Are Here Again" may be heard from afar. President Kennedy is now approaching the microphone.*

KENNEDY: We have liberated ourselves from the past—we are ready to proceed to the New Frontier. We have abandoned the party of Aaron Burr, Simon Legree and Daddy Warbucks. The Economic Royalists have been cast out from the temple. A new era has begun.

Tonight, we face the past with confidence, and the future with Tito, Sukarno and Lumumba.

I close with the words of our beloved and divine founder: "WE HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR—BUT THE NEW FRONTIER!"

Invictus, 1960

Whenever I become depressed
About my Presidential quest,
I turn (aghast) from Gallup polls
To Galbraith, Schlesinger
and Bowles.

When opposition runners tweak
My wife, because she's ultra chic,
There's nothing that I know consoles
Like Galbraith, Schlesinger
and Bowles.

When they, in jowly vowels, hoot
Unpleasantly at father's loot,
I thank the Harvard bell that tolls
For Galbraith, Schlesinger
—and Bowles.

WILLIAM VON DREELE

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Principles and Heresies

FRANK S. MEYER

The Age of Modulation Presents its Great Debate

WHO sows the wind shall reap the *whirlwind*. In this election of 1960, which takes place in as dark an hour as the Republic has ever seen, we are paying the price for decades of progressive decay of civic and intellectual principle in our political life; for a century of apotheosis of the mere mass, the mere majority; for a century of witless dismemberment of the complex and delicate balances that made the American constitutional system the most formidable bastion of liberty ever created by men.

As the state has absorbed more and more of the powers of the individual citizen and circumscribed his liberties narrowly and ever more narrowly, so the Presidency and the omnivorous bureaucracy it heads has drawn into itself decisive control over the American state. For this office, unequalled in power, inestimably demanding in wisdom, possessing today an almost apocalyptic significance, a contest is being waged.

Between whom? Between men of the calibre of a Washington, an Adams, a Jefferson, a Madison; or even of a Douglas or a Lincoln, a William Howard Taft or a Woodrow Wilson? No, at this crisis of our fortunes we are faced with a choice between two prime products of the Age of Modulation, elbowing each other in desperate anxiety to seize the geometrical middle of the road. Trimmers and calculators, they make a William Henry Harrison or a James Buchanan, a Warren Gamaliel Harding or a Harry S. Truman, look like statesmen of dignity and depth.

IT IS not primarily their personal fault that they posture before the television screen, ludicrous little men patently incongruous to the lofty grandeur of the office to which they aspire. They are there because the enshrinement of mass populistic democracy has thrust them forward as winners of a popularity contest, the rules of which decree that only the mediocre, only those who can pass through a mesh which screens out wisdom, devotion to principle, loyalty to truth and tradition, will survive.

Politics, it is true, *is* partially the art of prudential adjustment of principle to circumstances—circumstances created by the play of conflicting opinions, conflicting interests, and the sheer imperfection of the human condition. But adjustment should be adjustment towards a purpose, compromise to gain support for principled ends—not adjustment for adjustment's sake, not the gaining of votes for the sake of gaining votes.

Such a concentration upon gaining votes at any cost and in any way is, however, the inevitable outcome of a concept of government that raises the mass electorate to the position of final and absolute arbiter of the destinies of the nation. Ironically, the sway of that concept insures the survival of the mediocre man as a candidate for an office to which the same concept has given a power beyond the capability of even a wise and sober man to wield justly. Hence the inanity (farcical, if it were not freighted with ominous portent) of this election campaign and its pathetic television encounters—which Quincy Howe and his *compères* press upon posterity as a Great Debate to set the tone for the future of the Republic.

A Great Debate! Surely never before (with the possible exception of Nero's legendary performance) has there been such a spectacle of fiddling and fuddling in the face of desperate issues by presumptively responsible leaders. As a result of their anxious avoidance of true debate, what a distasteful personal impression they have succeeded in making: Nixon with his *tremolo* scoutmaster act, which *he* seems to think makes the corn grow tall on the Great Plains, but which leaves the viewer wondering how Uriah Heep managed to get born again; Kennedy, looking like a pudgy high-school bully and sounding like a sophomore who has painfully boned up for an intercollegiate debate.

They must both be pleasanter men than the image they present, but this image is all that remains after the poll surveyors and the calculating machines have done their job, after the candidates and their massive staffs have bent their every effort to win votes on every side of every issue.

On Quemoy and Matsu, for example, despite the initial *Sturm und Drang*, both candidates have succeeded in ending up in the same ambiguous position: each firmly defending the meaningless middle and accusing the other of holding a position which, meaning something, might alienate some votes somewhere. So it has gone, on issue after issue; and it is my prediction that by election day, whatever apparent challenge one or the other may issue in the remaining days of the campaign, both will have succeeded in occupying essentially the same ambiguous position on every possible question. (Even on Cuba. Surely Nixon is not going to continue right up to November 8th in the role of a Sane Nuclear Policy breather of doom, calling down the wrath of the UN upon unilateral American action and prophesying Armageddon if we intervene; and before then Kennedy will undoubtedly find a way of slithering out of the stance of a militant, patriotic Theodore Roosevelt.)

ONE or the other of the candidates, of course, will be our next President. And when he becomes President, we must try to accord him the respect the office demands. Let us fervently pray that, as has happened before, the exalted responsibilities of the Chief Magistracy will bring out the qualities and abilities now so egregiously lacking. Short of such a miracle, however, the hope of the country is not in its next President. For that we must look elsewhere: to the Congress; to the rapidly growing conservative leadership that is being thrust up in all areas of American life; to the constitutional tradition, the love of freedom, the love of country, that, despite all efforts at eradication, still remain deeply implanted in American breasts.

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From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Californian Follies

Although there are some indications of an earnest movement toward reform of public instruction in California, that state continues to provide the dispassionate observer of American education with considerable excuse for falling into passion. I offer the following two instances.

The Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, a highly reputable association of evangelical Christian faculty people and students, has branches on many campuses throughout the country. At one division of the University of California, the local Inter-Varsity Fellowship was startled last year to be informed by the officious dean of women that women students, thereafter, were forbidden to join the group. Discussion of religion upset girls, she said, and made them neurotic. (The Inter-Varsity Fellowship, far from manifesting the symptoms of the more extreme varieties of religious experience, is a sober association with considerable intellectual attainments and a serious press.) Apparently the dean of women believed that co-eds should be confined to normal socially-approved activities, like smooching.

Marx, But Not Christ

Student members of the local Fellowship appealed to the dean of students—who promptly sustained the dean of women. "But," a Christian student remonstrated, "is it permitted for students to read on this campus?" Yes, the dean said warily, it is. "And is it permitted to hold discussions on this campus?" Yes, the dean replied uneasily, it is. "And would it be all right to conduct a Marxist Discussion Group on this campus?" The dean frowned, but said it would be. "Then," inquired the student, "why can't we have a Christian discussion group?"

"You're missing the point," cried the dean, nervously. "You have more than three people in your group, and that makes it a public meeting, and you have to have the University's permission for that."

But the dean, what with the protests of people on the faculty and professors at other universities, was forced to give way. The dean of women still tried to enforce her ban upon the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, but also had to allow young women to discuss the scandalous doctrines of Christianity. This academic year, nevertheless, a fresh threat to the Inter-Varsity Fellowship is arising—and, presumably, to Newman Clubs on Californian state campuses. For there goes into effect a University ban against any student group which discriminates as to "race, color, or creed." It is the "creed" which will be used as a bludgeon against Protestant and Catholic societies, if the administrators have a mind to establish the domination of Positivism. If a Catholic club is ordered to admit Baptists or Unitarians or atheists; if a Protestant society is expected to welcome Catholics or Jews or Moslems —why, the organization simply loses its reason for being. The Californian zealots for complete equality and "togetherness" doubtless would have demanded John Wesley's "Holy Club," in eighteenth-century Oxford, to open its arms to members of the Hellfire Club; and the Tractarians, in nineteenth-century Oxford, to embrace the champions of the dissidence of dissent.

Among the positivists of the sociological profession in our universities there exists a detestation of fraternities—or voluntary associations of most sorts, including religious bodies. These gentry will bear watching in California. If faculty and students may not meet to discuss their common religious beliefs—why, what is left of a university but a center for secular indoctrination?

Now our second present Californian folly is at the other end of the educational pyramid: a little school for boys and girls aged three and a half years to five. Mrs. Lila Joralemon, of Berkeley, has conducted such a school for the past three years. It is called Melody Workshop, and it teaches music to small children. Who would want to abolish so innocent and charming an enterprise, particularly when it does not compete with the state schools?

Why, the Californian State Department of Social Welfare hopes to abolish Melody Workshop. Why? Because, according to Mrs. Jane McKaskle, area deputy of the Social Welfare Department, this is a nursery school. And nursery schools in California must have "nails, saws, auger bits, hammers, live ducks and rabbits, a punching bag, a stripped old car, old boat and cement pipe for imaginative play, a trapeze, a large cement cylinder for climbing, jingle hammers, maracas, tom-toms, a pounding board and mallet for quiet play [!]" and similar impedimenta, if they want to be licensed.

Regimenting the Five-Year-Olds

"We object," says Mrs. McKaskle, "to her regimentation of the children —giving them no time for free play during the two and one-half hour classes . . . and there is no opportunity for free expression for the children." You can't feel free unless you have a stripped-down car and jingle hammers, you know.

Mrs. Joralemon of Melody Workshop replies, "There are enough of these play schools. The kids are tired of playing with plastic popguns. Besides, they all have them at their own homes. . . . My primary goal is to make happy mornings for the children while introducing them to the wonderful world of music. . . . I combine an introduction to music with a reconnaissance of the alphabet, phonics, etiquette, and a new vocabulary."

Wouldn't it be dreadful if small children actually learnt something in school—and enjoyed it? Why, they might grow up to be smarter than area deputies of the Department of Social Welfare. And we couldn't have that—not in the welfare state of idiotic togetherness and pounding-boards which humanitarian sociologists are planning for us.

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Light on an American Dilemma?

WILLMOORE KENDALL

No one can read *The Negro in American Civilization* by Nathaniel Weyl (Public Affairs Press, $6.00) without realizing: a) that we have long needed a compendious and objective survey of the *facts* about the American Negro (not least of all because many of those facts have been systematically suppressed and misrepresented); b) that we—not merely "we" in America but "we" in the West—do have a "Negro problem," the mishandling of which may be the instrument we shall use to destroy ourselves; and c) that the author, clearly a man of intellectual honesty, is attempting to perform a signal service for us all, and especially (for he will surely be accused of the contrary) for the American Negroes themselves.

Let us speak first of the author's intellectual honesty. Just as Columbus did not set out to discover America, so Nathaniel Weyl did not set out to write this book. What he intended, he tells us, was a modest little study of the "changing status" of the Negro under the American Constitution—one, moreover, that was to be predicated upon and to document the prevailing mythology as to what constitutes "justice" for the Negro. His subject-matter, however, grew and broadened under his hand, carrying him into areas that he had "intended to ignore." He discovered that "material which passed for the objective findings of social scientists could more accurately be characterized as rationalizations and propaganda wearing academic cap and gown."

Above all, he found that the evidence accumulating in his hands warranted his changing his mind on some of the major issues involved—not, I hasten to add, on one: the imperative need for "policies . . . designed to achieve harmony between the two races on a foundation of justice and freedom." Rather, he found the need to reshape his ideas on the form those policies are going to have to take and the political theory that is going to have to guide them. A less honest man would have found a means of papering over the cracks in the wall he had selected to work on; a man less bold would have chosen—as, if he had his wits about him, Weyl must have felt tempted to do—not to write and publish the book he found germinating within him. (This reviewer's *a priori* guess, for what it is worth, is: He will pay dearly for it.)

I shall not attempt to summarize the evidence to which the questions burgeoning in Weyl's mind led him, if for no other reason than that my readers owe it to themselves to go to the book itself and examine it in detail. Suffice it to say that in "area" after "area" the evidence Weyl has assembled is vastly more discouraging, with respect both to the Negro's own future and to his future impact upon American society, than most of us have permitted ourselves to fear in our most pessimistic moments. And suffice it to add that the cumulative effect of the evidence in the several areas is appalling—doubly so because the author is apparently himself appalled.

On Weyl's showing, the Negroes, on the average (happily, the propositions can be stated, and should be for Weyl's kind of purpose, without using any such judgmental terms as "inferior") just plain do chalk up lesser scores on intelligence tests than whites. They just plain do learn less than whites, and with greater difficulty than whites, at school. They just plain do commit fantastically more crimes proportionally, and more violent crimes, than whites. And Weyl believes that these statistical tendencies have—at least at our present stage of knowledge and understanding—to be explained in large part (never mind how often you have been told this can't be) in terms of specifically biological inheritance. In which case, not only do these statistical tendencies apply to the present generation of Negroes; they will be found applying to the next and the next generation (which, incidentally, will be much larger proportionately than the present one).

ALL THIS, or at least all except the "biological" part, most of us knew in a sense already—even those of us who rely for our information upon sources that supply information of *this* kind most grudgingly. So the value of Weyl's book lies elsewhere, namely: a) in his handling of the ten thousand Liberal expedients for explaining all of it away on so-called "environmental" grounds, that is, as the wages of our sin in not having done more *for* the Negroes, and b) in his treatment of what, ultimately, is the only interesting question: Where, for the sake of all of us, white and Negro alike, do we go from here?

As for a), Weyl's general answer is along the following lines. From the standpoint of income, comfort, the means to health, access to the goods of civilization, the present generation of American Negroes is a *privileged* class—by comparison either with most of the population of the world, or, more importantly, an entire series of "underprivileged" groups in the United States which have responded successfully and fruitfully to the challenge of American life: the Russian Jews, the Chinese and the Japanese, to take only a few of the examples that come most readily to mind.

Here again Weyl's statistics are

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breathtaking and, in the opinion of this writer, formidable. Could it be we shall never do justice to the Negroes in our midst, nor the Negroes to themselves, save as we all recognize that, as a group, they may have a lesser capacity than the rest of us for civilizational achievement? When we impose upon them equal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for civilizational achievement we may be doing them not justice but injustice.

As for b), Weyl's major thesis would seem to be this: American civilization cannot survive without, first, an educational system that offers maximum opportunity for students of extraordinary ability to grow and learn in an academic environment that is both congenial and so structured as to bring out of them (*e ducere*) the best they have in them; and, second, cities capable of performing the indispensable urban function of providing facilities for intellectual and aesthetic communication. We are sacrificing both these goods to our ignorance and sentimentality and vicarious guilt (guilt, let me add to Weyl, that is always greatest in those quarters of American life that have *no* ethic over against which to feel guilty) about the Negroes. Or, to return to the point about political theory, we are sacrificing them to our determination to subordinate the American dream of liberty to new-fangled notions of equality.

The American educational system must be rescued from those who would treat it as an adjunct of the Negro problem (on this point Weyl tellingly cites Mrs. Agnes Meyer, and so enables me to say: this even Mrs. Meyer can see). We must reverse the trend that is making the American city an all-Negro city, in which the rule of life is, quite simply: have more children because more children mean bigger relief checks. The alternative may be no less than the self-destruction of America—with the Negroes themselves as the chief sufferers. And these possibilities call, in Weyl's view, for simultaneously learning to think of the Negroes as a group that pose very special problems, and paradoxical though it seem, ceasing to treat the Negroes as a group:

"Southern racism believes," Weyl



writes, "or pretends to believe, that *all* Negroes are mentally [and morally?] inferior to *all* whites. . . . In the North, [the] fundamental creed is that all races are equal in innate intelligence [and moral capacity?] . . . Negro shortcomings are therefore . . . due to an unfavorable environment. . . . [Now:] . . . Being equal, the Negro should produce his share of Einsteins, Freuds and Picassos. . . . Yet the really outstanding Negro intellectuals can be counted on one's fingers. . . ."

And then: "Today, the intelligent and capable Negro finds that he is carrying the stupid and delinquent one on his back. . . . He is not permitted to . . . demand that he be treated solely on the basis of . . . individual merit. . . . The American system . . . does not [properly understood?] offer equality of reward where inequality exists in ability or effort. The capable Negro . . . demands merely the full privileges of citizenship without regard to race. He is not entitled to more, nor are any of us."

Over a Sinful Abyss

VINCENT MILLER

Alan Swallow has reissued Allen Tate's *The Fathers* ($3.75; paper, $1.85), perhaps to discover if it can take its place as the finest novel about the South, and one of the half-dozen or so finest novels about America, now that the jargon and the *mores* of the "new-critical" thirties out of which it grew are dead. How soon it establishes itself, as it will, is of no significance; but the process can be hastened perhaps by admitting that Tate has not so certainly done for his subject—the Manichean sin-obsessed puritanism that typifies the South—what Joyce did for Dublin: both rendered it intelligible, and offered an inescapable purgation.

Here then is no satisfying catharsis: too much remains of the compulsive concern with sin which caused Wyndham Lewis to write (thinking of Popeye and his "rape" of the "sinner" Temple Drake) that the South's most highly-thought-of novelist was, underneath it all, a puritanical fanatic with a corn-cob. But it is only against Faulkner's failure (and not against Margaret Mitchell's, as Arthur Mizener suggests in his introduction) that Tate's achievement can be measured; for the obsession of serious Southern fiction is best represented by Faulkner's novels, and perhaps most clearly represented in his works by his story of Isaac Snopes in *The Hamlet*. Isaac is a half-wit, deprived of what Dante called the good of intellect, and pulled toward the good which man finds mirrored in the flesh after a horrible fashion. Here we have the main if not the only theme of modern Southern literature: the letch of a human will toward what seems always to Southerners to be the symbolic, depraved, horrible, fleshly desecration of some pure and other-worldy (and only occasionally magnolia-scented) ideal. It is an attitude of mind which has dogged the Christian West. In Tate's novel its Southern embodiment is raised for the first time to intelligibility.

The Fathers deals with the period of time between 1860 and 1861 which sees, imaged in two families, condensed into a few months, the death of the high if narrow prewar civilization and its replacement by the only replacement it can have: one of tremendous merit defecting into refinement rather than civilization, impotence and violence rather than ordered action. The absorbing story is told us by an old man, Lacy Buchan, who was, in 1860, a fifteen-year-old boy torn between his love of his father and his love for his brother-in-law. The first embodies a dying civilization ("I thought of papa down

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in the old house in Alexandria thinking of his honor, which he would if necessary mention, and acting on his dignity which he did not know he had because he had it so perfectly.") The second, George Posey, has not been subjected to, and cannot now accept, the discipline of the old gentleman's code ("And by God they'll all starve to death, that's what they'll do. They do nothing but die and marry and think about the honor of Virginia.") George is undisciplined, "romantic," "dashing," and "refined"; and he realizes that the Major's way is dead, ended not by the war but by the prior failure of the economic base upon which it rested.

What unites these two men is the putative "fact" that life takes place over a sinful abyss, which the Major's civilization has learned to ignore, but which George's romantic refinement has not. George, "refined," Lacy tells us, but not "civilized," sees a young Durham bull struggling to mount a cow, and, falling momentarily but significantly into an abyss of Manichean selfawareness, "blushes to the roots of his hair." But Major's wife answers a young girl who asks, simply and without irony, "He's here on business." She expresses, as her son realizes, not a different view of the sinful horror of earthly existence, but the extent to which events have for her only their socially agreed-upon meanings. It is an "intricate game," which the Major expects everyone to play "because everything he was and felt was in the game itself." But the game is over: George and Lacy will never be disciplined into its intricacies; they and the rest of the Major's family are about to be swept into the pit, there all the time, where Faulkner's Isaac lies.

Whether or not Tate shared Lacy Buchan's views is unimportant (he may even have felt with Lacy the compelling attraction of some of the events in his horror story, or thought with George that the Major's world fell as a result of economics, rather than of a healthy if tragically purging moral law relating to will powers over abysses). His novel is in any case a near-great one; for he learned just enough of "technique" from the new critical movements of the thirties—and, one guesses, from Ford Madox Ford—to create a plot less compelling than Faulkner's because more artistic.

However symbol-laden, unrealized, and "new-critical," his novel projects a world to be understood rather than a set of fictional events which arouse and satisfy the blinded will. What one sees, sufficiently distanced by the pane of glass Tate learned how to put there by respecting his craft, is the touching grandeur of Major Buchan's South and the tragic inevitability of its fall into romance, violence and refinement—mirrored in a host of precisely imaged actions which, considering the date of its subject, no author younger than Mr. Tate can now assemble. It is one of America's finest novels.

Our China Policy: A Reminder

RODNEY GILBERT

SOMEWHERE in every purposeful book one can find a few passages which give the gist of the author's message and also give a clue to the reason why he sat down and wrote it. So it is that in the body of David Nelson Rowe's *Modern China: A Brief History* (Anvil-Van Nostrand, $1.25) the reader comes upon the following three revelations of purpose:

1. *"In respect to China, as in Korea and Germany, the United States and its chief allies seem resigned, at the most, to a policy of military protection of the territorial status quo, combined with economic and political support of South Korea, West Germany and Taiwan. The more positive concept of carrying even economic and political warfare to the enemy comes under increasing attack from the allies of the United States and from those elements in the United States who believe that the mitigation of hostility between the Communist world and the free world is feasible and desirable. These governments and people evidently do not accept the Communist analysis, according to which 'Bolsheviks' and their enemies—all non-Bolsheviks—have essentially nothing in common; there is no shared standard of value between and above them!"*

2. *"Satisfying the interests and demands of Communist regimes can lead only to war, the course of which would be heavily determined in advance by the extent of our surrender prior to the failure of a policy of appeasement."*

3. *"Today there seems little reason to doubt that the Chinese Communists are gradually but steadily working themselves into a problem of internal dissidence so massive that the mere slowness of its development may deceive us into unawareness of it. The impact of this dissidence will not likely be suddenly catastrophic like that of an avalanche. Rather it will probably be as slow and irresistible as the movement of a glacier. It is the task of a sophisticated economic and political warfare, backed by constant military readiness, to aid and abet the development of massive dissidence among the suffering Chinese people."*

Half of Professor Rowe's book is historical narrative; half consists of pertinent historical documents. The old story of the decay of imperial China under the impact of pushful European commercialism — inevitable in an already shrinking world—is retold. How the Chinese tried to defend their ancient position of cultural superiority in their own detached world, first by exclusion and then by resort to arms, and how the merchant adventurers of the West broke down the barriers with much brutality and injustice, is related with fair apportionate blame to both sides. Then comes the story of how the Chinese, after their disastrous defeat at Japan's hands in 1894, went through thirty-five years of fumbling reform, revolution, and experimentation with alien political institutions, involving many disheartening failures, until Communist infiltration of Dr. Sun's Kuomintang excited interest in the possibilities of a still more radical experiment with an alien political nostrum.

Finally—just as Chiang Kai-shek's

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dual tasks of purging North China of warlordism and South China of revolutionary Comunism under Soviet Russian auspices were being accomplished; and as China seemed about to enter at last upon a period of unity, economic stability and internal peace—the Japanese, in 1931, struck in Manchuria in what was very evidently the first move in a campaign to reduce all China to the status of an imperial colony and a field for exclusive exploitation by the Japanese.

There was no surcease from worry from then on until the Japanese did, in the summer of 1937, launch an all-out war of conquest that was to last for eight full years. During the first four years China fought alone, "yielding space for time." Then for a time she was worse off than ever, as Japan's conquests of the American Philippines, of French Indo-China, of British Malaya and Burma, and of the Dutch East Indies, cut off the Chinese in the western provinces from all communications with the world, and the only relief from despair was the sight of Clare Chennault and his volunteer Flying Tigers shooting the Japanese air force out of China's skies.

The magnificent obstinacy with which Chiang Kai-shek fought on, keeping a round million Japanese soldiery busy in China and rejecting all of Japan's tempting offers of peace, is something that Dr. Rowe does not now forget, although the American government and people were shortly to become shamefully forgetful of it. It is when Dr. Rowe reaches the point where our foreign-service boys in Chungking began their propaganda against "the unspeakably corrupt and incompetent Chiang Kai-shek" and their tributes to the merits of Mao Tse-tung's "agrarian reformers," that he really gets into his stride.

The story begins with the anti-Chiang smear campaign; but almost coincidental with it was Franklin D. Roosevelt's betrayal of Chinese interests at Yalta. It wasn't long after the savor of victory over Japan had been soured by the revelation of that betrayal that Chiang Kai-shek had to put up with General Marshall's meddling (under Truman's direction) in China's effort to dispose of the Communist threat.

WHETHER the idea of forcing Chiang to take the Reds into a coalition government by withholding desperately needed financial aid authorized by Congress, and still more desperately needed munitions authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the result of stupidity at the top or of malevolent near-treasonable scheming at lower levels, it did insure a friendly regime's collapse and a dedicated enemy's total victory. When General Marshall boasted (as Dr. Rowe does not relate) that he had "disarmed Chiang Kai-shek with a stroke of the pen," meaning that he had put an embargo on aid to Chiang, he was actually boasting that he had insured China's delivery into the hands of Stalin and Mao. All this Dr. Rowe reviews as he leads up to the observations quoted above, on the present inclination to do it all over again.

The 98-page historical review and comments on the current effort to substitute what Neville Chamberlain called "patient conciliation" for the Dulles policy of non-recognition and pressure, is followed by twenty-two supplementary documents, or "readings" as Dr. Rowe calls them. These include five treaties, important if not always exhilarating; a couple of foreign-service reports to the State Department from Chungking, deliberately misleading; some of Mao Tse-tung's revelations of Red thinking; one of General Marshall's reports, interesting because of the conflict in it between his official anxiety to carry out his wrong-headed mission and his angry unofficial reaction to consistent Red duplicity, bad faith and mendacity; a digest of Dr. Sun's "Three People's Principles" and Free China's Constitution; and finally, and most important, "U. S. Policy towards the Chinese People," a memorandum put out by the State Department, August 11, 1958, for the guidance of all diplomatic personnel abroad.

This last document, composed while Secretary Dulles was still alive and Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson was still in action, is a detailed and all but exhaustive statement of the many good reasons for our policy of non-recognition and for denying Red China admission to the community of civilized peoples. The reprinting of this alone justifies the publication of Dr. Rowe's little book at this particular time.

Finally, it needs to be emphasized that Dr. Rowe was born and grew up in China, where he became as familiar with colloquial Chinese as with his own language, and that he later made a systematic study of the language at Harvard and in Peiping. He is thus equipped, as no onlooker from without can possibly be, to *feel* what is going on in the minds of the Chinese people. When he refuses to accept the twaddle about "the secure and permanent establishment" of the Red regime in China and expresses his firm conviction that the despotic clique in Peiping and its stupendous bureaucratic organization will go down sooner or later under the weight of massive "dissidence," the reader can feel confident that he is learning something from the very heart of China. This reviewer accepts this view without reservation (as Secretary Dulles obviously did when he described the present situation in China as "a passing phase") and he fervently hopes that Dr. Rowe's message makes the impression on our people that it should.

Fall Book Number

The November 19 issue of NATIONAL REVIEW will be a special book number, including reviews and discussion by:

Will Herberg, on *Marxism: The View from America,* by Clinton Rossiter
Sir Shane Leslie, on *Lord Derby,* by Randolph Churchill
Hugh Kenner, on a group of contemporary poets
James Burnham, on *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age,* edited by Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff
Joan Didion, on fiction of the fall season
Robert Y. Drake, on the faddist critics of *Huckleberry Finn*

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Theater

Assault Upon Honor

GARRY WILLS

THE PATRONS of Broadway, fed a steady diet of incest, perversion, and various kinds of cannibalism, may well be expected to stomach anything. But it was shocking to observe the titters and applause with which an entire audience saluted that colm affront to mankind, Jean Anouilh's *Becket*. The play is not "immoral," as that term is normally used of a play; it is, rather, supremely *dishonorable*, a high mark in the modern assault upon the very concept of honor. It is grimly ironic that the leading actor is one of that band of men who still bears a "Sir" before his name. Laurence Olivier's participation in this drama is a sign that all memory is lost of the honor once demanded of a knight.

Anouilh purports to tell the story of St. Thomas Becket. Satire, burlesque or attack upon Thomas would have been relatively open and honorable; but Anouilh comes, with a sneering sympathy, to *understand* the mystery of a man—or, rather, of two men, since England's King is as important, in the play, as England's Archbishop. It is the tale of a doomed friendship.

What was in reality the secret of mutual respect and sorrow between these adversaries, men who loved each other yet would not yield an inch on matters that touched the dignity of their separate magistracies? The subject has intrigued men ever since this great tragedy was first enacted in the solemn setting of Canterbury Cathedral. Anouilh's answer is formulated in scorn, and depends on the simplification of every aspect of the historic encounter of man and issues before the high altar.

Kingship is presented as absurd: Anthony Quinn, the bestial Henry II with an adolescent's "crush" on Thomas, has nothing but contempt for his own position, his half-witted family, and all the ceremony that doth hedge a king. Priests are presented as absurd: all of Thomas' colleagues are conscious frauds, including the Pope (here seen, in Machiavellian council at Rome, speaking the "Italian" of B movies—an immigrant's broken English). Thomas himself is defending neither Church nor creed: under a concept he blasphemously calls "the honor of God," he regains with the Archbishop the dignity of his defeated Saxon race, and stands up for the Saxon peasants cringing under the Norman rule. Though he will not himself strike at the men come to murder him, and to spoil the dignity of his stance, he encourages a Saxon monk to do so; and Thomas' last breath is spent regretting that the poor monk died without taking a single knight with him. With a last touch of tastelessness—something Anouilh unerringly achieves in this play—the Archbishop gives the monk his silver crozier as a weapon to use against the Normans.

Anouilh archly confessed, in the *New York Times*, that he knew this business of racial conflict had nothing to do with the original tragedy. Becket was not a Saxon! Anouilh does not ignore historical accuracy, like Shakespeare, in order to concentrate on the basic human situation. Rather he uses error to translate the complex struggle of man and man, of man and God, to the base level of simple conquest and revenge.

Henry murders out of blind jealousy and wounded love. Thomas, who is presented as incapable of loving Henry or anyone else, adheres to Anouilh's blasphemous "honor of God" as the only escape from his emotional impotency. The King of France is seen picking his teeth while receiving ambassadors. The Pope mumbles that he is "'fraid of an honesta priesta." Thomas and Henry go hunting and whoring together in the early scenes that depict their friendship (and give occasion for two deft strip-tease acts). The peasant girls Thomas would defend are anxious to become wealthy mistresses of the Normans. The nobility is as stupid, drunken, and full of hate as the clergy. In short, nothing of dignity is left to anyone—kings, priests,

St. Thomas Becket

Khrushchev Said:
"There was one American President we got along with very well"



Roosevelt's Road to Russia

by George N. Crocker

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countries, religion, friendship, prayer, man, God—when the curtain falls at last on the senseless flogging of Henry by the priests.

This may seem the common fare of Broadway, but there is a great difference between *Becket* and *The Balcony*. One must have whores if one places the drama—as Brecht, Behan and Genet do, to mention only plays now running—in a whorehouse. But Anouilh pretends to address himself to the understanding of the mystery of a real man's life, and its real effect on the world; for Thomas stands for something intimately woven into the history of the human race—something as real as the steps in Canterbury Cathedral worn away by the knees of pilgrims from every age and every area of Christendom, something as real as Chaucer's poem or the candles burned at Mass on the feast of England's patron.

Eliot knew this when he presented the plight of contemporary England in *Murder in the Cathedral*, a mystery play which re-enacted the shepherd's death for his flock. Of course, Anouilh did not have to agree with Eliot, or Chaucer, or anyone else, in his interpretation; but when he deliberately chooses a tale so rich in significance only to mock every aspect of the real event and all it has meant to men for centuries, he places himself outside of civilization. He is a barbarian spitting on the place where Thomas fell, simply because other men have kissed it. He admits any mockery—the most tasteless, the most inartistic. It is just bad dramaturgy to suggest that men are conversing in Italian by making them speak bad English; it is the kind of thing a child might do. Anouilh, of course, knows better; but he is willing to do himself any dishonor in the name of scorn.

Perhaps Olivier and Quinn know better, too; perhaps, deep down, even the audience does. But we have been taught to clap our hands every time a man sticks his tongue out at tradition. Impudence can almost always pass, among us, for talent; and childish tantrums are dignified by the word "iconoclasm." The price of such insolence must be paid, and soon. After this pilgrimage-in-reverse to Canterbury, one cannot go much further in the loss of dignity and honor. Perhaps a long run on Broadway of the Black Mass; then the darkness.

BOOKS IN BRIEF

KENNEDY OR NIXON—Does It Make a Difference?, by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (Macmillan, $1.95). A cream puff for Jack, by a historian whose simple-minded partisanship strips him here of style and manners. He sits at table gorging with his fingers and spilling food down his front, in his ravenous desire to feed the gnawing hunger-at-large for a plausible set of reasons why anyone in his right mind should vote for Mr. Kennedy. Professor Schlesinger's recipe: Hate Nixon.

W. F. BUCKLEY JR.

POEMS OF A JEW, by Karl Shapiro (Random House, $3.50). Mr. Shapiro's preface virtually thrusts beneath our nostrils these forty "documents of an obsession." "One of those who views with disgust and disappointment . . . the backsliding of artists and intellectuals toward religion," he trafficks in turbulent hallucination, with the ego at the center: "Messias," in which a boy's terror at the sight of a bearded alms-seeker mounts to the cadence of implacable quatrains; "Five Self-Portraits" taut with bitter epigram; "The Leg," a savage comedy about amputation; everything proclaiming a fierce animal intransigence, as of a fist pounding, which is Mr. Shapiro's meaning for the word "Jew" ("the primitive ego of the human race"), and saturated with an ungovernable pungency of idiom, like Armenian cookery. Pound said of the late Wyndham Lewis that he was a seismograph, not a compass. Mr. Shapiro is neither. His turmoils are not public phenomena, and as a guide to order he is as useless as a burning bush. He had perhaps the ill-luck to be born into the wrong language; to a more austere idiom than colloquial American (littered with glamors that, quickened into poetry, look merely Victorian) he might have brought the gifts of a Jewish Baudelaire.

H. KENNER

LIFE, ITS DIMENSIONS AND ITS BOUNDS, by Robert L. MacIver (Harper, $3.00) is an idiotically pretentious title, no doubt the choice of the publisher, not the author. Actually Mr. MacIver modestly refrains from forcing himself into the company of great connoisseurs of life, like Plato or Saint Anselm. His purpose is simply to display the limits of science, a task which he accomplishes well. He sets up a nominalist scientist to represent the classical scientific claim to possess the only significant source of knowledge and truth, and opposes a realist scientist who demolishes his superficial mechanistic materialism—but who fails miserably to put anything substantial in its place, stumbling, apparently, on the *pons asinorum* of contemporary scientism, Heisenberg's theory of indeterminism.

J. WISNER

Books of Interest

Tourist in Africa, by Evelyn Waugh (Little, Brown, $3.75). Amusing, interesting, faintly querulous observations upon The Emerging World from a man destined never to get The Beat Of It.

Lament for a Generation, by Ralph de Toledano (Farrar, $3.95). The political and spiritual odyssey of a sensitive and knowledgeable man through the crowded decades of the mid-century.

Moments Preserved, by Irving Penn (Simon & Schuster, $17.50). Some 300 photographs—pointillist landscapes, surgical portraits of people notable and notorious—by America's best magazine photographer, a man who transcends, even as he helps to create, that four-color bleed world where, as he once observed, "women do not wrinkle, fruit does not decay, babies do not cry."

Memories and Commentaries, by Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft (Doubleday, $3.95). More *Conversations with Stravinsky:* likely random gossip about music and people, plus the first Stravinsky-Auden scenario for *The Rake's Progress*.

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To the Editor

Some Final Words on the Election

You maintain that abstention from voting, or working to "defeat Nixon," is "a rational position for a conservative" ["NATIONAL REVIEW and the 1960 Elections," Oct. 22]. Such a policy actually would have an effect the opposite of what you predict.

If Mr. Nixon loses, he will not assume that conservatives purposely stayed home, because it will be impossible to prove that with statistics. Rather, he and the other politicians will assume that Mr. Kennedy got more votes because he promised more—and the Republican Party will continue its leftward course in the vain search for those votes.

New York City ROSEMARY MCGRATH

I have noted a few rather caustic letters from some of your clientele who declare their intention to stay at home on November 8. Such a course of action (or inaction) to my mind is sheer defeatism. In a Presidential election we must always deal not with ideal choices of alternatives, but with the actual choices before us.

There is much practical wisdom in Senator Goldwater's advice not to let this election go by default. As President Grover Cleveland once said in another connection, "It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory."

Chattanooga, Tenn. FRANK W. PRESCOTT

Why all this fuss about Mr. Nixon's liberalism? Don't you realize he is carrying out The Dirty Plot [Sept. 12, 1959]?

All of you have written volumes on the political scene and we all agree, but author Peter Crumpet (obviously a practical man) spells out the Perfect Plan and you aren't even aware that it is being put into effect.

So relax, sit back and listen to those wonderful records Mr. Ralph de Toledano recommends. . . .

N. Tarrytown, N.Y. PATRICIA B. BRADY

I hope your readers who write of "sitting this election out" realize there will be more at stake on November 8 than just the Presidency. Senators, Congressmen and state officials will be elected too—and it is imperative that all conservatives vote for the right candidates for these positions, whether or not they vote for Nixon.

The state legislatures are especially important this year, because many congressional districts and state legislative districts will be altered as a result of the 1960 census. The *Wall Street Journal* reports that such redistricting could decide as many congressional contests in 1962 as the elections will do this year. So conservatives, don't forget your local candidates!

Cleveland, Ohio LYN SWENSON

Does no one remember in 1952 Frank Chodorov's saying, in part, that while he could not bring himself to do so, his more Machiavellian friends were going to vote for Stevenson? They felt that Stevenson wouldn't get off the ground (such alarm did he create among conservatives). Whereas with Ike, too many would lean back, relieved and not observing, because Ike was sort of conservative. . . . And look what happened!

Today, so with Nixon. Let Kennedy win! That'll really shake up a bunch of people logey with the good, good life. . . .

Evanston, Ill. DOROTHY MAHLE

Japan's Population Problem

I find it extremely distressing (both in the original memorandum printed in Mr. Burnham's column on the population problem and in the further expansion by the original author) to find the example of Japan put forward admiringly—while the harsh facts of the Japanese "success" are concealed by omission.

Japanese control of the birth rate has been achieved, not by contraception, but by a massive state-encouraged program of abortion. It is possible for men to remain within the Western tradition and hold differing views about the morality of contraception. Abortion, however, is a very different matter; and widespread subsidized abortion, a horror.

Indeed, I should think that, whatever one's personal moral attitude towards contraception may be, any action whatsoever by the state in what is the most private of private



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

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

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

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matters would be regarded by NATIONAL REVIEW as philosophically, morally and politically evil.

Madison, Wis. JAMES MAY GREY

A Brave Man's Enemies

Anne Konstance drew an accurate bead on Pearson ["Full Moon for Drew Pearson," Oct. 22]. I am just waiting for the malefic columnist to get around to one of the bravest men in Congress, California's Edgar Hiestand of the 21st District. If you can judge a great leader by the caliber of his opponents, Mr. Hiestand rates one hundred per cent (which, incidentally, is his rating in the ACA Index, too).

Jimmy Hoffa has sworn to defeat Hiestand, who wrote vital sections of the Landrum-Griffin "workers' bill of rights." Adlai Stevenson crowded a cocktail party reception for Hiestand's opponent into a hasty and unhappy visit to Los Angeles last month. And AFL-CIO's COPE is spending an estimated $100,000 to delude union members into voting against this staunch friend of laborers. . . .

La Canada, Cal. MRS. EILEEN IVERS

Washington Redeemed

At long last we have something in Washington to be proud of—the Redskins.

E. Milton, Mass. BERNARD MCCABE

The Company Cousins Keeps

One point of "The Ordeal of Kenneth Tynan" [by Wm. F. Buckley Jr., Oct. 22] leaves me confused. Norman Cousins is alleged to have been angry because the Tynan production linked him with members of the extreme Left like Dalton Trumbo and Alger Hiss.

This is the same Norman Cousins who links *himself* with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. SANE has among its most ardent workers such people as: Lewis Mumford, formerly of the National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell; Ira Hirschman, supporter of the Henry Wallace for President Committee; Harold E. Fay, national committee member of the Workers Defense League; Dr. Harold Taylor, former President of Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, and supporter of the Committee of One Thousand (to abolish the HUAC). This list, to be sure, only scratches

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the surface. If Mr. Cousins objects to being linked with members of the extreme Left, are we to suppose he considers his committee associates to be moderate Liberals?

Of course, we might have stopped at the beginning to reflect that Dalton Trumbo and Alger Hiss slipped into the category of the extremists only by virtue of the workings of congressional committees against which moderate Liberals crusade. Therefore, when the moderates succeed, there will be no more committees and, *ergo*, no more extremists. Happily, Norman Cousins' dilemma may be solved.

Yonkers, N.Y. ED. J. CANAVAN

A Two-Minute Hate Session

Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn's revealing article ["The Phenomenon of Willi Schlamm," September 24] is in many respects correct. . . .

Curiously enough, the most violent reactions to Schlamm at his Munich speech came from those young men who admittedly never bothered to read his book. The boos and catcalls came from compact heckling sections in the audience—and the agitators themselves were, save for a few hangers-on, in the 19-22 age group.

After a bit of investigation, I learned that the SPD (Democratic Socialist Party) had arranged pre-lecture pep sessions, at which heckling was practiced while the "warmongering" and *Kriegslust* tendencies of Schlamm were exposed (one student described the Orwellian character of a session as resembling a "two-minute hate period"). Once having succeeded in convincing the students of Schlamm's total worthlessness, it was a simple matter to find willing and able demonstrators.

RICHARD V. ALLEN
Kaulbachstrasse, Germany

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An International Termite Symposium just opened under the hallowed auspices of the United Nations. One confused newspaper couldn't determine whether it was being conducted by them or just on them.

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Hewlett, N.Y. ANDREW E. CARLAN

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MASS PLUTOCRACY

Continued from p. 275

tery of the physical world, they appear to reason, has caused us to pass a critical point, so that we need no longer be concerned with those forces which derive from physical vigor and character. *Virtus* like honor is now something for the museum.

But life has other challenges, and the testimony of history is against those who place their faith in a material sufficiency. My prediction is that the test of whether a people or a nation will survive still depends on the mettle that is in them and not on the appurtenances that they own. All possessions are in fact detachable. What is not detachable is the constitution of the man. His capacity to endure physical hardship and his ability to think clear and straight take precedence as gifts over his belongings. The former may insure the latter, but the latter cannot insure the former.

Plutocratic thinking begins by ruling out this unpleasant conclusion, which is that the man will have to stand a test as a man and not just as a possessor of outward means. At one time such thinking was characteristic of only a few persons, who had allowed their possessions to distort their vision. Now it is becoming characteristic of the masses, and as our leaders tend to become more and more followers, out of their fear of pressure groups, it is the line which they feed back to the masses. Is there any way of avoiding an epitaph which would read, "Here lies the world's greatest plutocracy"? It is too early to despair, but certainly a mountain pile of stuff and guff about progress and comfort will have to be swept away before anything can be done. Much of it has appeared with the imprint of universities and from the hands of professors attached to these. Much of it has been transmitted by politically motivated politicians. And journals of high and low opinions have contributed a mighty share. Until it is removed, we will not be able to see man as a creature of more than appetitive function, whose training must include the disciplines of rigor and denial. But it needs the word and the special power of a prophet to wake us up to the necessity. A prophet in a plutocracy is a rebel. Of course he would not have to be honored in his own country in order to save it.

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

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NATIONAL REVIEW

November 5, 1960

A JOURNAL OF FACT AND OPINION

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What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?

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BEAR AND DRAGON

What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?

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Illustrated by A. Derso and Don Reilly

Designed by Mabel Wood

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MEMORANDUM

To: Publisher, National Review
From: Charles Edison

The American-Asian Educational Exchange was organized in 1957 for ". . . the exchange of information, literature and personnel for the purposes of creating a broader understanding between the peoples of the United States and the independent nations of Asia insofar as they refer to our common struggle for freedom against totalitarian oppression."

The Exchange has been fortunate in enlisting the active cooperation of distinguished and dedicated individuals in both the United States and Asia. In spite of restricted financial resources, we have managed to draw Asians and Americans together in a common front, and to make real, if still modest, progress in the line of our basic aims.

There are other distinguished organizations in the United States and Asia that work together toward mutual understanding. For the most part, their programs are limited to philanthropy and purely cultural exchanges. Even the agencies of our government do not seem to be meeting the political challenge of the increasingly critical advance of international communism. The American-Asian Educational Exchange is one of the very few organizations that explicitly recognizes, and seeks to fulfill, the political along with the cultural requirements.

As part of our program, we are pleased to cooperate with National Review in preparation of this symposium on the problem of Sino-Soviet relations. We believe that its wide distribution in the United States and, through translation, in Asia will add to our knowledge of the plans and purposes of international communism, and thereby help to strengthen our hands in dealing with it.

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Operation Will-o'-the-Wisp

Communism has roots that extend backward, through the first two Internationals and the Marx-Engels Manifesto of 1848, to the primitive Christian Church, classical Greece, and Palestine's age of the prophets. As an operational enterprise, however, communism went on line in 1903, when Lenin pieced together his Bolshevik faction at the convention of the Russian Social Democratic Party that adjourned to London after having run into trouble with the police in Brussels. The enterprise started with a couple of dozen adherents; a few hundred pounds, borrowed from the first bourgeois fellow-traveler, as treasury; and six or eight revolvers as arsenal. It had, in addition, a goal and a strategy.

The goal was a monopoly of power over the whole world: a World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics in which, as the chosen anthem proclaimed, "the international party will be the human race." The strategy was to struggle by all and every means until the goal was achieved, until the communists themselves should be alone on earth—and non-communists, by necessary implication, buried. This goal and this strategy were adopted once for all, as the defining essence of the enterprise. Both were explicitly and publicly stated.

Today, fifty-seven years later, the communist enterprise, in pursuit of its fixed goal through its total strategy, has consolidated as its base the most powerful strategic situation on earth; extended its rule over a billion human beings and a fifth of the world's land surface; neutralized half and infiltrated all of the remainder; amassed resources and arms able to challenge if not yet equal those of the surviving opposition. In 1917-23 the enterprise took over the greater part of the Russian Empire. In the early 1930's it added Outer Mongolia. In 1944-49 it got eastern Europe and drove through to the China Sea and the Himalayas. In the early 1950's it moved into the Korean and Southeast Asian peninsulas, and acquired a foothold on the South Sea islands. In 1956 it entered the Middle East. During the past year it has planted beachheads in Africa and Latin America. Advance units of the enterprise are in continuing behind-the-lines action within all nations where it does not yet prevail.

Words to Get Lost By

At every stage in this world-advance, which has no precedent in history for either scale or speed, non-communist opinion has wandered after beckoning formulas that have whispered that the communists did not, or could not, mean what they had said: that they didn't really seek to conquer *all* the earth; that they were not really prepared to use *every* means.

In the earliest years it was easy enough. Not many then, outside the ranks, had even heard of communism (Bolshevism). There was no need to take seriously what you didn't know existed. A few prescient eyes saw something of the future in the course of Russia's 1905 revolt. But Lenin's enterprise was still very small in 1905, and did not appear under its own banner in that action. The communists were intermingled with liberals, socialists, populists and miscellaneous radicals. The most spectacular individual leader of 1905, the young Trotsky, did not at that time adhere to the enterprise or its discipline.

As the enterprise gathered itself together in the years after 1905, it seemed, to most of those who became acquainted with it, a mere minor sect—the radical, rather crackpot wing of the great social democratic movement, within the framework of which the communists were still functioning. When the war came, the communists—who broke away from the social democratic parties after the reformist majority rallied to defense of the "bourgeois fatherland"—seemed a powerless, doctrinaire, anti-war handful scattered in jails, Siberia, Switzerland and the Bronx.

The 1917 Revolution brought little clarification. For the Germans, at first, the destiny of Bolshevism was only to speed the collapse of the Czar's armies by defeatist propaganda; and on that assumption the General Staff sped Lenin and his associates from Switzerland eastward in the meticulously sealed train. The Allied powers were ready to accept the communists as one segment of the patriotic Russian people who were replacing medieval autocracy by a modern parliamentary regime that would be much better suited to the task of making the world safe for democracy. The Western liberals and socialists felt no need to omit the communists from their greetings to the forces of progress that were leading Russia onward and upward into the modern age.

Lenin as Teacher

When Lenin's enterprise revealed that it meant business about quitting the war, when it outlawed rival parties even of the farthest Left, and sent its Red Armies to destroy non-communist regimes within the former Czarist realm and to attack the border regions, a few persons in the Allied coalition took alarm. They fought back in Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states, and made a half-hearted intervention in support of the enterprise's doomed internal rivals. By 1923 the storms subsided. The enterprise abandoned its premature lunges against the West. It fell back inside the reduced Czarist boundaries to consolidate its victories and gather strength for rounds to come. The primary external drive, having been temporarily stopped in its direct push westward, shifted to a vast encircling movement through

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Asia, supplemented by infiltration operations in the Western countries.

New formulas arose to beckon Western opinion away from the truth that it did not choose to face. Fixing its attention on the now stabilized western border, and thus overlooking the flanking campaign already launched in China, Western opinion now found it easy to believe that the communist enterprise, however distasteful by Western standards, had quieted down (*viz.*, the New Economic Policy) and was no longer a danger. In spite of the ritual internationalist jargon of the leaders, the Revolution was "fundamentally Russian" and "not for export." Besides, the new Soviet government had all it could do at home, trying to rebuild the food supply and the shattered economy. This comforting formula seemed to be confirmed when Stalin won his domestic victory under the slogan of "Socialism in One Country." No one could object—could they?—to a nation's having whatever internal system it wanted. The Soviet regime, if still backward, was now sufficiently regularized in the eyes of the West to permit trade and diplomatic recognition.

Too Popular Front

After 1933 the still more seductive will-o'-the-wisp of the Popular Front was added to the lights flickering on the horizon. The Soviet Union and the communist enterprise were bulwarks against the gravest threat and greatest evil, fascism-Nazism. Even if from motives somewhat different from ours, the communists were opposed to Nazism. Far from being any longer a menace to the free world, the communist enterprise was to become its indispensable colleague. A lingering minority dissent to this formula sounded briefly louder during the two puzzling years of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but instantly evaporated in 1941, when the communists became — so read the rejuvenated formula of those days—our staunch allies in the democratic war against totalitarianism, Hitler, and (for a couple of weeks) the Mikado.

The war-time ally formula wore itself out rather quickly after the shooting stopped, but Tito popped up just in time to keep Western eyes from focusing. Confrontation of the truth about the goal and strategy of the communist enterprise, and about the consequent counter-strategy required of the non-communist world, could be conscientiously avoided, this time, because an internally divisive and thus outwardly harmless national communism, modelling itself on Tito, was going to replace the monolithic communist structure.

With the death of Stalin, a whole new covey of formulas rose on the wind. We now learned that the trouble had, all along, been the individual Stalin, a tyrant, megalomaniac, sadist and general psychopath. With Stalin out of the way, a sensible "committee government" was taking over, thus introducing some of the checks and balances of democracy. It was being influenced by Malenkov to give up dreams of world conquest in order to please consumers; by Beria, to close Stalin's slave camps; by Zhukov, to revert from cosmopolitanism to Russian nationalism; by the intellectuals, to abandon totalitarian controls.

When Khrushchev took it upon himself to kill Beria, purge Malenkov, demote Zhukov and bring the intellectuals to heel, he evidently absorbed by a kind of spiritual osmosis the ideas of his victims. Now it was Khrushchev's ascendancy that showed that we could hope to coexist with the enterprise, that there was no need to defeat it. Our scholars proved that Khrushchev *had* to favor disarmament, peace, coexistence and internal liberalization, because the people demanded more consumer goods, youth insisted on a more open society, the industrial managers wanted a freer hand in running industry, and everybody was sick of Stalinism. Khrushchev's crushing of the Hungarian revolt was a parenthetic throwback that did not affect "the basic trends."

Throughout the world an eager welcome mat was spread for Khrushchev, the liberalizer and coexister. This formula not only retained but steadily fortified its attractive power, until the aborted Summit Conference of May, 1960; nor was it even thereafter dead, but sleeping.

Before, however, bringing to a close this summary list of the diversionary formulas, we must turn back in order to add a short converging series. Not long after its victory in Russia, the enterprise began, as we have noted, a major operation in Asia, specifically in China. Although this had attained a rather formidable scale as early as 1926-27, Western opinion was not much concerned with communism in China until the mid-1930's, when for the first time stories about the Chinese "Red Army," the "Long March," the "Yenan government," and Mao Tse-tung began to appear in both public journals and the private dispatches of foreign service officers.

Yenan Way and Ways

Attached to these stories, and to the analyses, interpretations, monographs and theses of and on the Chinese Revolution that soon proliferated, there was, as always in the West's relation to any phase of the communist enterprise, an attractive formula adapted to the job of leading the mind away from the truth about communism's goal and strategy. In this case, since China was particularly in question, the formula was of course cooked *à la mode de la Chine*.

The terms of the Chinese formula became well enough known not only in the days when it flourished but from discussion, inquiry and debate after it was laid uneasily to rest. Reduced to simplest terms, it read: a) Chinese communism is not an offshoot, auxiliary or dependency of Russian communism or the Soviet-dominated Comintern; b) Chinese communism is an authentic, nationalist, Chinese development; c) considered as a social tendency, Chinese communism is not in fact "communist" in the Russian communist sense, but rather a radical, peasant (agrarian, populist) movement. Corollaries to the formula explained that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang represented not Chinese nationalism but reactionary "feudalism."

This formula, in varied guises, prevailed until some time after the completion of the Communist conquest of mainland China in 1949. It had a per-

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vasive influence, negatively and positively, on American and Western policy toward China during the war and postwar years. After the Korean War began, however—with Western soldiers being killed by communist Chinese troops shooting Russian guns, flying Russian planes, and trained very often by Russian instructors—this formula was largely withdrawn from public circulation. But its attractive power has continued to express itself in campaigns for diplomatic recognition of, UN membership for, and increased trade with, Communist China, and for liquidation of Chiang's regime on Formosa.

More recently the still hardy roots of this perennial have been grafted onto a new plant that has been pushing up for the past few years until it was ready to burst into bloom in the Summit harvest. Since May, 1960, the dominant formula—the ascendant will-o'-the-wisp drawing Western eyes toward its flickering outline—has been "the Sino-Soviet conflict." The initial impotence of the communists, their Russian patriotism, Stalin's abandonment of the international revolution, communist anti-fascism, the alliance against Hitler, Chinese agrarian democracy, Tito and national communism, committee government, patriotic opposition of the military, the thaw, consumer desires, Khrushchev the liberalizer and coexister—all, one after another, have failed and betrayed us. But the Sino-Soviet conflict remains, and we shall yet be saved.

It may be observed that "the Sino-Soviet conflict" is a synthetic formula—a "dialectical synthesis at a higher level," the communists themselves would say. It compresses into one package the essential juice of both the eastern and western series. In it we can discover derivatives of the early formulas about Khrushchev's softening of Russian communism (which, in turn, hark back to formulas about Stalin's domestication of Lenin-Trotsky's world revolution), as well as the earlier formula about the independent local roots and special character of Chinese communism. In effect, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" formula reassures us that neither Russian nor Chinese communism is really "communism," or really means what it says about destroying

"imperialism" and winning a victory "in the entire world." Rather, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" suggests, Russian and Chinese *soi-disant* communisms, reverting to ethnic and national origins, are developing into each other's worst enemy. They are gradually channeling their principal energies into internecine struggle. Such, at any rate, are the implications of Western analysis, 1960 model.

After tryouts in secluded scholarly circles, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" began to make public appearances in the West shortly after the conclusion of the Korean War. Incidentally, it seems to be a subject of conversation much favored by communist hosts, and has been frequently featured in the reports of statesmen and journalists on return from visits to Peking or Moscow. Mr. Lazitch, in his essay here printed, cites the statement of Clement Attlee on arriving back from China in 1954. Konrad Adenauer—who had perhaps been primed by the studies of Dr. Starlinger, to which Professor Wittfogel makes reference—is reliably reported to have been swung toward the formula during his visit to Moscow. Chancellor Adenauer, in turn, is said to have discussed it with General de Gaulle when they spent a weekend together at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises last winter. Shortly thereafter, in a public address motivating his invitation to Khrushchev to visit France, de Gaulle remarked a "more reasonable" Soviet attitude, which he attributed to the spreading "rift" between Russia and China, and the looming "threat" to the "white men" of Russia from the "yellow hordes" of Asia. The British had sighted the formula some while back, when they recognized the Peking regime and offered trade concessions. Adlai Stevenson, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Senator Hubert Humphrey and Vice President Nixon were among the American travelers who brought versions of the "Sino-Soviet conflict" back among their Moscow gifts.

But it was the May, 1960, Summit blowup and the resultant damage to the "Khrushchev the liberalizer and coexister" formula that launched "the Sino-Soviet conflict" into stardom. Everybody—well, just about everybody—saw at once that Sino-Soviet conflict was the basic explanation for the way Khrushchev behaved in Paris. This was what the 3,000 correspondents cabled from the scene. "Pressure from the Chinese communists" was the gist of the judgment rendered, after due inquiry into the causes of the Summit episode, by Senator Fulbright and the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Nixon soberly concurred, and Senator Humphrey, drawing on his eight and a half hours of Kremlin instruction, devoted a Senate speech in August to "the deep-seated frictions [that] have developed in the last few years" between China and the Soviet Union. "It is a fair assumption," he ventured, "that these cleavages will increase rather than lessen."

Passkey or New Look?

Newspaper editorial writers throughout Europe and the Americas composed creative variations on the formula's theme. Everybody quoted sentences plucked from journals in Moscow or Peking, and each other. Learned confirmation was not lacking, especially from those scholars who had been most conspicuous in developing the earlier Chinese formula about the non-Russian, local, agrarian roots of the Chinese communist movement. By September and the meeting of the UN General Assembly, "the Sino-Soviet conflict" had become all but universally accepted as a kind of general field theory for the explanation of all international goings-on.

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* found Khrushchev's UN behavior axiomatically explicable by his need "to affirm his pre-eminence within the communist bloc, now riven by the dispute with China." Mr. Joseph Alsop, who functions as a rhetorical triborough bridge linking journalism, the State Department and the academies, was able to sum up *ex cathedra* on September 16, 1960: "A threatened break between the Soviet Union and Communist China looks more and more like the missing

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piece in the deeply disturbing puzzle of recent Soviet behavior. . . . Even the smallest possibility of a break could be counted on to exert great pressure on Khrushchev. But the evidence suggests that the possibility is not small. It is no slim chance now, but a rather strong possibility. If [a mid-October meeting between Khrushchev and Mao] fails [to compose the conflict], however, the betting will be rather better than even on an open Sino-Soviet break at the meeting of communist leaders over all the world that is expected to be held in Moscow in November."

From Formula to Reality

In its operational consequences, each of these formulas acts to divert non-communists, and the non-communist nations, from a line of action aiming at the defeat of the communist enterprise. This is the effect, whether or not any of the formulas or all of them successively are true, and whether their source is deliberate deception by the communists, wishful thinking by non-communists, or a fusion of both. Each formula suggests, either a) that the communists do not really mean what they say about conquering the world ("burying" us) and using all necessary means thereto; or b) that they will be prevented from achieving their goal by an internal development—bourgeoisification, internecine squabbles, liberalization, or whatever. On the first alternative, peaceful, if competitive, coexistence is both possible and reasonable. On the second, we need only hold on a while. Stalin and Trotsky, or Tito and Stalin, or Beria and Khrushchev, or Khrushchev and Mao, or X and Y, will kill each other off, or a taste for free speech and consumer luxuries will dampen revolutionary ardor.

Most of the past diversionary formulas are no longer relevant or persuasive. Stalin's Socialism in One Country wasn't much of a comfort after Stalin grabbed eastern Europe. Most of us, even the experts on matters communist and Soviet, would probably admit, if pressed in private, that most or all of the earlier formulas were, well, mistaken. Still, we seldom admit this in public. The mistake is never subjected to a rigorous examination that might disclose the springs of error, and guard against their further influence. The old formula is merely shoved quietly out of public sight, while first the experts and then the rest of us switch smoothly to the new one — which never fails to make a timely appearance.

Even though the old formulas may have been mistaken and false, the new one, of course, may nevertheless be true. And there is no question but that most persons who express opinions on these matters do at present believe the now dominant formula of "the Sino-Soviet conflict" to be true. It is official, established, part of what may properly be called "public opinion." Yet the fact that it is so generally believed does not, unfortunately, guarantee that it is any less mistaken than some at least of the past formulas have undoubtedly been. "The Sino-Soviet conflict" may be only the latest in the fifty-seven-year series of strategic will-o'-the-wisps that have beckoned the West away from the main road.

A paragraph from the letter of invitation that I wrote to the contributors whose essays follow hereon states the aim of this present project: "The American-Asian Educational Exchange has asked *National Review* to prepare and publish on its behalf a symposium on the critical problem of the relation between the Soviet Union and Communist China. . . . I am inviting eight experts to contribute essays that will analyze this central problem from the perspective of their respective special fields: Chinese history; Russian history; economics; communist operations and history; strategy, etc. The purpose of the symposium is not to debate issues of current practical policy, but to assemble and focus a body of relevant data, analysis and interpretation which will be of intrinsic scientific and intellectual interest, and could, if so utilized, provide an improved basis for wise decisions on policy."

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Connecticut
September, 1960

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Perspective I

World History

For centuries the relations between China and Russia have swung between extremes of conflicts and friendship. Which will prevail tomorrow?

WLODZIMIERZ BACZKOWSKI

The problem of Sino-Russian relations is but one facet of the immense subject of relations between different societies and civilizations. Since the dawn of history these have always been marked by incessant rivalry which in moments of great stress has ripened into armed conflict.

Direct analysis will show that Sino-Russian relations conform to this age-old pattern. Ever since Russia conquered the eastern regions of Siberia, and in the middle of the seventeenth century came into contact with the Chinese sphere of interest, her relations with China have been characterized by rivalry and wars. These began with the frequent clashes between Russian conquistadors and scattered Chinese military units that were temporarily halted by the Treaty of 1689, under which China kept the Amur river. Lacking bases from which to attack, Russia was compelled to restrain her expansionist dynamism in the Far East, and to limit herself to slow colonization along with trade.

This trend was sharply reversed in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Russia turned to open penetration and seizure of the northern and northwestern provinces of China. Between the treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the end of the century Russia won a series of concessions as a result of which she was able to acquire vast areas on the left bank of the Amur, conquer the rich province of Ussuri, and occupy ports on the Pacific Ocean. After settling in western Turkestan, Russia gained trade privileges in China proper and began the penetration of eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang). Even Tibetan affairs and Franco-Siamese quarrels evoked lively interest in St. Petersburg.

Among the major steps by which Russia reached the warm waters of the Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century were the concessions extracted from China in 1896 for the building of the Chinese Eastern Railroad that was to connect eastern Siberia with Vladivostok and secure a dominant position for Russia in Manchuria. A show of force in the Pacific by the Russian Navy secured a lease on Port Arthur and Port Dalny, with the right to build spur lines to those two cities. In 1900 Russia's participation in the quelling of the Boxer movement placed Russian troops for more than a year in the Chinese capital of Peking. By forcing China to grant autonomy to Outer Mongolia through treaties signed in 1913 and 1915, Russia opened the door to an unhampered take-over of the country.

World War I Plans

During World War I, Russia's plans in China were ambitious. In the event of the confidently expected victory, Russia was to annex and incorporate within her frontiers all the Asian border regions. One sponsor of this plan—the then Governor General of Turkestan, Aleksey N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925)—reported to the Czar that the postwar security of the Turkestan border demanded the return to Russia of the Persian provinces of Astarabad, Gilan and Mazandaran, "the heritage of Peter the Great," as well as establishment of a Russian protectorate over the Tabriz, Meshed and Teheran areas. Within Afghanistan, Russia would take control of the Amu-Darya and Mugrab rivers and the Tedjen, would open the country to Russian trade, and would build a railroad through to India. As for China, Kuropatkin wanted a new border drawn from the Khan Tengri Range (in Tian-Shan) to Vladivostok, thereby placing northern Mongolia, the Kuldja, and northern Manchuria inside the Russian Empire.[1]

The general pattern of Russian policy toward China was not very much different from that of the other European powers. Although Russia did not follow their example of fostering religious missions, she promoted her interests by spreading the Russian language and Russian culture. The Chinese Eastern Railroad, cutting through Manchuria, was in reality an extension of Russia, and all Manchuria was being rapidly transformed into a Russian province. A Russian atmosphere and Russian customs soon prevailed in Port Arthur and Dalny. Relations with the native population began to resemble those in British colonies. The haughty representatives of the Russian Empire regarded the Chinese *hodia* as a mark of inferior race.

In spite of some surface appearances, the situation following the Russian Revolution of 1917 showed few changes of real benefit to China. True enough, the Kremlin renounced Czarist privileges in China, and supported China's struggle for freedom *from Western influence* with propaganda and diversionary tactics, but it showed little respect for Chinese sovereignty or forms of government. Through the Comintern (organized in 1919) and the Chinese Communist Party (organized in 1921), communist Russia was undermining the existing Chinese regime and subverting the ruling nationalist Kuomintang party. Russian tactics were instrumental in preventing a stabilization of the internal Chinese political situation and a peaceful development of economic and social reforms.

[1] "The Kirgiz Rebellion of 1916," *Novy Vostok*, Vol. VI, p. 270, as quoted by Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky in *Russia and Asia*, New York, 1933.

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There is ample evidence from Soviet actions in the period immediately following the Japanese surrender in August, 1945 that the Soviet Union regarded non-communist China as an enemy. The most obviously inimical gesture in those years was the wholesale looting of equipment from heavy industrial and defense plants in Manchuria, after Japan's surrender, and its shipment to Russia as "war booty."

Sino-Soviet Similarities

The history of relations between peoples reveals that, besides the powerful currents of rivalry and war, there is also a recurrent impulse toward the peaceful coexistence even of radically different societies. Such a tendency is discovered when great empires are constructed out of heterogeneous nations, as in the instances of the Roman, Islamic, British and French empires. There thus arises the question whether future historians will find Sino-Soviet relations to be a new proof that two dissimilar powers can live together peacefully within the framework of a common ideocratic empire. Russia's great empire-building talents, proved by the creation and endurance of the multinational Russian state, as well as Chinese political and national tradition, seem to support an affirmative answer.

There are many factors that favor an amicable Sino-Soviet coexistence. History shows that China—like the ancient countries of Mesopotamia and Egypt—created its own highly developed method of carrying out gigantic projects through a centralized governing body and a total mobilization of the population.

Soviet plans for rapid industrialization, agrarian collectives and thought control are, essentially, new forms of ancient Chinese plans for vast irrigation works, great defense walls against invasion, ambitious colonization drives, etc. Some historians even lean to the theory that the pre-revolutionary Czarist regime in Russia, especially prior to Peter the Great, was in many respects akin to Chinese, Persian and Byzantine prototypes. Dr. Karl Wittfogel, for example, has described China as the world's cradle of totalitarianism, planned economy and super-bureaucracy. According to this author, Russia is in these matters a Chinese marginal area, a sort of Chinese borderland.[2]

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It is thus safe to assume that when the present rulers of the two countries discuss industrialization, collectivization campaigns or far-reaching expansion programs, they do so in terms that have on both sides an old, familiar ring.

Hatred of the West

Moreover, certain mental and psychological traits help to bring Russians and Chinese closer together. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and some Romance peoples, who can be influenced by dispassionate reflection, the Chinese and the Slavs are swayed primarily by emotions, faith and non-rational beliefs. Thus the new Russian and Chinese ideology, even though atheistic, rather easily replaces religions. The passions and longings fanned by the new ideology take on the earmarks of religious fanaticism and become powerful stimulants of the sociological dynamism. Both countries are passionately envious of the Western world and its riches; and as a result acquire a hatred of everything Western—a sentiment nursed and sustained by a systematic indoctrination which harps on the real and imaginary wrongs allegedly inflicted on Asia and Russia in the past by Western nations.

Even some of the leading pre-revolutionary Russian intellectuals expressed spiritual kinship with China and Asia. Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, traveling companion of Crown Prince Nicholas during that future Czar's travels in Asia in 1890-91, wrote about "the brotherly and close spiritual ties with Asia." Russia, he declared, is also Asia, and Russia's historic mission is to lead the East. "Asia is now suffering because it is aware of the unbridgeable chasm between herself and the West, while there are no barriers between our creative chaos and that of China." Nothing is easier for Russians (he continues) than to deal with Asians. Between the peoples of the East and the Russians there is such a consensus on most vital problems that spiritual kinship is easily discernible. "There is only one alternative for the All-Russian empire," Ukhtomsky concluded. "Either to become a world power that in itself embraces both West and East—and Russia is destined to be such a power—or to follow, inconspicuously and ingloriously, a path of decline in the course of which Europe will eventually crush us by its superior material strength." An awakening of Asian nations without Russia's prodding, Ukhtomsky added, would be much more dangerous for Russians than the threats from their Western neighbors.

Soviet authors who write about Sino-Soviet friendship naturally ignore the aristocrat, Ukhtomsky. In his place they quote the noted revolutionary and materialist, N. G. Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), who violently denounced the policy followed by the Western powers in China during the Opium War, and wrote approvingly of the Tai-ping movement. Other Russian authors who wrote about China with sympathy and admiration, and who nowadays are much quoted by Soviet writers, include the famous novelist, I. A. Goncharov (1812-1891), and the physician, P. Y. Piasetsky, a member of the Russian expedition to China in 1875-1877.



However, the most frequently quoted of all protagonists of Sino-Russian friendship is the world-famous scientist, D. I. Mendeleyev (1834-1907), who, though known chiefly as a chemist, was also prominent as a philosopher and geopolitician. He taught the necessity of the most cordial relations with China. In his last statement, *Thoughts for Posterity*, he wrote: "It is desirable that

[2] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, 1957. Russian historians who attribute a decisive role to Oriental factors in the development of the Russian state and society include: N. Karamzin (1766-1826); V. O. Kluchesvky (1841-1911), in part; N. Kostomarov (1817-1885); M. Pokrovsky (1868-1932).

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Russia conclude the closest political and every other sort of alliance with China, which is an awakening country of 450 million inhabitants, and has, like Russia, every opportunity of becoming the most powerful state in the world. . . ." If she secures the friendship of that most numerous people of the world, Mendeleyev reasoned, Russia may face with equanimity the changes that the twentieth century will bring.

The above-quoted examples of pro-Chinese sentiments are more than the isolated opinions of a few individuals. In truth, they mirror the innate and subconscious leanings of the Russian people toward the East, and their distrust of the West. This was the tendency also of the Russian slavophiles of the nineteenth century, who believed that Russia belonged neither to East nor to West, but who, psychologically, broke the ground for the rapprochement of a considerable part of the Europeanized Russian elite with the East.

Similar leanings may also be found in statements of Russian religious leaders, especially those of sectarian and non-ecclesiastical trends—conspicuous among them the great novelist, Leo Tolstoy. In his letters to the Chinese, Tolstoy counseled them not to introduce reforms in the liberal European tradition, but to seek a Chinese solution to their problems. He also advised them to fight Western oppression by passive resistance—a recommendation he repeated in his letters written in 1908 to Hindus, which became a key influence on Gandhi's choice of strategy.

The Qualitative Strategy

The Russian revolution of 1917 begins a new era in Sino-Russian relations. The change was foreseen by Lenin, who asserted after the Chinese revolution of 1911 that events in China were of such world-wide importance that they would engulf Asia and stop the West.[3] But before the revolution could get into full swing in China, the Kremlin's attention was drawn to events in Germany and Hungary and to the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. It was not until 1923-24, when it abandoned hope for a victory of the Western proletariat, that the Kremlin again focused on Asia and the colonial hinterlands of the Western powers. Lenin described this shift in one of his last pronouncements in this field. In the article entitled, "Better Less but Better," written in 1923, he wrote that the hope for the final triumph of the revolution is based on the fact that the peoples of Russia, China, India, etc., comprising the overwhelming majority of the human

race, are being drawn with great speed into the fight for emancipation.

What this really meant was that the Kremlin's *creative* foreign policy was veering slowly toward Asia and the colonial empires of the Western nations. For obvious reasons, Western foreign policy-makers failed to notice this shift. Western statesmen were misled by the fact that the Soviet governmental apparatus, fearing an attack on the western borders of Soviet Russia, continued to be preoccupied in its *conventional,* diplomatic activities by relations with the Western powers.

Thus two separate and distinct lines of Soviet policy were developed: one, which we may call the *qualitative* policy, concerned itself with Asian countries; the second, which we may call the *quantitative* policy, concerned itself principally with Soviet relations to Europe and the Western world.

The primary aims of the quantitative policy were the defense of the Soviet borders and the postponement of "the final and decisive battle" for world rule to a time chosen by the Kremlin.

It was the qualitative strategy that expressed the ultimate goals of the communist leadership and the basic tenets of Soviet strategy. Success for the creative, expansive qualitative policy meant general victory for the communist enterprise; failure meant a slow disintegration of communism within the narrow confines of the Soviet state.

Predicated upon such premises, Soviet plans for China were lifted to the level of global grand strategy, backed by a readiness for any sacrifice in the struggle to absorb China and the other countries of Asia. Between the two world wars this Soviet willingness to accept any required sacrifice was not apparent to the Western leaders, whose diplomatic eyes were focused on the steadily growing tensions along the western Soviet borders. It became obvious only after World War II and the sovietization of China in 1949.

Mutual Bonds Tighten

Three striking facts symbolize the content of the Kremlin's new policy toward China: the voluntary withdrawal of Soviet officials and units from the administration of Port Arthur and Dalny, which were under lease to the Soviet Union; the voluntary withdrawal of the co-administrators of the Manchurian railroads; and the further voluntary withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. There are no precedents in Russian history for such actions. Also without precedent is the scope and volume of Soviet aid in the development of China's military, industrial and political potential. A proper evaluation of this aid can be made only by remembering Russia's shortages at home and the low standard of living of Soviet citizens.

The impact of this new phase of Sino-Soviet relations is so deep and pervasive that even the divergent views of Chinese and Russian leaders on current internal and international problems must be understood within the specific context which it determines. The respective leaders differ not in the essentials of policy, not about the necessity for cooperation and for the pursuit of common objectives, but about some of the methods for realizing the Marxist-Leninist aims, and for reaching in the shortest possible time the next stage on the road to the final goal. It may seem paradoxical to state the truth that *the leaders of China and Russia differ not in matters that divide them, but in matters that unite them.* In Mao Tse-tung's words, the differences between China and the Soviet Union are "non-antagonistic"; and such differences not only do not hinder

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* 4th ed., Vol. 17, p. 435.

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cooperation, but, on the contrary, stimulate progress.[4] This explains why each crisis in Sino-Soviet relations has served only to tighten, not to loosen, their mutual bonds.

Cooperation Predicted

Thus, we find in the over-all history of Sino-Russian relations two clearly defined currents: one of strife and suspicion; the other of cooperation and friendship. Which of the two will prevail in this decisive hour of world history? Nobody knows, of course, with complete certainty, but it seems probable that it will be the tendency toward friendship and cooperation.

Apart from the factors already discussed, this prediction is based on a number of developments of much greater importance than the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the events in China since World War II. One of these—which became apparent long before the Russian and Chinese revolutions—is the gradual decay in both countries of nationalistic civilization and consciousness of specific national destiny.

Since the nineteenth century both Russia and China have been gradually losing the innate traits of dynamic, individual historic entities, and have been slowly transforming themselves into societies lacking both originality of thought and indigenous policy. Traditionally theocracies, they broke away from religion; having had authoritarian governments from time immemorial, they experimented with Western types of democracy; lacking their own traditions in pure science and modern technology, they suddenly began to believe that their future development was dependent upon the supreme power of science and technology. In the course of the cataclysmic changes that befell both countries, they were slowly losing the native ideologies and civilizations which, differing so widely, had in the past been repellent to each other. Russia was ending her spiritual battle against the "barbarian" steppes, against the "yellow peril," and against the Latin "heretics" of the West—thus forgetting her mission to establish a Slav-

Orthodox world empire which would fuse in itself the "rotten" East and the "declining" West. At about the same time, China was ending her attempted progress from an archaic past to a modern Westernized nation —a form which she could neither understand easily nor assimilate with a Japanese tempo.

Meanwhile both nations were creating internal conditions destined to draw them closer together politically, ideologically, and even culturally. The disappearance of their former "historic missions" and native civilizations was accompanied in both countries by a fading of their temporarily assumed socio-economic structures and ideas. Thus the gates were opened to a new social and economic system of a radical type. The foundations were laid in both countries for the eventual victory of Marxism-Leninism.

To sum up: the two most decisive factors affecting recent Sino-Soviet relations are: 1) the eclipse of the traditional forms of civilization that had always in the past caused frictions between the two countries; and 2) the emergence in both countries of a Leninist-Maoist ideology that tends to unite them. It is a special and determining feature of this process that Leninism-Maoism did not have to supplant a live and dynamic ideology in either country. In both, it filled a void left by the decay of traditional values that were not replaced by adequately dynamic new values.

This may explain why the Soviet Union is building a powerful China —an action that is contrary to the best interests of historical Russia. It also explains why the new elite of an ancient and proud Chinese nation consented to obey the dictates of an international enterprise centered in "barbarian" Moscow.

There is another link in Sino-Soviet relations that tends to hold the two countries close together: the similarity in their political and military strategies Russia modeled her strategy on Chinese, Mongol and Persian-Byzantine patterns, a fact noted by several Russian historians both before and after the 1917 Revolution. For example, in 1875 Prince Golitzin, a member of the military-scientific committee of the Russian General Staff, recommended the book by General M. Ivanin about the Mongol art of war. He wrote that General Ivanin explained how the military system of Jenghiz Khan had been partly assimilated by the Russians during two centuries of Tatar captivity, and had entered into their customs and habits in the period preceding the reforms of Peter the Great.[5]

The Soviet General A. Svechin also acknowledged the debt of Russia to the Eastern peoples: "We have borrowed from the East a deep respect for accurate shooting, for leading an army into battle from the rear, for division of a big army into right and left wings and into vanguards and reserves, for organizing light cavalry to fight like infantry; and we have learned to attach great importance to espionage and the security services."[6]

Alike in War Tactics

For Chinese observers also, the Soviet-Russian art of war appears to be essentially oriental. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated in his book published in 1957[7] that Soviet military strategy represented a combination of the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese strategist of 500 B. C. In their study of military art, according to Chiang, the Russian communists have paid particular attention to the theories and principles which Sun Tzu and Jenghiz Khan propounded.

The following excerpts from Sun Tzu's writings on strategy[8] show striking resemblances to the Soviet-communist *strategy of stratagem*:

[4] "In Connection with the Problem of the Right Solution of Contradictions within the Nation," *Pravda*, June 19, 1957.

[5] Gen. M. Ivanin, *On Military Art and on the Conquests of the Tatar-Mongols*, St. Petersburg, 1875.

[6] Gen. A. Svechin, *Evolution of Military Art*, Moscow, 1927-8.

[7] Chiang Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek), *Soviet Russia in China*, New York, 1957.

[8] Lionel Giles, *Sun Tzu on the Art of War*, London, 1910; and I. I. Konrad, *Sun-Tzy, Traktat o voyennom iskustve*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950.

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All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must make an impression to be unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. . . .

Pretend meekness to make the enemy overconfident. When the enemy's morale begins to crumble, pretend that your own army also is tired and weak. Should unrest break out in the enemy's camp, pretend that similar unrest is rife within your ranks. Simulated disorders postulate perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. Hiding beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy . . .

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are as inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent, and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.



The Mongolian art of war was similar. Basing their foreign and military policy on an excellent intelligence system and secret service, *the Mongols almost never faced defeat, because their army was employed only in the final stages of conflict, after extensive subversive activities in the country which they intended to conquer.* Long before actual battles were started, the Asian chiefs collected detailed information about their adversary. They minutely studied the physiographical conditions, as well as the military, political, economic, social and religious situation. This espionage, practiced on a very high level, assured the Mongol chiefs of a detailed knowledge of conditions, means, resources and morale within the theater of future operations.

Mongolian emissaries, working in close cooperation with general headquarters and using the information obtained from the intelligence service and local agents, carried on a lively activity. They instigated racial wrangles, regional, national and religious struggles, in order to provoke discord among the population and rebellion in the army. Simultaneously the Mongolian diplomats sought to isolate the adversary from his allies.[9]

The close relationship between Soviet and Chinese tactics and strategy is based not only on common Chinese and more generally oriental patterns, but also on indigenous Russian-Soviet ideas. Leninist strategy has had its reciprocal influence on present Chinese concepts of strategy and tactics, as is amply revealed in the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese communist leaders, which frequently quote Lenin approvingly and advocate policies in line with his teachings.

Moscow's influence on China in the sphere of strategy and tactics is extensive and deep because both countries derive their basic doctrine from closely related sources. The application of Leninist strategy on Chinese territory is in reality a return home of the older Chinese and oriental strategy that in a new form boomerangs back from Russia to China.

Thus, China and the Soviet Union understand each other not only because they share the same ideology, but because their operational methods are much the same. Acting in concert, they take pains to camouflage the closeness of their alliance and to deceive the West with stories of internal quarrels and conflicts.

There is another aspect of the present relationship of the two countries that is frequently overlooked. China is a country that throughout a long history has usually been ruled by an omnipotent and easily corruptible officialdom. This mode of government has often caused widespread opposition among the masses, has led to the counter-formation of numerous secret societies, and has from time to time erupted in peasant uprisings which have toppled dynasties and regimes. But this recurrent pattern has now been changed. Thanks to the close ideological and strategic alliance between China and Soviet Russia, any rebellious move against either regime would be crushed by the combined power of both, as in Hungary in 1956.

China is compelled to uphold the present regime in the Soviet Union in order to assure the uninterrupted flow of Soviet material aid, which is mandatory for China's development, and the *raison d'être* of the Chinese Communist Party. If this massive flow of goods and weapons is to continue, the present Russian regime must be not merely maintained, but kept at the highest ideological pitch.

The Kremlin acts from similar motives. The fall of the present form of government in China would be a major disaster for the Soviet Union. It would end the Kremlin's grandiose plans, and would endanger the motherland of the revolution and the empire of the Russian people. It is in communist Russia's best interests to preserve a pure Marxist-Leninist line in Peking.

Under such conditions, there is little chance for the successful organization of secret societies, or for staging rebellions in either China or Russia. Any sign of serious opposition in either country would be promptly stamped out not only by the police and armed forces of that country, but also by those of the neighbor. The first condition for successful uprisings is that they should occur simultaneously in the two countries; and this is too much to hope for. Sino-Soviet amity and cooperation must be recognized as principal and constant factors of the present era of world conflict.

[9] W. Zatorski, *Jenghiz Khan*, Warsaw, 1939.

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Perspective II

Russian History

The Communists themselves may not understand how the past history of both Russia and China opened the road to common totalitarian victory.

DONALD W. TREADGOLD

Relations between the governments of China and Russia reach far back into history. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic began with the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950, but the more important fact is that intimate contacts between the two Communist Parties now ruling these countries date from 1921, when the Soviet Party assisted in the foundation of the Chinese Party. The Russian Empire and the Chinese Empire first established official relations in the Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689. But at a much earlier time Russia and China were in close contact, when both were parts of a larger empire, that of the Mongols, founded in the thirteenth century.

Rather than trace the course of diplomacy or official relations between the two countries—this has been done by a number of scholars—I will attempt a brief examination of the main features of Russian social organization and thought in comparison to the society and thought of China, in order to suggest some of the reasons why communists were able to come to power in both.

Power Diversified

The first organized state of the Eastern Slavs, who later became differentiated into Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians, was known as Kievan Rus. The first princes were Norsemen, ruling in Kiev from the middle of the ninth century A.D. They accepted Christianity and thereupon entered into the circle of European civilization in 988 A.D., within the period when the very phrase "European civilization" was for the first time assuming clear meaning.

For the next two centuries and a half Kievan Rus and the semi-independent principalities into which the Kievan state, in the early twelfth century, dissolved developed a kind of society not radically different from that of the other ex-barbarian European states of the time. Kievan Rus knew princely government, and also the influence of noble councils and popular assemblies on it; there was a hereditary nobility which served the princes, not under the classic feudal pattern of contract, but still retaining an important series of rights and privileges; there were peasants who had various degrees of obligations to the nobles or princes or church authorities on whose lands they lived, and free and independent farmers, as well as slaves; there was a sizable class of merchants and traders. It was a kind of society in which Christian and barbarian legal notions were intermingled and to some extent codified, and in which a powerful clergy undertook to uphold Christian ethical norms and the independence of the Russian Orthodox church, against the princes when necessary. In summary, it was a society in which elements of diversity and unity could both be found, a society which could be called multicentered.

In China some of the same elements could have been found in the society which preceded the Ch'in dynasty, established in 221 B.C., but after that time China developed as an empire whose power was centralized in an emperor and his scholar-officials, one in which no nation-wide class or institution could resist the imperial power beyond a certain point, or establish effective limits on the exercise of such power. China thus experienced a despotic state system for fourteen hundred years before Russia, at the time of the Mongol conquest, fell under the control of a similar authority.

When Russia was overcome by the Mongols, beginning in 1237, the latter had already destroyed the Chin state of north China and, working through a Sinicized chancellor, Yelü Ch'u-ts'ai, in effect re-established the old Chinese system in the north under Mongol overlordship. Shortly afterward the Mongol prince Kublai proclaimed himself first emperor of the Yüan dynasty, which ruled China from 1271 to 1368. The outlying regions of the Mongol Empire, such as Russia, experienced the introduction of certain Chinese bureaucratic devices, though Russia was governed for the most part indirectly and rather loosely by the khans of the so-called Golden Horde, with headquarters on the lower Volga, as part of the larger Mongol domain.

With Kiev devastated, the Russian principalities in the upper Volga basin rose to prominence with the acquiescence of the khans of the Golden Horde. The descendants of Alexander Nevsky, Grand Prince of Vladimir, more particularly those who came in the line of Prince Daniel of Moscow, followed a policy of loyalty to the Mongols, who in turn allowed them to assume powers of tribute collection and to annex their weaker neighbor principalities bit by bit. The Mongols were overthrown in China by the founders of the native Ming dynasty in 1368, and the whole empire experienced a series of upheavals from which the Moscow princes profited to establish their factual independence of the Golden Horde, ending the "Tatar Yoke," around 1450.

The Russia which emerged from the period of Mongol rule was no

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longer a federation of semi-independent principalities. Ivan III of Moscow (1462-1505) completed, with trifling exceptions, the task which his predecessors had painfully advanced, that of bringing all Great Russian states under the rule of the Muscovite Czardom, as it was now styled. In China the end of Mongol rule brought with it no need to restore the pre-Mongol state system; this had already been adopted by the Mongols themselves. In Russia there was an effort by the Muscovite Czars to regain what they claimed to be their "patrimony": this meant all the lands once ruled by the House of Riurik in Kievan days; and in fact this objective was pursued, by the Czars and then the Emperors who followed Peter the Great's assumption of that title in 1721, until achieved in the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796). However, the Czars neither sought to restore the multicentered system of state and society of Kievan days nor did they in fact do so. What emerged in the Russia of the immediately post-Mongol or Muscovite period was a "state stronger than society," as a great Russian historian termed it—that is, a despotic state, in which no single class or institution strong enough to challenge the state's power remained at the end of the period.

Factors for Autocracy

Historians have debated hotly and at length whether the emergence of Russian despotism or "autocracy" is to be explained by the influence of the Mongols, the heritage of Byzantium, the necessity to wage war for two centuries and a half against Muscovy's enemies—notably the Tatar succession states into which the Golden Horde broke up—or a combination of these and other factors. Sometimes the debate has served virtually to obscure the wide agreement among scholars that Russia by the time of Peter the Great was a single-centered society. The Autocrats of all the Russias had destroyed the old hereditary nobility and bound a new nobility fast to lifelong state service, bound the entire peasantry in serfdom either to the landlords who were themselves the Czar's servants or to the Czarist state directly, laid heavy and fixed obligations on the townsmen, and, after a long struggle, had brought the Orthodox Church under the direct administration of the central government.

Apparently no systematic attempt has been made to compare Ming China with Muscovite Russia in order to determine the Mongol impact on the two. There may be some points of similarity. Trade routes by land across Eurasia flourished under the Mongols, and withered as their empire broke up, with effects on the economic life of both countries. European contacts, vigorous in pre-Mongol Russia and just beginning in early Mongol China, were interrupted by the Mongol conquest in Russia and as the Mongols weakened in China, and something like a rediscovery of both had to be undertaken by seagoing Europeans in the sixteenth century, with increasing intellectual impact in succeeding centuries in both countries. In the post-Mongol period the rulers of both made serious though perhaps somewhat artificial efforts to obtain ideological strength by invoking a real or imagined nativist past, in Ming China by supporting neo-Confucian teachings, in Muscovite Russia by teaching the purity of Russian Orthodoxy as against "heretical" Roman Catholicism and the Orthodoxy of fallen Byzantium.

But there were also differences, fundamental among them the fact that while in post-Mongol Russia despotism was new, in post-Mongol China it was almost nineteen centuries old. It should be added that as Yüan China was livelier and more intellectually vigorous than Ming China, so Russia under the Mongols enjoyed its last great artistic age before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Russian society, after the initial shock of the conquest, was left alone—so that, for example, the Church had greater independence under the Mongols than under the Moscow Czars. It was, then, not the Mongols themselves who should suffer all the blame for the sharp turn Russia's institutional development took after 1450.

The policies and practices of the Muscovite court were, by comparison with those of the earlier Kievan princes, ritualized, barbarous, and

antagonistic to foreign influences (even though, and perhaps partly because, such influences made substantial headway). The brutality exhibited by Ivan the Terrible was a special case of a more general characteristic of Czarist practice. From the mounting arbitrariness of Autocracy and the sharper exactions of serfdom multitudes of peasants and other ranks fled southward and eastward in search of freedom. To such men are to be credited the crude but proud self-government of the new Cossack bands in the south and the speed and sureness of the exploration of Siberia in a great age of overland discovery.

Nevertheless, the Muscovite state expanded behind the pioneers and annexed the territories into which they had ventured, and by the time of Peter the Great the domain of the Czars reached from the Baltic to the Pacific. In all of that vast territory Moscow's writ could not run evenly, and many evaded the tax-collectors and recruiting officers, but the power of the Czar had become more unlimited than ever even though it could not be systematically enforced everywhere. For a time it had seemed that some effective checks might be found. The hereditary nobles resisted Ivan the Terrible, and in the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) which followed made several efforts to establish some kind of aristocratic rule. A na-

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tional assembly of heterogeneous and fluctuating composition, the Zemsky Sobor, developed and for a short time met regularly. High clerics set forth claims that the church should be independent or even supreme over state power. But the nobles failed and were absorbed into the serving class, the national assembly disappeared, and the church was subjugated.

Peter the Great inherited this system and he enforced and perfected it with great ruthlessness. His reign marks an important divide in the flow of Russian history, aside from his assumption of the title of Emperor. The Empire, with its new capital in St. Petersburg, presented an interesting and deep contradiction between the Europeanizing ambitions of Peter and the semi-Asiatic lineaments of the state, which had bound all segments of society more tightly than ever to its needs and demands. Peter's ambitions were regarded ambivalently by the serving nobility during his lifetime, but he nevertheless set in motion a lasting series of contacts with the West, ranging from the habit of dynastic marriage with German through the systematic importation of Western technicians and scholars of all kinds to the great increase of movement of young Russian aristocrats to the West for recreation and education. Under his successor sovereigns of the eighteenth century, most of them transitory dynastic mishaps, the serving nobility gradually won its independence of state service. Upon this grant Catherine the Great (1762-96) put her seal of acceptance, and yet it was a conditional sort of grant and the habits of submission could not so easily be cast off. The Autocracy remained intact, and beginning with Catherine a series of strong if not always capable sovereigns sought to maintain it—but in the nineteenth century, also, to use it as an instrument for modernizing Russia and to some extent for reforming it.

Early Chinese Mistrust

While the Romanovs turned their face to the West and wholeheartedly accepted at least one part of its tradition—that of Germanic bureaucratic absolutism along with some Protestant conceptions — the Ch'ing emperors of China reacted quite differently. Western traders and missionaries in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries operated within very narrowly restricted limits, and the minor wars with European powers beginning in 1840 deepened the distrust of the West without spurring any other efforts than to improve Chinese capacity for military resistance. Not long before a Russian sovereign virtually presided at a great European peace conference in 1814-15, the Chinese emperor expressed his disdain of European kings and at most a willingness to accept their homage to the ruler of the Middle Kingdom. At a time when a small but enthusiastic and vigorous Euro-

Peter the Great

peanized intelligentsia had appeared in Russia, such a phenomenon in China lay a hundred years in the future.

In the nineteenth century the reformist efforts of the Russian Autocrats culminated in the Emancipation and the other so-called "Great Reforms" of Alexander II in the 1860's, and in the subsequent debates about how far they should be extended (although under his successor there was a brief effort to limit and abridge them). A variety of circumstances, including the dynasty's fear of the growing and fanatical revolutionary movement, led to the temporary dampening down of further reformist efforts. Such efforts were resumed, however, in Russia and seriously begun in China at about the same time, around the turn of the twentieth century. One difference was that the Ch'ing dynasty had been weakened by the growth in power of local authorities following the repression of the severe T'ai-p'ing rebellion (1853-64), while the centralized state of the Romanovs kept in its hands the reins of authority, even during the disturbances of the so-called Revolution of 1905, and down to the very moment when it collapsed in March 1917.

No Basis for Democracy

The last Romanov was brought, under the impact of revolt and the urging of capable ministers, to grant a series of reforms. He established a legislative assembly and granted civil liberties including religious toleration (some of which were subsequently abridged but not abolished). His ministers and the assembly pushed through labor legislation and planned for universal education in a decade. In China, in the very last years of the dynasty, plans were announced for a parliament and other reforms including mass education, but the Revolution of 1911 overtook them. In retrospect it seems clear that the Ch'ing reforms were far too little and too late to satisfy the small but influential group of Westernized intellectuals which had come into being, or to enable the government to mobilize the mass support needed to restore real national unity. The Romanov reforms came earlier and more nearly approached the achievement of their objective.

What doomed the Romanovs was the grievous burden of World War I, coming at a time when the bureaucracy had shown its worst traits. What doomed the Ch'ing was no immediate outside force, but the maturing of an internal ailment of long standing, intensified for decades by inability to meet the Western imperialist challenge until Western forces were actually and firmly established on Chinese soil. The two dynasties could be more easily overthrown, in the twentieth century, than replaced by a modern government. What was lacking in both countries was not the will of Westernized leaders to construct one, but the habits of constitutional government, a strong legal tradition, and perhaps most fundamentally, a disciplined social cohesion stemming from the long possession of rights and self-consciousness by social groupings independent of state control. The prerequisites of freedom proved to be, in both Russia and China, not the proclamation of

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constitutional and democratic forms, but the characteristics of an open society. Thus there ensued in both countries a prolonged period of chaos and violence, ended in Russia when the Bolsheviks restored order in 1921, in China when the Kuomintang completed the Northern Expedition in 1928—only to suffer in turn the fate of the Romanovs, that of being caught in a gigantic war which forced the setting aside of plans for reform, and which resulted in loss of power.

Growth of Ideas

Despite the persistence after conversion of pagan legends and superstitions in a fashion common to other newly Christianized barbarians, the Russians adopted Christianity in the ninth and tenth centuries. Of the three ideals which were formulated for the West by the Greeks and retained by Christian philosophers, it can be said that the Russians, from the first Kievan saints and artists to the great nineteenth-century novelists, were more preoccupied with goodness and beauty than with truth. Ethics and aesthetics, in precept and practice rather than theory, interested them more than metaphysics or indeed systematic philosophy of any kind. The use of Church Slavonic for the liturgy made Greek more dispensable to those clergy who were literate than Latin was to the clergy of the West, and indeed only a portion of the treasures of Greek learning reached Russia, there to have only a small audience.

The intellectual achievements of the High Middle Ages in the West remained unknown to Russia, and the ideas of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Catholic Reform, while Russia was by no means insulated from them, still arrived only in truncated and distorted guise. Many Roman Catholic ideas were transmitted to Muscovy. Some interesting parallels appear in Western and Russian religious history—for example, that of the Council of Trent with the Russian Council of a Hundred Chapters—and admiration for Roman Catholicism was shown by laymen and high clergy (above all Patriarch Nikon) in the seventeenth century. Many Protestant ideas were brought in a little later. They helped to shape Peter's seizure of control over the church, and inspired Alexander I's pietism and his notion of the Holy Alliance. But the habits of disciplined and systematic thought had never been developed, and neither Aquinas' or Calvin's rigor of exposition ever found emulators in Russia.

When the post-French Revolutionary philosophers and political thinkers of the West became known in Russia, they were embraced with fervor. There may be recalled Alexander Herzen, humane and undogmatic in his ideas, who broke friendships over Hegel and burned with passion on reading the French socialists. Fleeting phases of attachment to one Western thinker or another resembled affairs of the heart more than intellectual positions taken. As the century wore on, the radicals—and the radicals in word rather than in deed (though the former were ready enough for action, as the Bolsheviks proved)—consistently outcompeted the more moderate spirits. The populists were silenced by the Marxists, the Mensheviks by the Bolsheviks, the liberals by the socialists as a whole. The triumph of Lenin's uncompromising April Theses in the revolutionary babel of 1917 was foreshadowed by the defeats of moderate and realistic men for decades before. Russia's thinkers had not been tempered and trained in the center of Europe's philosophical tradition; they had danced at the edge of the fire, intoxicated by the sparks, but neither wearied by the labor of building nor warmed by the flame itself. That did not make the most uncompromising thinkers the inevitable victors, but it handicapped the soberer spirits, and indeed men who were both sober and profound in thought were rare in the early twentieth century.

If Russian thinkers were not restrained by the philosophical experience of centuries in Europe, however, they still shared with the West the idiom of a Christian tradition and had been exposed to the categories of European philosophy in common with it. Chinese thinkers of the early twentieth century, however, had virtually no preparation for the Western intellectual impact. They were familiar, not with analysis, but precept; not with philosophical categories, but lists of virtues, elements, and relationships; not with historical investigation, but memorization of words of timeless wisdom; not with rational argument, but with ritualized personal pressures. Not habituated to Western philosophical thought, the Chinese literati were still less familiar with political organization and movement in the Western sense, and lacked even the experience of the Russian intelligentsia in this respect.

Neither in Russia nor in China were present the safeguards which have protected the West (except for Nazi Germany, which would require separate discussion) from the logical consequences of its extremist doctrines. Neither a pluralistic society nor a systematic philosophical tradition founded on absolute values stood in the way. It proved impossible, whether or not inevitably so, to borrow the fruits of twenty-five centuries of Western growth without paying more attention to cultivating the tree.

Russian-Chinese Attitudes

For centuries before the middle of the nineteenth, Russians and Chinese were scarcely aware of each other; or, more accurately, had forgotten the awareness they had had to some extent in Mongol times. By 1850 Russian intellectuals saw themselves as Europeans, and if some of them, such as Chaadaev, spoke of Asiatic strains, they did so mainly in order to shock their fellows into more rapid Westernization. In dealings with the Moslem Tatars, for example, they saw themselves as "Christians" as against "heathen," though such contacts were easier than between West Europeans and the Asians they found at the end of sea voyages. Similarly Chinese thinkers—and common people—regarded the Russians as like other Europeans, not only from their appearance and language but from the behavior of the government.

The somewhat sudden entry of the Russian Empire into the combined assault on Chinese integrity by the Powers came in 1858-60. Although this should have been enough for a warning, Chinese often regarded Russia as a lesser evil *vis-à-vis* Japan, whose transformation struck

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the Chinese with envy and fear. The Russians had less racial pride than some other Europeans, and their national strength seemed less dramatically threatening than, say, England's. When Sun Yat-sen welcomed the Revolution of 1917 as marking the "break-away of the Slavs" from Europe, he was intending a compliment to a people he regarded as basically European. A few Chinese (for example, the censor Wei Mu-t'ing in 1861) sensed in Russia the partially successful result of a great effort at modernization begun by Peter the Great which China would do well to imitate. However, it is doubtful whether such attitudes were very widespread. To influential Chinese Russia was merely a slightly less troublesome, less efficient, and less overbearing section of Europe. If Russia's institutional and ideological heritage had certain similarities with that of China, neither Russians nor Chinese seemed very much aware of the fact.

Nevertheless, as has been suggested, there were such similarities. The communists have talked a good deal about how they mobilized the workers and peasants of the two countries, and about how the bourgeois revolutions against feudal survivals and the proletarian revolutions against growing capitalism and imperialism placed them in power. It is not clear, however, that these assertions, to the trifling extent they may be true in any sense, have anything important to do with the explanation of why the dynasties collapsed or why the forces attached to genuinely reformist solutions failed or why the communists themselves finally succeeded. It has been argued here that the partial absence in Russia and China of the prerequisites for free states and open societies contributed to the failure of the reformers and the victory of the totalitarians, as the lack of a sophisticated philosophical tradition eased the task of those who sought to win able, dedicated young spirits to the crudities of Marxism-Leninism. No doubt wars, political mistakes, and personal ineptness among the noncommunists played important parts, as the abilities, trickeries, and strokes of luck of the communists were significant.

It is doubtful that the communists understand to this day all the factors that led them to win, but unless noncommunists come to understand better what happened, their chances of staving off further disasters will be small.

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Perspective III

Chinese History

Does China want to shake loose from her present political, military and economic dependence on Russia? We must interpret Chinese motives in the light of China's own historical tradition.

DAVID NELSON ROWE

What can we learn from the history of China that might illuminate the problem of the Sino-Soviet relation today and give us some inkling of its future? This question becomes particularly meaningful in view of the seeming abandonment by the Chinese communists of much that has gone into the more recent development of their country. Does not Communist China in truth constitute an immense reversion from the modern world, back toward traditional Chinese ideas and practices in government and international affairs?

China's Dependence

To put this all into proper perspective, it is perhaps necessary to recall some of the fundamentals of modern China. About fifteen years ago I attempted to state some of these in a small book (*China Among the Powers*). I stressed the weaknesses of China, and the unlikelihood of its being able within twenty-five years to provide for its own security on anything like a great-power basis. Hence, I argued, China must remain dependent upon others for at least that long, and perhaps longer.

This general thesis was brought forth at the very moment when China was being officially installed as one of the Big Five of international affairs, and the reaction to it was mixed. But from one significant quarter there came strong endorsement of these views as "realistic" and based upon genuine knowledge of China. This was the reaction expressed in a Russian technical journal—on scientific grounds, as differentiated from the inevitable propagandistic reaction in the *New Times* of Moscow. Perhaps it is not going too far to say that in 1945 there was a better understanding of China's continuing need for economic and military dependency in the Soviet Union than in any quarter of the West. At the same time the Russians held the natural belief that this dependency would quite probably be upon the West, therefore chiefly upon the United States. Thus Stalin's interest in Manchuria was both a valid feature of his policy for protecting the Chinese communists, and a purely imperialistic interest on his part.

The West had long been pursuing a policy based upon the assumption that China was incapable of defending itself against external aggression. Treaties and other international agreements regarding China clearly embodied this belief. It was hoped by the framers and protagonists of some of these that China's security could be guaranteed by various ordinances of self-denial on the part of would-be aggressors, backed by strict arms limitation. But this whole attempt fell apart after 1931, when by force of arms Japan took over the Manchurian region of China, and the Western Powers failed to prevent the conquest. Eventually this sequence led to World War II, in the course of which we publicly stated that our postwar aims included the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over all lands taken from her, the restoration of her complete self-government and sovereignty, etc.

At the same time, however, we were actually in the process of liquidating our traditional policy toward China. This finally happened at the Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to restore the pre-1905 Russian position in the Chinese territories of Manchuria. By this and other acts we effectively abandoned our position in Asia as defenders of Asian nationalism against foreign aggression and colonialism. This Yalta sell-out convinced all thinking Chinese patriots that the West either could not or would not defend the independent states just beginning to develop in Asia. Was the coming thing perhaps communist international universalism?

When in addition we failed to give the Chinese Nationalists any material support in their war against the communists in China, we combined this political sell-out with a military betrayal. General Marshall's ill-fated attempt to bring these two irreconcilable enemies into a framework of constitutional and legal compromise embodied a total mis-reading of the revolutionary environment in China. In its approach the United States actually combined a maximum of political-military pressures against its friends in China with a minimum of pressures against their enemies.

Anti-West Reaction

By these actions, combined with other factors that influenced the outcome in the same direction, we helped throw China into the grip of a thorough reaction against the West and everything it stood for. The internal result was political absolutism. The result in foreign relations was political universalism. The fact that both these modes were communist in the orthodox sense should not distract our attention from the distinct reversion here to earlier Chinese patterns of thought, which the long course of

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the modern Chinese revolution had never wholly destroyed.

With the help of the Russians and their friends everywhere, we forced China into this reversionist pattern. This did not just happen; it was by no means inevitable; it was caused.

Traditional Policy

What were the chief features of this traditional Chinese pattern of national and international politics to which the Chinese communists have reverted? It would be impossible to examine all of them here, and since we are chiefly concerned with the relation between Communist China and the Soviet Union, we may limit our analysis to the international features. Here the traditional Chinese pattern is quite clear. Throughout much of Chinese history the relations between China and surrounding regions were those of a central state (China) disseminating her culture abroad and making cultural satellites in a number of areas. China's relations with these regions varied greatly in intensity and type. She usually accompanied the export of her ideology with the institution of a system of military protection in the satellite areas. There was a minimum of interference in local self-government, provided always the governments in the dependencies were friendly and neither combined against China nor sought alliances with her enemies. There were also economic relations between China and her dependencies, but ideological, political and military relations were paramount.

Since in Imperial China politics and government were based on an all-pervasive Confucian ideology, this ideology together with the related social and political psychology was exported from China to the dependencies wherever and whenever possible. This helped provide the basis for genuine harmony of thought between the Chinese ruling elite and the elite of the dependencies. It was hoped that the dependencies would become politically homogeneous with China. The ultimate aim was a universal politics among all "civilized" peoples. All others were "barbarians," beyond the pale, and worthy only of complete subjugation as a preliminary to the introduction of Chinese civilizing influences.

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In the Chinese way of thought this relationship with her dependencies was a mutually honorable and profitable one. The dependent areas grew to accept this view also. The Chinese had an innate tendency to attribute to themselves a general superiority over all non-Chinese. But the ability of the ruling elite over the centuries to make the conditions of dependency upon China "an honorable estate" is indeed a major tribute to their diplomatic skill, as well as to some of the time-honored features of their official ideology itself. In general the Chinese way of treating dependents was marked by a Confucian stress on strongly maintaining the privileges of all persons, differentiated according to their status in society, without the handicap of egalitarianism of a more romantic type.

Reliance on Russia

That China today is in so many respects a dependency of the Soviet Union does no essential violence to these basic historical precedents. The reversal of China's role in this revolution of her status in East Asia does not disturb the logical or practical virtues of the condition of dependency as the Chinese mind understands it. In a way, the current dependence upon the Soviet Union is for the Chinese communist elite the culmination of a search which had been going on in China for decades, and which all the excursions into a Western-type political modernism had never quieted. This was the search for a valid system of dependency, for a source of power which could be relied upon to pay off in the real coin of ideology, dependable military support in any and all exigencies, and—in the world of today where China's economy had to be revolutionized—in economic support. Better, it was argued, to be a thoroughgoing dependency of someone who can be relied upon than to run off after the illusory values of Western political modernism, that is, nationalism under a rule of law among equal independent states. This mood, as I observed it in China on the eve of communist takeover (1948), was strong and becoming stronger even in many of the Chinese intellectuals who had been formerly the most convinced and dedicated supporters of the Western way of life.

Aspirations for Empire

History never quite repeats itself, even in reverse. Accordingly, it was also possible for Communist China, as time went on, to enjoy having her own dependencies such as North Korea and North Vietnam. It seems clear that she aims in the future to bring all of Korea and Vietnam into her orbit as satellites, plus all the chief countries and areas of Southeast Asia, and eventually Japan itself, which though in traditional times much influenced by China, was never a part of the system of Chinese dependencies.

The very material need of Communist China for dependency upon the Soviet Union should be evident. It is quite true that her own domestic investment in industrialization, for example, exceeds the amounts received by loan from the Russians. But the Soviet supply of equipment and technicians is the critical part of the total investment. It is indispensable to the whole effort at industrialization. This also holds for the military field. The number of Soviet forces in Communist China is small compared with the masses of Chinese troops, but again, the critical components such as aircraft and other specialized weapons are all, or in vital preponderance, supplied by the Soviet Union. Communist China's entire military posture and her policy of armed aggression in such places as Korea and northern India are possible only because of the mutual overriding commitment between her and the Soviet Union, which gives her a power of international blackmail in spite of her own relatively

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mediocre military strength. Was it Communist China which made her own defeat in Korea impossible? Or was it the threat that a defeat of China, quite feasible within the resources of the United Nations, might bring the Russians in and start World War III, that prevented us from winning the Korean War?

Friction with USSR

Much is being made nowadays of the possible ideological divergence between the Chinese and Soviet communists. Even if such divergences should exist, the important question concerns their extent, and their likely impact on the continued cooperation of the two chief communist states. Whatever the disagreements amount to, they do not seem in any way to mean that the Chinese communists have ceased to view China and the rest of the world through Marxist-Leninist dogma. Much greater ideological differences than any which have so far been observed between Communist China and the Soviet Union could develop without in any way changing the basic dogmatic link, or materially harming the continued cooperation of these two countries in the pursuit of the communist world revolution. To argue otherwise would be like trying to prove that because the institutional systems and parliamentary terminologies of the United States and the United Kingdom are so dissimilar, one or the other of them does not genuinely practice a variety of representative government.

Now, it is always possible that quite apart from practical issues or ideological involvements, partners may disagree. In the Sino-Soviet case, one of the most obvious sources of disagreement is the traditional xenophobia of the Chinese. There has undoubtedly been more friction with Russians in Communist China, for example, than their hosts would be likely to admit, or we would easily learn of. But the evidence is that, as in many other countries where foreigners have been focal points of friction, this has never become a major problem. It is clear that the Chinese communists invite, and desperately need in China, the services of their Soviet comrades, and that there are enough of them there to provide the Soviet Union with a thoroughgoing network of informers on local Chinese conditions. There are no appreciable signs today of such friction between Russians and communist Chinese as would constitute a major difficulty in relations between the two countries for the near future.

On the other hand, there are in China's past history many precedents for shifts in the relations between the central power and its satellites. Let us examine types of shift that have taken place in the past, and try to determine whether these have any chance of being recreated soon in the relations between the USSR and Communist China.

In the past, when Chinese dynasties have declined in vigor and the government of the Empire has weakened, the tendency has arisen for China to seek to escape her responsibilities toward the dependencies. In the nineteenth century, for example, when the Empire was hard pressed by Western and Japanese expansionism and when the ruling dynasty was lacking in the qualities necessary to government, numerous of China's dependencies were penetrated and taken over by third powers. At times when China's internal affairs were in such bad condition that the government could not extend a normal degree of armed protection to its dependencies, these areas tended to fall away, and if other pressures were brought to bear on them at the same time, they often changed their allegiance.



To raise the possibility today that the Soviet Union would be forced by its own internal weaknesses and problems to decline to support its own dependency, Communist China, against the threat of foreign pressure is so far-fetched as to border on the ridiculous. Today, when the Soviet Union feels safe in threatening the United States with rockets if Washington should "intervene" in Cuba, there is little indication of such a degree of Soviet weakness as would cause it to abandon dependencies much closer and more important than that small Caribbean country.

Furthermore, in the free world we have gone a long way toward accepting the communist doctrine that anything within their "boundaries" is entirely, irrevocably and permanently theirs. At the same time, we seem to feel that almost anything still outside their "boundaries" is a suitable subject for a discussion raising the question as to whether or not it should be "liberated" into a condition more suitable for communist absorption. Thus today, there is neither the weakness within the central power, the Soviet Union, nor the positive resolution within the free world, necessary to create in relation to Soviet satellites anything like the possibility, seen in China's past history, for the detachment of dependencies from their political orbit.

Another precedent in Chinese history involved the gradual increase of strength in dependent areas, with a resulting decrease of the need for dependency upon the central power. As a result, some satellite areas developed in the direction of autonomy or independence. This type of development would coincide at times with the weakening of third power pressures on the dependencies. Here is where Chinese communist foreign policy seems most clearly set against the possible repetition of a pattern of past history. The Chinese elite seems to reason that it is quite possible to regulate the degree and nature of the external hostilities that will be brought to bear, or that can be made to seem a threat whether actually so or not.

It is illuminating to contrast the attitude of the United States government in this respect with that of the Chinese communists. At the same time that Washington presses the Chinese communists to abjure the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese communists openly prepare for just such use, thus preserving hostile relations. In this policy they rely upon and thus sustain their military dependency on the Soviet Union, which is the presupposition of their political and economic dependence. They are evidently determined not to

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allow a weakening of third power pressures to decrease the need for Russian military involvement in China. How mistaken it is, in this context, to proceed on the assumption that the Chinese aim to extricate themselves from their present dependency on the Soviet Union! Any such assumption is based upon a false reading of Chinese communist motivations in almost every field, as well as upon an irrelevantly Western interpretation of the word, "dependency," as contrasted with the traditional Chinese interpretation.

Still another type of change in the relation between the central Chinese Empire and its dependencies took place at times when the central government disintegrated and a regime in a formerly dependent area took over the whole of China. This happened, for example, in the case of the Mongol takeover of China, beginning in the thirteenth century, and of the Manchu accession to power in the seventeenth century. These cases are not identical, since the Mongols, unlike the Manchus, had been little influenced by Chinese civilization. However, in both cases, the domination of China by what had been a rather unimportant satellite or dependent, was made possible as much by the internal disintegration of central China as by the direct strengthening of the satellite area itself. The Manchus, in particular, could hardly have succeeded in imposing their rule on China except for the internal divisions, rampant factionalism and disorder which invited them to intervene in China's affairs.

This type of precedent would apply to the relation between the Soviet Union and its greatest dependent, Communist China, only if we could point to an internal Soviet decay and disintegration that, unfortunately, are not much in evidence.

Advantages of War

Are the Chinese communists themselves under the delusion that the Soviet Union is on the way down, and that they may find it possible by sufficient effort to reverse the roles of Russia and China? There is much possibility for self-delusion built into the Marxist dogmatism that grips the Chinese communists today, and such delusion may be more virulent at the top than at the bottom of the official hierarchy. Remarks made by members of the elite to the effect that an atomic war would leave China with one-half (300 million) of its people remaining alive, have served to create the impression in some quarters that the Chinese communists are counting on Russia's being destroyed, together with the United States, in a nuclear war which they themselves would survive.

It is also true that in recent years the Chinese communists have focused strongly on protection against the peculiar and almost unique vulnerabilities of their society in wartime. Their Korean War germ warfare propaganda campaign, for example, was certainly planned to forestall Western development and possible use of biological weapons systems, to which Communist China is particularly vulnerable. And their current institution of Peoples' Communes in both rural and urban areas is clearly designed to maximize military, political, social and economic localism in China in case of general war. The Commune structure strengthens the aspect of Chinese society that so frustrated the Japanese in 1937-45, and helped create, in the minds of many military observers in the West, the notion that any and all attacks against the body of China, by no matter whom, are doomed to inevitable failure. The prevalence of this erroneous idea materially handicapped our own strategy in the Korean War, and it is doubtful that we have yet purged our minds of all its stultifying effects.



It must be categorically stated that it would be only in the event of a major war which did not include China as a major theater that the Chinese communists could possibly count on a reversal of their relation to the Russians. If the United States had few weapons to spare from Soviet targets, so that China suffered relatively little damage, perhaps the Chinese communists could hope to pick up the pieces. It is conceivable that some such hope as this helps to account for their continued intransigence toward us, and their emphasis on the "inevitability" of war between "socialism" and "imperialism." These attitudes, in turn, might even work to make such a war — from which they would plan to stand aside until the last stages—more likely.

The West's Answer

If the Russians were convinced that the Chinese communists actually held this outlook, and if the Russians are as convinced as they seem to be that they can bury us without resort to the risk and mutual destruction of nuclear war, then they would have every reason for avoiding the war. It would even make sense for them to want us to have a large enough stockpile of H-bombs to feel we can spare plenty for China after due attention to all Soviet targets. If that were the case, and known to be the case, it would presumably discourage the Chinese communists from trying to provoke the war. In the meantime, any and all Chinese communist ideas along these lines could and should be eliminated once for all by our own adoption of a clearcut strategy for unlimited war which would include Communist China. A healthy step in this direction was revealed by the recent publicized statement that Polaris submarines will soon join the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific.

The dependent relation of the Chinese communists to the Soviet Union is required by the objective situation in which they find themselves. The slight and temporary problems to which this relation has given rise are not enough to threaten its continuance. Moreover, the Chinese communists can feel that in terms of China's own history and tradition their dependence is politically and psychologically acceptable to themselves and to their subjects. So far as they seek guidance from their national history, they have no reason to wish or to expect that their relation of dependence toward the Soviet Union will be either abandoned or reversed in the presently discernible future.

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Perspective IV

Communist History

The history of the Comintern offers a neglected clue to Mao Tse-tung's political career and to Chinese Communism's past, present and future.

BRANKO LAZITCH

There is probably no other country where the connection between the Russian October Revolution and the founding of the Communist Party is as striking as in the case of China. In contrast to Europe and to several Asiatic and American nations, China had no socialist party before October, 1917. Whereas elsewhere the Communist Party has generally sprung from the socialist Left, in China it has no root in Marxian, Western socialism.

Everything came from Moscow and everything was presented in the Bolshevik version. In 1920, the Communist Manifesto was translated into Chinese at the same time as the first articles of Lenin; the first emissaries of the Communist International, starting with Gregory Voitinsky and G. Maring, (alias Sneevliet) visited the country; the Communist Party was founded under strict supervision; the doctrine and the organization were imported from Moscow. Bolshevism was thus transplanted to China even before fertile ground had been found in which it could germinate.

After forming the Chinese Communist Party, the Comintern laid down its tactical line: alliance with the Kuomintang. The objective of this alliance was explained to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International by a Chinese orator in a speech of total frankness:

> If we should abstain from penetrating this party [the Kuomintang] we would be isolated in our propaganda for Communism, which would thus remain an abstract principle, powerful and elevated, no doubt, but unable to move the masses. If we penetrate this party we can show the masses that we also defend revolutionary democracy, but that this democracy is for us but a means to attain a still higher goal. . . . We can thus win the masses to our ideas, and destroy the Kuomintang.[1]

That the Comintern, through the intervention of its agents, directed the Chinese Communist Party in this first phase, from 1921 to 1927, is a historic, and notorious, fact. It is only with the *rise* of Mao Tse-tung that the problems of the actual relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and Moscow provokes debate and diverse interpretations.

Mao-Moscow Relations

To get a clear picture, it is important, at the start, to distinguish three elements which are generally confused in these discussions on the theme, Mao-Moscow. The first is based on the numerous "theoretical essays" of Mao Tse-tung, starting with his "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan," written in February, 1927, which was to become famous in the West, much later, as the first proof of Mao's "heresy." The discussion on this general subject still continues, but it is, fundamentally, more academic than political. Even if one admits that Mao Tse-tung has sometimes diverged in his writings from Leninist doctrines —which is far from proved—this fact would in no way suffice to class him as a "rebel." Lenin made his revolution in the name of Marx, but acted totally at variance with Marx' theories of social revolution; Stalin used Lenin to justify his "building of socialism in a single country"; and Khrushchev, in his turn, has rejected Lenin's theory of the inevitability of wars in an imperialist epoch. All three, while practicing revisionism, have cried out incessantly against the "revisionist treason" of others, from Bernstein to Tito. The same is true with the theories of Mao Tse-tung: so long as Mao remains all-powerful, his *Complete Works* will remain among the keystones of Marxism-Leninism. If he falls from power, these same *Complete Works* will serve as proof of his continuous deviations for the past forty years.

The second distinguishable element are the disputes of Mao Tse-tung with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, disputes which undeniably and fairly frequently occurred after 1926-1927. These conflicts took place within the Central Committee of the Chinese Party, not in or with the Executive Committee of the Comintern. They are part of the history of the Chinese Party, but not of the history of the Party's relations with Moscow.

There remains a third element, the simplest, but also the most decisive in determining the relationship between Mao Tse-tung and the Comintern: and this is based on the official documents of the Comintern's directing body. To be sure, the majority of the documents which bear on Mao's relations with Moscow are accessible to no one, including communist historians, but the rare official statements of the Comintern permit one to establish certain guideposts, once this governing principle of Stalin's policy has been admitted: that while communist leaders have often been first covered with eulogies, and then stigmatized as traitors, it has never happened in the annals of world communism that a leader suspected of "deviationism" and insubordination has been promoted in rank, and praised for his actions. In applying this principle to

1. *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International,* Moscow, Dec. 2, 1922, No. 20, p. 5.

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Mao Tse-tung, one can say that if Mao had been hostile to the Comintern, the Comintern would never have publicized his merits.

Party Militant

Though he was one of the twelve founders of the Chinese Communist Party—only two of them were still in the Party at the moment of its triumph in 1949—Mao Tse-tung was not a member of the first Central Committee and in the early years was not one of the better-known Party leaders. During this period, his name does not appear in the official publications of the Comintern. Probably for the first time he is referred to—without being named—in connection with the above cited "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan." At the Eighth enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in May 1927, Bukharin, its chairman at that time, referred to point 2 of the agenda, "Problems of the Chinese Revolution." He described this report of "one of our agitators" as "excellent and interesting," and quoted a passage to prove this characterization, without finding any signs of the "deviation" which Western China hands would later uncover.

In the troubled years 1926-28, Mao Tse-tung was in conflict with certain leaders of the Chinese Party, but there is no trace of any criticism he leveled at that time against the Comintern, or, conversely, of criticism of him from Moscow. Over the course of the years, the Comintern had numerous disagreements with the leaders of the Chinese Party, but each time the outcome was the same: these leaders were purged, while Mao Tse-tung remained. Still more striking: ousted from the Central Committee by his own comrades, Mao, despite the fact that he was not present, was reinstated by the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Party *which took place in Moscow*. The least one can say is that this Congress, meeting at the headquarters of the Comintern, would not have reinstated Mao in the directing body of the Chinese Party if he had been suspected of being a deviationist or a rebel.

When Mao Tse-tung devoted himself to building up partisan bands, the official organ of the Comintern never missed an occasion to praise him despite the rather modest extent of these military units. Thus, in 1929: "We learn from official sources that the partisans are well armed and are organized along military lines. The troops of Chu Teh and of Mao Tse-tung number 6,000 men."[2] The following year the same organ published a curious article. Under the heading, "Our Dead," bordered in black, it announced the death of Mao:

> Reports from China tell us of the death of Comrade Mao Tse-tung—one of the co-founders of the Communist Party of China, initiator of the detachments of partisans, founder of the Red Army, and the most feared enemy of the great landowners and the bourgeoisie—is dead on the Fukien front as the result of an old lung ailment.

The article ended thus:

> Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the principle political director of the "Chu Teh-Mao Tse-tung" troops. In his region, he fully carried out the resolutions of the Sixth World Congress [of the Communist International] and destroyed the illusions of the reformists. . . . Mao Tse-tung has fulfilled his historic mission as a Bolshevik and a Pioneer of the Chinese Proletariat.[3]

This premature obituary is full of interest as soon as one takes into consideration the fact that the adage, *De mortuis nihil nisi bonum*, has never been admitted by communist morality, particularly during Stalin's epoch. Death is not an extenuating circumstance for the communists: "traitors" remain traitors and "suspects" remain suspects. If Mao had the right to an obituary notice full of compliments in the organ of the Comintern, this proves that he was judged faithful to Moscow.

The foundation of the Soviet Chinese Republic in 1931 did not put an end to the internecine fights within the leadership of the Chinese Party, but it brought in a new and important element: the name of Mao Tse-tung appeared more and more often in the official writings of the Comintern, usually followed by his title as President of the Soviet government. His appeals, his manifestoes, his political reports are cited in abundance. When the Seventeenth Congress of the Russian Bolshevik Party assembled in January 1934, Manuilsky paid particular honor to the Chinese Communist Party by placing it immediately after the Russian Communists in the Comintern hierarchy: "After the Communist Party of the USSR, the first place

Mao Tse-tung

belongs incontestably to the Chinese Communist Party, whose combative activity has greatly accelerated the ripening of the revolutionary crisis."

At Tsunyi in January, 1935, Mao Tse-tung was named chief of the Chinese Party. The Seventh and last Congress of the Comintern was held seven months later. Until then, Mao Tse-tung had never figured in the directing bodies of the International. This time, although absent, he was made a member of the Executive Committee, a position he held until the official dissolution of the organization in 1943. He was singled out for particular notice by the delegates, as is shown in the report of the final session: "Ercoli [Togliatti] then read, in alphabetic order, the members proposed for election to the directing organs of the Communist

BRANKO LAZITCH *was the delegate of the Serbian youth to the General Staff of Draja Mihailovitch during the war. He is the author of a number of works on communism, among them* Lénine et la IIIe Internationale *and* Les Partis Communists d'Europe. *He is at present one of the editors of* Est & Ouest *in Paris, and lectures on the history of communism at the College of Europe in Bruges.*

2. *International Press Correspondence* ("*Inprecorr*"), 13 July 1929.
3. *Inprecorr*, 22 March 1930.

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International. . . . Manifestations of approval were evoked at the names of Ercoli, Gottwald, Yezhov, Koplenig, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Mao Tse (the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Chinese Republic), Marty, and Pieck. . . "

The esteem in which Mao was held in Moscow can be explained in two completely contradictory ways. According to the theorists of Mao Tse-tung's "independence" from Moscow, Mao had imposed himself as Party chief, and the Comintern had accepted this as a *fait accompli.* Now this hypothesis not only has no documentary proof, but appears highly improbable in the light of Stalin's mentality, and the political context of the period. Mao Tse-tung could have been elected head of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 without the direct intervention of the Comintern, but he would not have been able to maintain himself in power without its approval; and this he would not have obtained, had he not been considered faithful to Moscow. In 1935, he was far from strong enough to impose himself as head of the party against Stalin's will. In China, the communist movement was going through an extremely difficult period in the course of the Long March, which obliged Mao's partisans, under constant harassment, to quit central China and take refuge in the north along the border of Mongolia, a satellite country adjacent to the

Stalin

Soviet Union. In addition, in 1935-36 Stalin had begun to liquidate entire teams of Comintern leaders. This makes it difficult to see how Stalin would have resigned himself to a *fait accompli.* Stalin always preferred to have a foreign Communist Party crushed but docile, rather than strong but independent.

Alliance with Chiang

The second possible explanation is consistent with the general character of Stalinist policy. Mao, having become the head of an important communist movement, continued to follow the line laid down by Stalin, including those abrupt turns in which Stalin specialized. Thus, on June 15, 1935, Mao Tse-tung, along with Chou En-lai and Chu Teh published a manifesto which said:

> The Chinese Soviet Government declares that it has condemned Chiang Kai-shek to death. It calls on the people of the entire country to put an end to this watchdog of Japanese imperialism.

But the following year, in 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was actually arrested by surprise in Sian, instead of being shot he was saved, by the intercession of the Chinese Communist Party in the person of Chou En-lai, one of the signers of the manifesto.

On August 21, 1937, Stalin concluded a non-aggression pact with Chiang Kai-shek; and three weeks later, on September 22, the Chinese Communist Party made public the conclusion of an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, after ten years of civil war against him. After Stalin signed the non-aggression pact with Hitler's Germany, on August 23, 1939, Mao Tse-tung was one of the first foreign communist leaders to approve it, which he did publicly in the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, just as he approved all the other acts of Stalin that resulted from the pact, such as, for example, the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and Soviet economic aid to Hitler. On April 21, 1941, the Soviet Union attempted a parallel deal with Japan: a non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow, under the terms of which Japan recognized the Republic of Mongolia (a Soviet satellite), and the Soviet Union recognized the government of Manchukuo (a Japanese satellite), both of which were created out of territories belonging to China. Mao Tse-tung aligned himself with Stalin, once again, as is proved by the directions which he himself penned and sent on May 25 to the members of the Chinese Communist Party. Evidently he did not expect (anymore

Chiang Kai-shek

than did Stalin) that a month later, after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, a new reversal would be called for in military and political alliances; that Stalin would become the ally of the democracies of the West, and that the Chinese Communist Party, once again, would seek a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek.

Illusions Fostered

With the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, the last official link between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party disappeared, a tactical advantage which the communists exploited to the fullest. From this time on, influential circles in the West successively adopted various theses on the problem of the relations between the Soviet Communist Party and Mao, which cancelled themselves out one after another.

The first illusion corresponded with the general state of mind at the end of World War II, and fitted in with the optimistic views about Stalin, the Soviet Union, and a nationalist and democratic evolution of communism. It may be reduced to this affirmation: Mao's movement is not communist, and is altogether divorced from Moscow. This absurdity, with its unlucky historic consequences, was simultaneously spread by the highest communist authorities, such as Stalin and Molotov, and by some of the American reporters in China, who

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were more or less under the influence of the communists, if not in their service. Today it is not even worth refuting. But at that time, when Stalin and Molotov were propounding these clumsy lies for the benefit of Averell Harriman, Patrick Hurley and Harry Hopkins, all of them special envoys of Roosevelt and Truman, this grotesque assertion had a major influence on Western policy toward China. This was the time when Stalin could remark to Harriman (July 10, 1944): "The Chinese communists are not real communists. They are 'margarine' communists." In order to realize how brazenly Stalin was pulling Harriman's leg, we need only recall that the three principal Chinese "margarine" Communists—Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh—were members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern along with Stalin himself, until its dissolution. The following year (1945) the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party elected a Central Committee, 57 per cent of whose members had received their training in Soviet political and military schools — a percentage which probably no other non-Russian Communist Party could equal.

Western Optimism

Mao Tse-tung having installed a communist regime in China from the moment of his victory, this theory had to be abandoned and replaced by another. From 1949 on, "Chinese Titoism" became the leitmotif of political commentaries and prognostications. This coincided neatly with illusions about the contagious nature of Tito's example. Whereas Americans had priority on the preceding illusion, this time the British led the way. The identification of Mao with Tito continued until 1954-1955, as witness the remark of Clement Attlee upon his return from China in the summer of 1954:

> It may, of course, be said that these are early days and that the Chinese Party will in due time introduce full-blown communism, but it will certainly be a difficult task. . . . I think that their actual policy is likely to be more inflexible than their theories. I have the impression that the Chinese communists have more genuine idealists in their ranks than have the Russians. . . . Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai are revolutionaries in their own right and, like Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, strong characters.

Once more, events have taken exactly the opposite direction. Mao Tse-tung has placed himself in the vanguard of the struggle against "Titoist treachery," and no one dares, nowadays, to associate these two names.

The next illusion, which attained its apogee in 1956, during the de-Stalinization campaign which followed the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, credited



Lenin

Mao with the initiative in this operation, thus making him the principal "liberal" and "anti-Stalinist" communist leader. But once again, the future was to give the lie to these gratuitous assumptions. Mao Tse-tung, from one day to the next, became the leading "hard," "anti-liberal," and "Stalinist"—a position to which he still belongs, today. This was the latest upset in this series of hypotheses manufactured in the West.

During 1960, sensational reports on the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev have increased and multiplied at an extraordinary pace. In April, on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary; in May, in connection with the failure of the Summit Conference; in June, during the conference of communist leaders at Bucharest, etc.—and there is no reason why they should not continue during the months and years to come.

Rather than wandering further in this miasma of rumor and counter-rumor, it may be more useful to formulate a few final observations on the nature of the relations between Moscow and Peking.

First, systematic misinformation originated by the communists themselves, coupled with the exaggeration of unverified and unimportant facts by Western commentators, has so often played a major role in the formation of faulty judgments on this problem that it would seem to be a matter of elementary prudence to refuse to accept at face value every new version of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Second, the monolithic facade and the absence of any genuine discussion within the "socialist family"—traits characteristic of the Stalin period—have noticeably changed since then, particularly since 1956. Since that time it has become evident that the reactions of the "fraternal parties" on important points are no longer rigorously unanimous: the French Party does not take exactly the same position as the Italian Party; the governments of eastern Europe do not speak an exactly identical language. Now, this situation has not resulted in conflict between the various communist parties, nor in the elimination of spokesmen for somewhat discordant policies. Consequently, it is possible for the Chinese point of view on certain problems, to be, for a variety of reasons, somewhat different from Moscow's.

Third, these differences of opinion remain within the "socialist family" so long as neither of the partners has any intention of breaking the unity of the communist bloc. What stands out today (as it did yesterday) in the statements of the Chinese is their insistence on the absolute necessity of maintaining the unity of the communist bloc. That problems will arise which will cause divergence within the bloc has been evident since the Communist International first saw the light of day. That one group or another should invoke the authority of Lenin, strongly buttressed with appropriate quotations and citations, in order to give an ideological and doctrinal character to these potential conflicts, is perfectly in keeping with the communist code. But when such disagreements and friction arise between two of the Parties (or, more precisely, between their two governing bodies), as is neither improbable or new, they are settled in the greatest secrecy. The conflict is not made public. When no solution can be found in a particular case, and the matter is made public, usually under

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the form of ideological criticism, this means that a decision has been made to liquidate the target of the criticism. If a tenth of the polemics of Peking against Khrushchev, and of Moscow against Mao Tse-tung, as presented by the Western press, were really so, the rupture between China and Russia would already be an accomplished and public fact.

Peking-Moscow Solidarity

Although the West has decided that it cannot or will not act inside the communist bloc, it must recognize, at the very least, its urgent need to understand what is going on there, and what is being prepared. It is not impossible that in the future Mao Tse-tung may claim for himself and his party a double honor: the governing role, now held exclusively by Russia, and the role of oracle of the Marxist-Leninist credo, now usurped by Khrushchev. It is possible that one day the Chinese, after having publicized Lenin's pronouncements on the inevitablity of war, may disinter another quotation, long passed over in silence, although its relevance is more and more evident: "For a time—undoubtedly very brief—hegemony in the revolutionary proletarian International has passed to the Russians, just as in different periods of the nineteenth century it belonged to the English, then the French, then to the Germans," wrote Lenin on May 1, 1919, in the first issue of *The Communist International.* This "very brief" period has lasted forty years. The Chinese can today put forward their candidacy, if not for hegemony, at least for parity with the Russians, a proposal which will not fail to evoke repercussions within the communist bloc. Nevertheless, even assuming this hypothesis, the solidarity of the two communist powers, which unites them in their struggle for the conquest of the world, will remain stronger than their internal disagreements.

At present, it is pure utopianism to expect to exploit possible contradictions between Moscow and Peking for the benefit of the West. To take it as an axiom, as is so often done today, that the Chinese are the most menacing of all the communists and that Moscow opposes Chinese extremism, boils down to saying that Khrushchev must be considered a possible ally. In other words, instead of exploiting existing differences between Moscow and Peking, it would be a matter of paying the price for separating the Soviet Union from China and bringing it closer to the West! After making largely useless concessions to Stalin when it was necessary to fight a real fascist threat, the West is supposed to follow a similar policy once more in order to obtain fictitious solidarity with Moscow against "the yellow peril." One need not be a prophet to foresee that this policy would lead the West into further retreats—on Berlin, strategic bases, military and diplomatic alliances, etc.—without in the least provoking, in return, a break between Moscow and Peking.

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Perspective V

Strategy

For the next ten to twenty years China will lack sufficient material and scientific resources to pursue a grand strategy independent of Moscow.

STEFAN T. POSSONY

Recently the myth has gained currency that Communist China has a strategy—and even a world strategy—of her own. This strategy supposedly tops that of the Soviet Union in singleness of purpose, ambition, recklessness, skill and bellicosity.

Strategic concepts are not born *in vacuo*. Like other ideas, strategic notions can be transplanted in time and space. Just as arithmetical plus and minus signs can accommodate any number of calculations, so military concepts are applicable to diverse situations. For example, the German war plan of 1914 emulated Hannibal's concept of double encirclement, through which he won the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. The French general staff was aware of this well-advertised German preoccupation, but this knowledge helped them little when they tried to parry the German assault.

Mao Tse-tung is quite capable of formulating vast operational concepts. He absorbed Bolshevik operational thinking from the period when it centered upon uprising and civil war. He added his own ideas on guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict, which reflected the experiences of the war with Japan and the Chinese revolution. Whether he proved himself a first class strategist in Korea is more debatable, and he has yet to give evidence that he really understands the problems of modern weaponry.

At any rate, strategy in the real world and abstract strategic concepts should not be confused. Although Peking may be rich in concepts, the current capabilities of the Chinese communists are extremely poor. Precisely because there is much propaganda about the growing power of China and the quality of Peking's conflict management, it is important to go beyond Mao's literature and and analyze military realities.

Clearly, China does not possess any of the capabilities requisite for world conquest. Perhaps China has a current global strategy in the sense that its leaders have an image of how to defeat the United States in the future; and in the further sense that they are working toward achieving the capabilities needed to implement their dreams. But in terms of present challenges and conflicts China can do little more than run interference.

China's Backward Technology

When it is said that the strategy of the Chinese communists differs from that of the Moscow communists, such a statement—if it refers to a "national" rather than to an over-all communist strategy—is true. It cannot possibly be false. China stands at a different level of socio-technological development, and its military problems differ enormously from those confronting the Soviet Union. Consequently, Peking's concrete operational planning must follow a logic unlike that prevailing at Moscow. The Kremlin is concerned with cryogenics and cybernetics, spacecraft and nuclear submarines, missiles and anti-missiles. But since Chinese technology and industrial production are out of date by at least fifty years, Peking still must deal with rifles, junks and coolie logistics. The few jets and the heavy artillery which the Chinese possess are of Russian (or American) make; and they have little strategic significance.

Mao may be more strongly convinced than the Kremlin that war is the decisive instrument of revolution. But from their own resources the Chinese cannot acquire nuclear weapons, nor build, maintain and operate global range delivery systems. Even by 1967-1970, when they "plan" to overtake Britain's industrial output of 1957, they will be unable to produce and run modern weapons systems.

Obviously, China can procure some modern weapons from the Soviet Union and other foreign sources. Given technical aid and resources, they may build and perhaps operate prototypes of one or the other modern weapon. Yet they would remain unable to produce complicated weapons systems, let alone man them with Chinese troops.

Naturally, the question is whether the Soviets have modern weapons to spare, and if so, whether they would transmit them to the Chinese. During the 1950s, the Soviets supplied the Chinese with obsolescent equipment, and failed to equip them plentifully. According to Pawel Monat, former Polish Military Attaché to North Korea, the jet fighters used during the Korean War were flown by Russian pilots. One motivation of Peking's 1958 attack on the offshore islands (Quemoy, Matsu) may have been to compel the Soviets to step up military deliveries. The Chinese may again be tempted to provoke local crises in order to enhance their armament programs. But Moscow will hardly supply intermediate or intercontinental-range missiles, heavy bombers and supersonic jets except, perhaps, in token quantities.

It is feasible, however, for the Soviets to help the Chinese set up modern armaments industries. Once factories have been built and native personnel has been trained, the Chinese probably can continue operating these installations. Still, it is unlikely that the Chinese would get substan-

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tial or high quality output. Furthermore, since in the technological era equipment must be constantly modernized, the maintenance of a Soviet-installed Chinese industrial capability is dependent on *continued* Russian assistance. Thus, an industrial or an armaments facade would mean not lesser but *heavier* reliance on the Soviet Union; granted that semi-modern weapons, even if they have no logistical depth for backup and replacement, would provide military advantages in short campaigns.

Nuclear Weapons from Russia

Thus, if within the next few years the Chinese should set off nuclear devices or acquire nuclear bombs, they will either have obtained them directly from the Soviet Union or from facilities within China which were built and operated under Russian supervision. It is unlikely that such weapons could be tested and serviced by Chinese personnel. On the contrary, it is almost a foregone conclusion that testing, training, maintenance and nuclear operations, for many years to come, would remain, almost exclusively, in Russian hands. The improbable can happen, of course, and the Chinese might succeed in building a few bombs themselves; but they cannot achieve nuclear output of such significance that it would weigh in the strategic balance of the *global* conflict. We should never forget that there are enormous differences between the types of nuclear weapons, and their qualities. A Hiroshima-type capability cannot be compared with Soviet or United States nuclear capabilities as they exist now, and will exist throughout the sixties. However, the Chinese might achieve a nuclear posture—explosives and short-range delivery means—which would enhance their local power within Asia.

Although the communists probably are envisaging various ploys for psychological purposes, ploys do not change the basic equations of power. The geographic transfer of substantial military power is not feasible. If the Chinese, through Soviet grants or through their own means, acquire a limited number of nuclear weapons in the kiloton range, Asian nations may be intimidated, and Africans, Latin Americans, Europeans and even Americans may be impressed. But in so far as the global conflict is concerned, a nuclear capability of limited size, tied to short-range and obsolescent delivery and support systems, makes no appreciable difference.

In the next decade, China undoubtedly will become a "nuclear power," but only in the sense that Russian technicians supervise a few highly selected Chinese troops in operating atomic weapons in and from China. There may be a great deal of doubt whether an apparent Chinese nuclear capability would not be, in reality, a Russian capability over which Moscow, by direct and indirect means, exercises full control. The apprehension—assiduously propagated in the United States and exploited by test ban agitators—that China soon may join the "nuclear club" is not unjustified in the sense that China must be expected, sooner or later, to demonstrate some sort of a genuine or implanted nuclear capability. But this does not transform China into a major nuclear power; and it will prove more difficult to acquire effective offensive and defensive combat systems than to obtain a few nuclear bombs. Militarily primitive nations often acquire seemingly modern weapons systems; and in a fashion they are able to use them. But the true technological status of a military force is determined by sociological and over-all industrial factors which cannot be changed overnight. To put it in a nutshell: the fundamental weakness of China's military position in the *global* power struggle is, and remains, that the Chinese cannot attack the United States, even if they have a few nuclear weapons, but that the United States could devastate China.

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The Manpower Myth

Population pressure is another determinant of China's strategic position. Usually, manpower is considered a strategic asset, but China is weak precisely because it is overpopulated. Crude manpower figures do not indicate the numbers a country can use for war purposes. Among other things, militarily effective manpower depends upon the ratio between farm and industrial labor. It takes less than one American farmer to feed ten Americans and four Russian farmers to feed ten Russians; but it takes eight to nine Chinese peasants to keep alive ten Chinese. Hence the United States has an effective population base of about 160 million, the Soviet Union of 125 million, and China of somewhere between 60 and 120 million. In terms of number and proficiency of skilled labor, China suffers from additional and obvious handicaps.

Population growth has serious strategic implications. It neutralizes a large portion of China's industrial gains. Moreover, the "new people" must be fed. This requires the cultivation of marginal land "reserves," substantial increases in fertilizer output, and considerable improvements in transportation. Yet China produces little investment capital. The other communist-bloc countries, if they are to attain their own economic objectives, must invest most of their capital at home. Hence the Chinese definitely are a *Volk ohne Raum.*

The Soviet Union is already overexpanded. Its food problems cannot be solved by further expansion. But the Chinese government, even if it prefers the colonization of the inner border lands, may want to move into the rice-producing areas of Southeast Asia. In case of famine, local aggression may, of course, be a useful diversion. Conversely, should guerrilla war occur in areas which the Chinese include among their goals, expansionist intervention would be a tempting course of action.

Three additional factors favor expansion. *First,* the continued existence of a nationalist China under-

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mines communist legitimacy claims and prevents the final consolidation of the communist regime. Consequently, the Chinese communists are anxious to destroy the nationalist government on Formosa. Presumably they also are eager to seize Hongkong.

Second, several million "overseas" Chinese are living in the areas surrounding the mainland. Their orientations, interests, and activities, whether pro- or anti-communist, cannot fail but be a motivating force in Chinese strategy.

Third, the Chinese always have maintained their historical claims on various "peripheral" areas. Even if they no longer worry about ancient suzerainties, the communist ideology offers ample justification for expansion in any direction.

Actually, in Burma, Indonesia and the Indo-Chinese successor states, guerrilla conflict has become endemic. If they avoid major battles, the Chinese communists could intervene without running the risk of international complications. This situation is entirely different from that confronting Moscow, which cannot move outside the bloc without provoking limited or large-scale war, and which, to preserve the momentum of its course of empire—in Africa for example—must hide behind national liberation movements.

Conquest in Asia

Chinese capabilities are a function of accessibility. If there were no alliances and international security commitments, the Chinese communists probably could penetrate deeply into Southeast Asia. It may be arguable how many troops could advance how far. But assuming that the Chinese would reach Singapore and be able to consolidate their conquests, they might pass by means of junk invasions into Sumatra and perhaps Java—on the condition, of course, that modern sea and air forces would not intervene and that the local forces would not oppose the invader effectively—*e.g.,* by defensive guerrilla operations. Whether even under optimal conditions the Chinese could leapfrog through all Indonesia is doubtful. It seems rather evident that the Philippines would be beyond the range of current Chinese technology.

In terms of mere accessibility, the Chinese communists could penetrate into South Korea, but they could not seize Japan. Similarly, the Chinese have proved that they can reach the northern borders of India, but given effective Indian-Pakistani defense cooperation, the conquest of that subcontinent would seem to lie beyond the present capabilities of China.

Formosa is China's highest priority objective. Assuming that the island is defended effectively, it would be even more difficult for the communists to invade Formosa in junks than it was for the Nazis to conquer Britain. Before writing off Chinese military capabilities too fast, however, we would do well to remember that the Soviet Union could give the Chinese equipment for amphibious and airborne landings, as well as aircraft suitable for gaining local air superiority.

Everywhere Chinese and communist expansion could be facilitated by

political and psychological pressures, local uprisings and guerrilla harassment, and nuclear demonstrations. On the other hand, the military strength in many target countries has been rising, and internal security has been improved. There are a number of highly vulnerable neutralist no-man's lands, but open Chinese intervention in most areas would activate security pacts, such as SEATO and Commonwealth commitments. An attack, under whatever pretext, on Japan, the Philippines, India, Indonesia or even Formosa would bring about a major conflict which the Chinese could not risk without a Moscow promise to keep them supplied and, if necessary, to come to their aid.

Assuming that after initial demonstrations they acquire an operational nuclear stockpile within reasonable time, it is improbable that if the Chinese were to use nuclear capabilities in local involvements, they could use such weapons against Asian nations without provoking full-fledged American nuclear retaliation.

Soviet Goals

Let us, therefore, think about the Kremlin's problem. Suppose Moscow has decided that sooner or later it must knock out the United States. Evidently this goal can be achieved only by winning the technological arms race to such an extent that American surrender can be forced through nuclear blackmail or that total nuclear war can be waged without totally destructive retaliation.

In order to achieve a winning posture, the Soviet Union must put a maximum of resources into its own technological programs. It can afford to give China discarded equipment, but it must avoid side shows which would delay preparations for the main event, and which could bring about premature involvement with the United States. Moreover, it must induce the United States to embark ever more vigorously on the road to unilateral disarmament.

If the really decisive contest takes place in the long-range nuclear weapons arena, world conquest by the salami technique through the deliberate waging of limited wars is impractical. Limited wars may occur "spontaneously," and "peripheral" or local victories may offer substantial psychological and political advantages. But nuclear war before the Soviet Union is ready would jeopardize the world revolution.

If, by contrast, the Soviet Union favors a strategy of piecemeal conquest, its overriding requirement still would be to achieve a nuclear deterrent strength so clearly superior that limited wars can be dependably kept "within bounds." Thus, under this hypothesis, too, the Soviet Union must act as though the achievement of a broad capability to defeat the United States by nuclear means is its primary strategy. Since Soviet "margins of nuclear safety"

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still are too narrow for the assumption of major risks, Moscow must delay enactment of offensive operations, whether limited or unlimited, until it can handle the United States. In brief, the Soviet strategic position of 1960 requires "coexistence" *now*.

If the Chinese communists really hold that the revolution must be carried on through incessant struggle, and that respites should not be tolerated, there might be cause for dispute. Actually, Chinese involvements in guerrilla wars throughout the "safe" areas of South and Southeast Asia, and on some islands in the western Pacific, can be called off under almost all conceivable circumstances. Those types of offensive actions *sans* risk therefore might be helpful to the Kremlin's long-range plans as well as to China's immediate interests. If the Chinese were to use nuclear weapons in these guerrilla war areas, the Kremlin probably would not take the risk of sanctioning the operation.

Need for Strategic Alliance

How then can there be a cleavage between the strategies of Communist Russia and Communist China? The Soviet Union has no choice whatever but to prepare for decisive nuclear conflict. Whether or not it communicates its strategic concept for the defeat of the United States to Peking, the Chinese communists, who lack even rudimentary knowledge about the technical problems involved, may fail to comprehend the Kremlin's nuclear strategy.

Lack of comprehension could induce the Chinese communists to exaggerate the significance of the "incessant struggle" in local theaters, to overrate the readiness of the Soviet Union, and to underrate the requirements, difficulties and hazards of nuclear world conquest. They might misconstrue the Kremlin's strategy as an attempt to slow down the revolution and seek accommodation with the West. This is an unlikely interpretation, however. The Chinese communists never misunderstood the need for "gaining time," and they have publicly "approved" coexistence tactics. Ever on guard against "adventurism," any communist knows it is foolish to take enormous chances for strategically unnecessary gains.

But suppose there is a dispute between Moscow and Peking, what can Peking do? The suggestion often has been made that the Chinese communists possess *one* real weapon which they could employ against Moscow: their ability to provoke a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a war would bring about the mutual extermination of the two "superpowers." As a result, although as many as 300 million Chinese might be killed in the process, a surviving Red China would become the ruler of the world.

Did Mao Tse-tung make the celebrated remark that in the interest of the world revolution China would be willing to lose 300 million people? Not unexpectedly, such a statement does not appear in Mao's published writings. But since his alleged hecatomb willingness is used as psychological weapon against the Free World, we might inquire into the practicality of victory-through-self-immolation.

It is one thing to argue that China would be stronger if it had only half of its population. It is something entirely different to say that half of the population could be killed and thereafter the Chinese government would still stay in power and retain enough strength to "take over" the world.

A loss of 300 million Chinese could occur in two different ways:

1. A mutually annihilative Russo-American war at excessively high megaton levels could produce fallout which, by drifting into China, would halve the population. This theory implicitly assumes that as fallout kills people, it exhausts itself like bullets which kill only once. Yet fallout could kill again and again. Hence if China were "invaded" by high-powered radioactivity, there is just as good a chance that the entire Chinese population rather than only half would perish.

Actually, in an isolated Russo-American war during the sixties, fallout would remain limited. Consequently, if China remains a non-belligerent, fewer casualties would occur; but to the extent that fallout spreads, China would suffer a disproportionately high loss.

But the point is this: neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would be destroyed. If the Soviet Union wins, communist victory would be achieved under Moscow's aegis. But the Soviet Union would not have been pushed into attack before it was ready. Hence the United States must be provoked. But if war occurs at a moment when the United States has superior strength, China's dream of a communist world would also be ended, by American victory.

2. Since *ex hypothesi* the Russo-American war would be brought about by Chinese provocation, it is hard to visualize how China could stay out of the fray. If China became a belligerent, it would suffer not only from the fallout drifting in from the outside, but also would be on the receiving end of nuclear explosions. In fact, China's best chance to provoke a war would be to use nuclear weapons if those should be in its possession; but the use of such implements of war almost inevitably would lead to devastating attacks against targets on the Chinese mainland. Thus, possession of nuclear weapons would constitute a merely *nominal* increase in Chinese capabilities. Despite the probable psychological effect of the new strength, China's freedom of action nevertheless might prove to be more constrained than it was before. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Chinese during the sixties would be *before* China's time, so to speak. Hence, while it would be a victory in terms of achievement, in a strategic context it would be a Pyrrhic victory.

China's Vulnerability

With its lack of modern equipment, medical facilities, and civil defense capabilities, its inexperience with radioactivity and its overcrowded cities, China is, of all countries, the most vulnerable to nuclear attack. Losses would be particularly severe among the "leading strata" of the Chinese people. Irrespective of whether the communist regime would survive politically, and irrespective of the damage suffered by the industrial nations, once the Chinese population has been decimated, Peking's capabilities for world conquest would be set back by many generations.

The effects of a global nuclear war are hard to predict. Consequently, it is possible that events would develop more favorably for the Chinese communists. But the ultimate outcome is

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far too uncertain for them to risk a strategy of this suicidal type. The overwhelming probability is that a defenseless country like China cannot but suffer the most severe and lasting damage of all belligerents. In addition, of course, it is silly to assume that the Moscow communists would allow Peking to trigger off nuclear war at a moment of irresponsible Chinese choosing. It is even more absurd to suppose that the Peking Politbureau would deliberately engineer the destruction of their operational base. Still, this phantasmagoria has been used to induce Free World public opinion into believing that the Chinese communists can effectively impose their law on the rest of mankind.

In fact, the shoe probably is on the other foot. For example, if the Moscow communists wanted to start a global war, one of their more rational courses of action might be to provoke a conflict between the United States and China in order to compel the American forces to expend a large portion of their nuclear stockpile on China. The bombs dropped on Chinese targets obviously could not again be used against the Soviet Union, and fallout usually spreads in an easterly direction. If it should turn out that the Soviet Union has helped the Chinese acquire a nuclear capability, even of token size, the chances are that the Kremlin's apparent helpfulness was prompted by a stratagem of this sort.

Dispute re Formosa

The practical meaning is that, at this juncture, the Chinese communists are able to support, or wage on their own account, guerrilla operations in some areas of Southeast Asia. They also have a moderate capability of intervening in some of the West Pacific islands. Since few risks are involved, there is no reason why the Moscow communists should object to such courses of action. But the Kremlin cannot yet condone really ambitious military attacks.

Peking's political need to liquidate the national regime on Formosa,

however, poses a dilemma. If the communists were to attack Formosa, they would chance a major conflagration. They cannot sustain a large-scale amphibious operation without Moscow's backing and massive support. In the absence of amphibious capabilities, the Chinese might want to use nuclear weapons or at least threaten their use. The Kremlin would be willing to underwrite such an undertaking only if it wants to bring about large-scale conflict, or if the defensive capacities of the nationalists have evaporated—in which case a massive military assault would no longer be necessary.

The Chinese have an overriding interest in obtaining ever-growing support for their own armament and industrialization programs. Whenever Moscow slows down its support, the Chinese communists, by launching provocative actions along their periphery, can put pressure on the Soviet Union. But China is only one of many claimants on Russia's resources. Its needs are so enormous that the largest possible aid can be no more than a drop in the bucket. Hence it is not certain that such tactics would pay. But since it is never certain whether a Chinese probe has Moscow's blessing, attacks on neuralgic points may result in unnecessary Free World concessions. By the same token, strong resistance would severely limit the residual freedom of action presently possessed by Peking.

Thus, if there is really a strategic dispute between Peking and Moscow, it probably centers around Formosa. Presumably, Peking wants to proceed forcefully and speedily against the Kuomintang, while Moscow considers this task to be less urgent. But, most assuredly, the dispute does not signify that Peking wants to fight a nuclear world war while Moscow desires forever to "coexist peacefully."

Ever since the Chinese showing in Korea ten years ago, the Free World has been overrating China's military power. There is a widespread conviction that China never can be conquered. True, China is relatively safe from World War II type surface invasions. But if the Chinese communists were pitted against modern forces using air power and nuclear munitions, their defensive strength would crumble rapidly, especially if the regime should prove to be unpopular.

The impression that China is on the verge of becoming a first-rate military power is entirely unwarranted. Actually, because of technology, China's military power has been *declining* relatively to that of the Soviet Union and the United States. If technology continues to advance at the rate of the past decade, the Chinese probably will be falling further behind. We must, indeed, expect that sooner or later China will acquire modern weapons. We also must recognize that in terms of past history, Chinese military strength is gradually growing. But in terms of genuine strategic capacities, China is nothing but a Russian satellite. It will remain such for at least ten to twenty years. This will remain true even if the Chinese should acquire a rudimentary nuclear capability during the sixties. But what will be the political world constellation of 1980?

Meanwhile, communist world strategy continues to be made in Moscow. The Chinese, whether they like it or not, are obliged to execute orders issued from the Kremlin. Psychology is used to conceal the true relationship of forces between Moscow and Peking. Bluff and bluster serve to create the deception that China has become an invincible world power. The hoax works, because the United States, like the childlike giant of mythology, remains unaware of its own overpowering strength.

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Perspective VI

Demography

It is true that Mao is not a Moscow puppet. It is false that Mao "will desert the bandwagon of an historically unavoidable global victory."

KARL A. WITTFOGEL

What exactly is Communist China's relation to Moscow? This question was asked as soon as the victory of the Chinese communists over Chiang Kai-shek was assured. By the summer of 1949 the Red Army had occupied most of the Chinese mainland. Our State Department responded to the changing situation by issuing in early August a "White Paper" on United States-Chinese relations that replaced a faulty early appraisal of the Chinese communists by one equally problematic.

To be sure, neither at the close of the war nor in the years following did the State Department officially call the Chinese communists "agrarian reformers." But not a few of its consultants took this line, and Washington's insistence on a coalition government with the communists at the time of the Marshall Mission implies that the Chinese communists were then considered different from, and more democratic than, the communists in Eastern Europe where we were opposing any similar arrangement.

This unfortunate position is well documented in the body of the White Paper. The accompanying Letter of Transmittal, however, reveals a change in attitude. For there the Chinese communists are held to be instruments of a "foreign domination," bent on exploiting China "in the interest of a foreign imperialism"—Soviet Russian imperialism.

This description of Moscow's role fitted the communists in Eastern Europe, but not the Chinese communists. The regime that emerged on the Chinese mainland was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. Its leaders were not Soviet satraps, but partners—junior partners—in a gigantic international communist axis. I pointed to this relationship in a memorandum, "Objectives and Methods of America's Policy in Asia after China's Shift into the Communist Orbit," written, like a number of others, at the request of the State Department in the summer of 1949 to serve as work papers for a conference on the Far East. (The conference, which was held in October of that year, was dominated by a group that vigorously urged the recognition of Red China.) Since in recent years the axis concept has been widely accepted, I cite below the way in which I formulated it in my 1949 memorandum.

> In contrast to Eastern Europe, communist power in China did not owe its success to the Russian army, except for clandestine help in the extreme north and northeast. To be sure, the extent of Russian political and military guidance was—and is—probably far greater than we know. But the rise of the Chinese communist government was due essentially to the Chinese Red Armies. Thus, those who try to find Tito-like features in Communist China overlook the fact that Mao Tse-tung and his followers emerged as victors not under the direct military and political control of the Soviet apparatus, but as a strongly indigenous movement. *The Peoples Republic of China comes into being as an ally rather than as a satellite of the USSR.* The two gigantic units are not bound together as is the metropolis of an empire and its border satrapies, but like two poles of an axis, Russia being the senior partner and China the junior partner.

The axis concept will be of little analytic help to those who doubt the very existence of serious tensions between Moscow and Peking, because, as they see it, the shared interests are so overriding that any such contingencies are automatically ruled out. Persons who hold to this view overlook the fact that the two major totalitarian movements of our time, fascism and communism, have both been harried by countless disagreements, intrigues, deviations, and rectifications. There can be no doubt regarding the community of interest within the communist camp. But we should reject the over-simplified monolithic conclusion that prevents us from paying proper attention to the many conflicts within and between the various communist regimes.

Nature of Disagreement

In trying to determine the nature and degree of the tension between the Soviet Union and Communist China, we must not forget that these states are poles of an axis. This situation gives the junior partner much greater freedom than a satellite to register its own opinions and implement its own policies, but it does not preclude joint action in essential matters. Hitler and Mussolini differed frequently, but they combined forces in the armed struggle against the non-fascist world, and they did so in spite of the fact their doctrinal and institutional ties were not as strong as those that bind the Communist axis partners to one another. Moreover, patterns of conflict vary according to the institutional framework in which they occur. When approaching the actual and potential tensions between Moscow and Peking, we must recognize that we are dealing with peculiar institutional and historical constellations—namely, the Chinese and Russian versions of communist totalitarianism.

Among the numerous attempts to explain these tensions in terms of China's growing population pressure, without reference to this peculiarity, we may consider two that have received wide currency: the first, by the

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German doctor, Wilhelm Starlinger; the second, by the American journalist, Harrison E. Salisbury.

Dr. Starlinger, who died in 1956, viewed history as a biological phenomenon. After five years in Soviet captivity (1948-1953) he returned to Germany convinced that, communist ideology notwithstanding, biological (population) pressure would compel Mao's regime to move into Mongolia, the Amur regions, and Siberia, "peacefully if Russia yields . . . or, if Russia remains firm, sooner or later in combat—in the ultimate contest of blood for soil *(in der letzten Auseinandersetzung des Blutes um des Bodens willen).*" [1] Despite the unsavory "blood and soil" formula, Starlinger's ideas have aroused considerable interest in West Germany, and have spread to other sections of Western Europe, especially France.

Starlinger's qualifications to judge these matters were modest in the extreme. His knowledge of the Soviet

Union derived from his experiences in Russian slave labor camps. His judgments concerning Sino-Soviet relations reflected the speculations of certain of his fellow-inmates and his own geo-biological approach to history. It may be added that his ideas took shape before the collectivization of Chinese agriculture—that is, before a specifically communist development that profoundly affected China's demographic situation.

Unlike Dr. Starlinger, Mr. Salisbury had ample opportunity to study the operational and doctrinal peculiarities of Russian communism. With respect to Communist China, he could have read the comprehensive translations of the Chinese communist press prepared by the United States Consulate General in Hong Kong. These translations cover metropolitan publications as well as regional newspapers that are not available to the general public or to foreign residents in Peking. A passage in Salisbury's recent book indicates that he has not

1. Wilhelm Starlinger, *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht.* Warzburg, 1955, p. 119.

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taken the trouble to consult this singularly important source of information which is used by all serious students of Communist China, including correspondents who spend much of their time in Mao's capital city.

Salisbury lists several factors as responsible for the "deep and ugly rifts" between Moscow and Peking, but he is most insistent about the threat posed by China's population pressing into the vacant lands of the Soviet Union. General comments on population growth are methodologically problematic in any case; they are worse than meaningless when they pertain to a communist country such as China after the collectivization of agriculture.

Collectives' Low Yield

In Soviet Russia collectivization greatly reduced the incentives and the efficiency of farm labor, despite the extensive character of Russian cultivation. The crippling of incentives through collectivization had a much more devastating effect in mainland China, whose irrigation-based intensive agriculture requires a maximum of personal interest and care.

Since the collectivization (1954-55), the Chinese press has been voicing the regime's grave concern about the low efficiency of farm labor—in some cases only one-half the required quota was attained—and about the resulting labor shortage.[2] Thus the collectivized villages did not have too many, but too few, able-bodied persons at their disposal. It was this situation that led to the dispatching of soldiers, students, school children and urban workers to the fields—a fact to which Salisbury points without seeing its implications. And it was this situation that in 1958 led to the initiation of the commune policy, which, by wiping out private plots and shifting hundreds of millions of women from domestic work to farm work, tried to combat the rural labor shortage and at the same time to provide manpower for the new local industries.

This policy went hand in hand with attempts to solve the food problem brought on by the collectivization. Food has been rationed since the winter of 1953-4, and in recent years the population has been fed less grain and more sweet potatoes ("pigs' fodder," as the people call it). But while the regime could ram more sweet potatoes down the people's throats, it was far less successful with its other innovations. The profound crisis that followed the establishment of the communes compelled Peking to restrict the labor-absorbing rural industries, to restore the private plots, and to slow down the transfer of women from work at home to collectivized agriculture and other "public" pursuits. The constant discussion of the labor problem in the major spheres of agriculture shows that the labor shortage in China's countryside is likely to persist during the next "historical" period—the very period in which the communist master strategists expect to overtake and defeat the non-communist world. Considering these facts, I find Salisbury's and Starlinger's demographic arguments unsound and misleading. Mao certainly will not fall out with Moscow to rid himself of a labor force which is insufficient to meet his own requirements.

Mao's Background

A critical examination of the population argument confirms the need for approaching the problem of Mao's regime with a full awareness of its peculiarities. These peculiarities stem in part from specific features in China's societal background, in part from specific features in the development of the Chinese Communist Party, and in part from specific fea-

2. Cf. Hupeh *Jih-pao,* April 16, 1958 and Fukien *Jih-pao,* February 28, 1958: cf. also Peking *Jen-min Jih-pao,* April 15, 1958.

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tures in the personal history of Red China's supreme leader, Mao Tse-tung. In the present context I shall concentrate on the third aspect without, however, totally disregarding the first two, and without forgetting that the recent Moscow-Peking discord is caused as much by Khrushchev's attempt to preserve the supreme authority of the Soviet Union over the international communist hierarchy, as by Mao's attempt to upset it.

Recognition of the patterns of Oriental despotism enables us to distinguish between old and new features in China's totalitarian order, and for that matter in Soviet Russia's society. Knowledge of the history of the Chinese Communist Party helps us to understand the unusual degree to which the Chinese leaders, in contrast to the heads of the Russian and other communist parties, have been conditioned to think in quasi-military terms: for more than twenty years (from 1928 to 1949) most of them had practical experience in handling military as well as political matters.

In the case of Mao, this general conditioning was reinforced by his family background (his father served for many years in the imperial army) and by specific traits of his personality: his decision in 1912 to join (briefly) the regular army, rather than a revolutionary student corps, may have resulted from a combination of these two factors. But while the conditioning of the Chinese communist leaders and Mao's personal predilections go far to explain Peking's 1958 decision to find, through the organization of large and comprehensive communes, a quasi-military solution to the rural crisis, they do not explain Mao's readiness to defy Khrushchev, who strongly opposed this policy.

Chinese "Cult of Personality"

The turning point in Moscow-Peking relations was the death of Stalin in 1953. Stalin's demise loosened Moscow's grip for some time, even on the satellites. It profoundly affected Mao's attitude toward the Soviet Union. Despite Peking's relative independence, Mao had recognized Stalin's supreme, if sometimes heavy-handed, authority. But Mao felt very differently about the new Soviet leaders, Khrushchev included, whose seniority status in the international communist hierarchy is strikingly inferior to his. To be sure, Mao did not cease to acknowledge Soviet Russia as the socio-historically most advanced "socialist" country in the world and the senior partner in the communist axis. But Moscow's institutional seniority was to some extent counter-balanced by Mao's personal seniority. The resulting pattern of conflicting seniorities was further complicated by a phenomenon that may be called "the growing megalomania of the aging autocrat."

Under conditions of unchecked power, autocratic leadership is the rule;[3] and the long-lasting exercise of such leadership tends to inflate the autocrat's ego pathologically. This was certainly the case with Mussolini and Hitler; and Khrushchev's secret speech revealed a similar tendency in Stalin. Mao, who was the master

of a regional totalitarian regime from the late thirties on and has been the uncontested ruler of 600 million people since 1949, has encouraged the cult of his personality at least since the fifties. Significantly, he is now called the "great leader" of all the people of the Chinese People's Republic. His "ideology" is placed side by side with Marxism-Leninism, and thus by implication above that of Khrushchev. The supra-Byzantine adulation in which he basks shows that he does indeed consider himself a secular demi-god.

This development has been recognized by such analysts as Father LaDany[4] and Professor Richard L. Walker.[5] It explains why from 1953 on Mao did not downgrade Stalin as severely as did Moscow and the satellite states. It explains why after Hungary Mao experimented, not too happily, with a little Hungary of his own (the Hundred Flowers policy of 1957), and why Moscow's disagreement did not deter him from promoting his extreme commune policy (which proved unworkable), from wrangling with Nehru over the Indian frontier, or from condemning the policy of temporary peaceful coexistence which Khrushchev is pursuing practically and justifying doctrinally.

Strategy of Communes

Going beyond these conspicuous conflicts, we can assume that Mao set up the communes not only because he and his lieutenants were predisposed to such a solution of the rural crisis, but also because a combined agriculture and industry in the countryside promised special advantages in case of an all-out war. We can even assume that Mao's stress on this perspective is based on his secret conviction that an atomic war (which he expects the communists to win) may weaken the industrially compact Soviet Union more than the Chinese mainland, with its limited primary urban industrial centers and its widely scattered secondary industrial centers. Such a perspective, which conveniently merges with the "orthodox" Leninist outlook would go far to explain Mao's disapproval of the Khrushchev Plan—coexistence until the communist camp is economically, militarily, and politically strong enough to blackmail the West into surrender.

But whatever his differences with Khrushchev, Mao's perspective presupposes the continuing unity of the communist camp. His autocratic megalomania may lessen the rationality of his judgments, but, as in the case of Stalin, it has not destroyed his materialistic way of thinking. His behavior suggests that, despite his grandiose gestures, he realizes both the

3. K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, pp. 107, 345.

4. China News Analysis, Hong Kong.
5. "Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality," *Encounter*, June 1960.

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fundamental community of interest between Moscow and Peking and the economically-conditioned political and military superiority of the Soviet Union.

Communist Unity

Believing in the materialistic interpretation of history, just as Hitler believed in his racist interpretation, Mao knows that, so long as the Soviet Union maintains its developmental superiority, it will be Moscow, not Peking, that will spearhead the global communist movement; and he knows that in terms of class solidarity, the Russian and the Chinese leaders are in the same boat.

The Soviet leaders also know this. Having once made the mistake of alienating a communist regime—Yugoslavia—even Stalin watched his step. In this respect, Khrushchev is not likely to act more rigidly, and more stupidly, than his predecessor.

Returning from this brief survey of the unifying factors to the issue of the Moscow-Peking conflicts, we may say that quite possibly there are even more conflicts than we know of, but in all probability they mean less than we believe. The present disagreements between Moscow and Peking, although real, occur in a socio-historical setting that is as compelling for the future as it was for the past. Considering the undoubtedly rapid, even if overrated, growth of the communist power economy (as distinguished from their subsistence economy), and considering the neutralist sentiment in many non-communist countries and even in some professedly anti-communist countries, the communist strategists expect an ultimate showdown in the foreseeable future, with or without recourse to arms. Mao is as confident as Khrushchev that, whatever the method, the communists will "bury" their enemies, and he has said so repeatedly. For this reason I stand by the statement I wrote a year ago:

> When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the First World War the communists controlled 200 million people, that after the Second World War they controlled 900 million, and that the next major holocaust would probably destroy all remaining non-communist power centers, he was expressing his belief in an historical perspective that makes any idea of a break between Peking and Moscow palpably absurd. The purposeful way in which the communists subordinate their subsistence economy to their power economy—and the easy way in which we handle these matters—hardens them in their conviction that, in the crucial spheres of economy, armaments, and diplomacy, their power-directed strategy will necessarily — and soon — overwhelm the free world.
>
> A Western strategy can, and must, frustrate this development. But only a victim of illusion will expect Mao, or whoever succeeds him, to desert what today the Chinese, like the Soviet, leaders hold to be the bandwagon of an historically unavoidable global victory.[6]

6. K. Wittfogel, "A Stronger Oriental Despotism," *China Quarterly*, No. 1, p. 34.

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Perspective VII

Semantics

The meaning of the theoretical disputes between Peking and Moscow can be understood by relating the abstract words to existing realities.

LIBRA

If the Sino-Soviet alliance is to continue to function properly, on a day-by-day basis, intricate problems rooted in national, racial, geopolitical and technological phenomena must undergo continuous solution. In today's world, the two principal communist powers constitute mutually complementary "revolutionary examples," and, perhaps more important, their military capabilities have become interdependent. Under the circumstances, they are strongly motivated to maintain an image of "proletarian internationalism," at least in their relations with the non-communist world. Yet the same factors which work to cement interdependence can —and do—give rise to frictions. In theory, both powers subordinate national goals to international ones. But the history of the alliance as it has evolved so far suggests that, whenever it becomes necessary to formulate joint strategy, both the Chinese and the Soviet leaders demonstrate a tendency to be influenced by national and racial considerations as well as by commonly shared objectives.

Moreover, at the moment, the domestic needs of the two powers differ vastly. The Chinese, in order to consolidate their controls at home and to drive their population to further sacrifices for "building socialism," still require the image of predatory imperialists allegedly intent on attack at any moment. By contrast, the Soviet Union, preoccupied with its commitment to win the technological race against the United States and the damage it would have to absorb should nuclear war eventuate, no longer can afford such indulgences. Its struggle with the free world must be characterized by subtlety, even in published sources. It is therefore not surprising that, since 1956 at least, Chinese spokesmen have been less circumspect in their public assessments of the alleged "imperialist threat."

However, April 1960 marked the intensification of public exchange of polemics between key spokesmen for the two powers, which centered around the problem of the role of war as a means of extending communist gains in the nuclear age.

This most recent exchange furnishes an example of how the two powers have attempted to work out a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi* to meet the requirements of the international situation and, simultaneously, to serve their divergent domestic needs. Neither side has shown evidence of abandoning classical communist theory on the role of war, and the Chinese have dramatically reaffirmed its continuing validity. The present discussion will examine the recent so-called debate as it had evolved by mid-August 1960, in terms of its relationship to earlier theory and to some of the broader factors now affecting all Sino-Soviet strategic decisions.

War and World Revolution

Before proceeding to the problem at hand, it is well to recall that, in the final analysis, it is impossible to equate the views expressed by communist leaders in published sources to *actual* strategic decisions taken in private. It is standard practice to conceal intentions and strategy from the enemy, deceiving him, meanwhile, whenever possible. While statements in published sources always must be handled with circumspection, the Sino-Soviet exchanges nevertheless are enlightening.

Chinese spokesmen have tended to emphasize the continuing validity of Lenin's theories on the nature of imperialism, the inevitability of wars, and the role of violence in establishing communist regimes. By contrast, their Soviet counterparts, without ignoring Lenin, have tended to stress Khrushchev's formulations to the Twentieth and Twenty-First Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

What are the implications, for free world interests, of these recent Sino-Soviet discussions? An answer must be sought, first of all, by comparing them to earlier communist doctrine on the role of war. Second, they must be related to Sino-Soviet military capabilities.

Communist doctrine on the role of war evolved gradually and, of course, was affected by developments in weapons technology as well as by changes in the international political situation. In barest outline, the main elements by the eve of World War II were:

1) The world revolution can be completed only by protracted conflict. While violence is the essence of revolution, military and non-military means of struggle are interrelated, and the continuous process of combining them to extend communist gains will end only when the entire globe has been communized. Until then, war is inevitable.

2) Any war which communist states conduct or support is automatically a "just" war, irrespective of who initiated it or what form it takes.

3) By contrast, any resistance to communist efforts to complete the revolution is "unjust." Hence, even citizens who resist deliberate military invasion by communist forces engage thereby in "unjust" warfare.

4) "Unjust" wars also include any in which communists remain neutral. The nature of capitalism is such that imperialist wars, predatory wars,

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civil wars, and wars of national liberation will occur, sometimes without communist encouragement.

5) Communists should initiate war or join the battle already in process, thereby turning an "unjust" war into a "just" one, whenever their policy objectives stand to benefit thereby. However, taking unnecessary risks and entering into conflict prematurely is to be avoided. First, nonmilitary means must be utilized to weaken the enemy and to insure decisive superiority of communist strength. Particular caution will be required as the end of capitalism draws near. The strongest non-communist states may attack the communist powers in a last desperate attempt to preserve their system, doomed by history eventually to disappear from the world.

Events during and following World War II served to prove the validity of earlier theory. With the assistance of Soviet troops, the Soviet Union became a colonial power in Eastern Europe. Mao Tse-tung completed the revolution in China by successes in guerrilla warfare, after having failed, prior to 1949, to reach the same goal by the exercise of "coalition tactics." During the first half of the 1950s, Asian gains were extended to North Korea and North Vietnam, again as the aftermath of military conflict.

In his last major theoretical work, Stalin in 1952 reaffirmed the fact that earlier doctrine was by no means outmoded: "In order to eliminate the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to annihilate imperialism."[1] Mao Tse-tung, who, earlier, had written that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," found no reason to disagree.

The Role of Nuclear War

Meanwhile, technological and political changes continued throughout the globe. On the one hand, new opportunities were emerging for extending communist gains in Asia and Africa by exploiting the instability and anti-Westernism characteristic of "national liberation movements." At the same time, the risks involved in waging war were being rapidly magnified as Soviet efforts to acquire the means to deliver nuclear fire-

[1]. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR,* Moscow, 1952, p. 86.

LIBRA *is the pseudonym of a person who for the past decade has monitored Sino-Soviet developments from the vantage point of Washington.*

power on United States targets continued to enjoy highest priority.

Did the existence of nuclear weapons require that fundamental doctrine on the role of war should be modified? Even before the Soviet Union had acquired a significant nuclear capability, communist leaders began to debate the problem. When the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party convened in 1956, Khrushchev attempted to formulate the "correct" position. His statement about the inevitability of war frequently has been quoted out of context. But an understanding of it is essential to gaining perspective on the more recent exchanges between Moscow and Peking.

Khrushchev told the Twentieth Congress, in essence, that the nature of imperialism had not changed. However, he added, *should certain other conditions be met,* it might be possible to complete the global revolution without experiencing the devastation of a nuclear exchange. *If* the "peace forces" intensified struggles to win the world for communism by all means short of all-out nuclear war, and *if* the neutralist nations continued to cooperate, a situation *might* arise in which wars no longer would be fatalistically inevitable. Khrushchev also took note of the increased desire, in major capitalist nations, to avoid nuclear war.

Only gradually did Khrushchev elaborate a bit on his cautiously phrased formula, in subsequent speeches to communist audiences. While he spoke circuitously, his meaning was clear to his comrades. He could only hope that his remarks would pass unnoticed by his noncommunist enemies. Khrushchev implied that conditions were not right for waging nuclear war *at the moment,* and argued that, for a time, emphasis must be on "peaceful coexistence" tactics. While World War III would mean the end of capitalism, he said, nuclear warfare also would bring setbacks to "the camp of peace." Communism would survive *only* after the Soviet Union had absorbed tremendous damage. Under the circumstances, he told the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Party in January 1959, it would be well to try to work out a way to exclude wars from the life of society even before the world revolution had been completed. Again, certain conditions would first have to be met: The Soviet Union would have to become a mighty industrial power, and the communist bloc would have to produce more than half the entire world's industrial output. Even then, the nature of capitalism would not change. But if, in the meantime, neutralist sentiments in underdeveloped nations also had continued to expand, and the "forces for peace" in the major Western nations had continued to grow, it might be possible to avoid *global* war. In short, if all these conditions could be met, it might be possible to force the major Western powers to surrender without an exchange of nuclear blows.

Open Aggression Avoided

Neither Chou En-lai, who subsequently addressed the Congress in behalf of the Chinese, nor Mao Tse-tung, who signed the official greetings from the Chinese party, took issue with Khrushchev's estimate. Further, the Chinese endorsed Khrushchev's optimistic claim that when the new Soviet Seven-Year Plan had been completed in 1965, the communist bloc would be well on the road to winning the lead-time race.

The communist leaders have not disclosed, in any detail, their current doctrine on limited war. Their behavior during the crises which have arisen in recent years suggests an awareness that limited wars could expand into global war. This introduces the requirement of assessing each conflict with extreme caution, and of refraining from sending troops to participate overtly whenever the risks of expanding the conflict might be increased thereby. Whenever major crises have arisen, such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Middle Eastern Crisis of 1958, both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic have confined themselves to verbal threats, mass protest rallies condemning "imperialist aggression," and similar propagandistic devices. The probability that both powers have

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furnished military equipment to "national liberation movements" and other local insurrectionists cannot be overlooked, but *overt* intervention has been avoided.

Complementary Armed Might

The "division of labor," as it were, between the Chinese and the Soviet military forces has its roots in the varying domestic requirements of the two powers and in the nature of their respective military capabilities. In today's world, these capabilities have become interdependent.

On the one hand, the Chinese will remain reliant on the Soviet Union's long-range nuclear striking capability and other advanced weapons systems, as they are developed, for a long time to come. The Soviet leaders have evidenced fears that an "nth country" problem might arise in the bloc eventually, and, presumably, atomic weapons have been denied to the Chinese. Nor does China yet have the technological and industrial base required to produce suitable carriers for weapons of global range. Since military technology continues to develop at a rapid rate, today's advanced weapons tend to become obsolete more quickly than formerly, and it is the Soviet Union which has the facilities required to continue the research and development race with the United States. Nevertheless, the Chinese have expressed an intent to attain a nuclear capability eventually, with or without Soviet assistance. Should they succeed in acquiring a token capability, undoubtedly they would press for the right to use it in waging limited wars.

Even if China has no nuclear weapons now, her current military forces are by no means outmoded for limited peripheral operations. Under some circumstances, the Soviet Union might be forced to rely on them. It is the Chinese who perfected communist guerrilla warfare techniques and who retain the best capability for waging this type of conflict, particularly in the tropics. Guerrilla warfare is the military means best suited to exploit whatever "revolutionary situations" may arise in Asia, Africa, or even Latin America. The risks involved in attempts to exploit localized opportunities as they arise are reduced by the mere existence of Soviet nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the nature of guerrilla warfare is such that concealment of assistance to local insurrectionists is not difficult.

Given the different roles their military forces can play in any conflict, and the other factors involved, the recent published exchanges between the two powers on the role of war make sense. The dispute has revolved around three points: first, the timing of war moves; second, the current effectiveness of Soviet nuclear deterrent capabilities; and third, the question of whether or not Soviet military technology is, at the moment, sufficiently superior to permit an effective victory over the United States if war is initiated now.

Lenin Reaffirmed

In its April 15, 1960 issue, the theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, *Red Flag,* opened the debate. A long article commemorating the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday contains one of the most outspoken summaries of classical communist theory on the role of war to be published in recent years. As such, it both reaffirms and updates the 1928 resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. Main points in the *Red Flag* argument were:

1) None of Lenin's theories on violence, revolution and war have been rendered obsolete by the existence of nuclear weapons.

2) Wars will continue as long as capitalism exists. "Since World War II, there has been continuous and unbroken warfare." Did not the many local wars which have occurred in the world in the meantime count as wars, even though nuclear weapons have not been used and the conflict has not expanded?

3) The devastation a global nuclear war would inflict on communist states is worth absorbing. Communist regimes then could be established "on the debris of a dead imperialism."

4) It is impossible to establish a communist regime without the use of violence:



> Even if it is compelled not to use these new weapons, the imperialist state will of course still remain an imperialist institution . . . until it is overthrown and replaced by . . . the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Revolution means the use of . . . violence by the oppressed class, it means revolutionary war.

5) Lenin long ago refuted Marx's earlier views that peaceful transition to communism was possible in the United States and Great Britain. Lenin's views apply to our day.

6) In general, neither "coalition tactics" nor other means of peaceful transition to communism are likely to succeed in the future any better than they did in the past:

> When in the world a certain capitalist country is already surrounded by socialism, there might be a greater possibility for the peaceful development of the revolution. But, even then, peaceful development of the revolution should never be regarded as the only possibility. It is necessary, therefore, to be prepared at the same time for the other possibility: nonpeaceful development of the revolution.[2]

In past exchanges of polemics between communists it has not been unusual to attempt to preserve an image of "monolithic unity" by specifically blaming one offender—for example, Tito — for theoretical errors, while actually intending to attack completely different members of the hierarchy. Certainly, at first glance, some of the Chinese accusations would apply to Soviet policy. It is important to note, therefore, that passages of the same article reiterated standard communist doctrine on the necessity for temporary alliances, periods of "peace," the signing of agreements with the enemy to gain time, and the like. Lenin's peace treaties, Stalin's pact with Hitler in 1939, and the Chinese truce with the Kuomintang in 1936 are specifically cited as examples of the necessity, on occasion, to emphasize temporary periods of "coexistence." Further, the Chinese also quoted Lenin to argue that, since the global revolution must be completed in stages, during certain periods it will be necessary to *"compel"* non-communist states to coexist.

Veteran theoretician Otto Kuusinen, one of the few remaining "old Bolsheviks" in the Soviet hierarchy,

2. Peking, *New China News Agency,* April 19, 1960. Excerpts may be found in *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 38, No. 4, July, 1960, pp. 666-681.

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delivered the speech on behalf of the Soviet Party's Central Committee to the Moscow rally celebrating Lenin's birthday on April 25, 1960. He, too, stressed that the nature of imperialism had not changed. However, he took pains to point out:

> The change in the balance of power in the international arena, the growth of the might of the socialist camp, and the obvious disastrous consequences of a new war all contribute to a division among the ruling circles of the imperialist states.

Some sober-thinking Western statesmen had begun to believe nuclear war would be madness and, under the circumstances, he argued, patience was required. Kuusinen then stressed the current necessity for "coalition" and "coexistence" tactics, concluding his assessment with a reiteration and an expansion of Khrushchev's earlier predictions to the Twenty-First Party Congress. By the end of the twentieth century, he claimed, non-communist colonialism would have disappeared. The Soviet Union would have become the world's foremost industrial power, and other communist nations would have made significant technological advances. New nations would have joined the socialist camp. Kuusinen was more cautious concerning the total capitulation of the United States by 2000. He quoted Senator Humphrey—out of context—to argue that even in the United States the masses might rise to overthrow capitalism. But he deliberately refrained from predicting that the revolution would have been completed in the United States by the turn of the century.[3]

The exchange continued along the same lines, and Khrushchev himself entered the debate when the various parties gathered at Bucharest. He told the comrades, in a speech to the Rumanian Congress on June 21, 1960, that the nature of imperialism had not changed; nevertheless, it was well to be circumspect in public assessments. Absorbing nuclear retaliation was a sobering possibility, and the revolution was proceeding nicely without it, for the moment. True, he admitted, wars would continue until the capitalist powers had been reduced to a few states "as small as the buttons on a coat," but nuclear wars must be properly timed. If patience were exercised, perhaps even the United States would give up without inflicting nuclear retaliation on communist nations.

3. *Pravda,* April 26, 1960.

Coexistence, a Deception

The Chinese speaker at the Congress repeated some of the points *Red Flag* had made earlier, in more circumspect language. Then the Bucharest Communiqué, signed by all parties, reaffirmed the 1957 Moscow "Peace Manifesto" as the correct guide to current conflict strategies. It is significant that this document includes reference both to the importance of emphasizing "peaceful coexistence" tactics for the moment and the necessity to complete the revolution by "armed class struggle" in states possessing strong military capabilities. This very same quotation on the role of "armed class struggle" has appeared time and again since the Moscow "Peace Manifesto" first was published. For example, exact sentences may be found in an article published in *Kommunist* (No. 10, July 1960), which reiterated in detail the positions, already described here, taken by Soviet spokesmen throughout the current debate. They also were emphasized in the major text on current communist tactics published in Moscow in the autumn of 1959 (O. V. Kuusinen, ed., *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma,* p. 529), and were quickly reprinted in a summary of the book published in the *World Marxist Review* (November, 1959).

The other Sino-Soviet statements during the debate are too numerous to summarize in detail, but have followed a similar vein, taking their cue from the four major statements which have been examined here. All have reflected that three points are being argued between the two powers: (a) timing of war moves; (b) the current value of the Soviet deterrent shield in permitting freedom of action to wage local warfare; and (c) the relative balance of military superiority between the United States and the Soviet Union at the moment.

The principal conclusion which may be drawn from the recent exchanges is that the nature of communism has not changed. However much they may argue over the preferred timing of war moves and the best means of proceeding in the continuing joint struggle against the free world, neither Moscow nor Peking has, as yet, shown any signs of abandoning classical theories on the role of war. Nor has either abandoned the race to build up military strength. In fact, Khrushchev specifically stated in January, 1960 that new, more formidable weapons would continue to appear in the Soviet arsenal, and the Chinese forces are undergoing gradual modernization.

The Chinese seem to assess current opportunities to get on with the revolution more optimistically than their Soviet counterparts. They seem to feel that, given the Soviet nuclear deterrent shield, they should be permitted greater freedom of action to lend overt support to battles for "national liberation" and to engage in other types of military conflict with conventional weapons. In addition, their statements suggest a belief that current Soviet military capabilities are sufficient to defeat the United States now, and that whatever retaliation may be involved in the attempt is a price well worth paying. By contrast, their more sophisticated allies realize that it is necessary to proceed with caution, to avoid a nuclear exchange if possible, and to attain the military superiority over the United States they still believe they lack *before* unleashing a global war. Khrushchev has summarized the matter succinctly: "We must not be in a rush and rashly introduce what is not yet ripe. This would lead to . . . compromise of our cause. But neither can we be content with what has been achieved, since that would spell stagnation."[4]

In the final analysis, whether or not World War III will occur will depend not on exchanges of polemics between Moscow and Peking, but on the ability of the United States to retain a clear-cut military superiority over the Soviet Union in the future. Furthermore, a way must be found to convince the communist leaders that, in making their own strategic assessments, they must learn to accept the fact that they cannot win the weapons lead-time race.

4. Khrushchev to the 21st Congress, CPSU, as quoted in N. Matkovsky, "On the 40th Anniversary of the Publication of V. I. Lenin's Book, 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder'," *Pravda,* June 12, 1960, during one presentation of the Soviet position during the recent Sino-Soviet debate.

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Perspective VIII

Disinformation

Is "the conflict between Moscow and Peking" only the synthetic product of a deliberate Communist campaign of "inspiration" and "misinformation"?

NATALIE GRANT

Communist "inspiration" and "misinformation," two important tools of intelligence and propaganda, have expanded monstrously in recent years. As a system, communism thrives on fiction, which it builds over truth. The so-called "capitalism" which communists attack is fiction: a mythical image woven by Marxism-Leninism around a grain of truth. Fiction serves the "construction of socialism." Fiction, with imaginary capitalist flaws acting as background for the illusory qualities of communism, becomes the magnet attracting outside sympathies. But where fiction is invaluable to communism, is in countering attempts of the Free World to evaluate "socialism" and its potential. Fiction is then used to confuse observers, to obstruct correct judgment, and at all costs to prevent concrete and constructive anti-communism. This result is achieved through inspiration and misinformation. They lead the West to erroneous calculation, and erroneous calculation brings defeat. And the defeat of capitalism is the major communist objective.

Bolshevik Beginnings

Moscow has used misinformation from the moment that the Bolsheviks seized power. In setting up its program, the Soviet Union had recourse to past Czarist practices, German experience, and some traditional forms of Chinese camouflage and framing. Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder* also contributed to the elaboration of Soviet inspiration and misinformation principles. From the beginning, Soviet leaders, including Lenin and Stalin, used misinformation tactics in dealing with outsiders.[1]

Lenin's precept that communism will be constructed by its enemies acts as an axiom in Soviet inspiration. It is for the enemy to make the move which will undermine his own interests and aid the communist cause. Soviet participation is confined to inspiration of this move. A further trait peculiar to Soviet inspiration technique is the discord between the official Soviet line and the line followed by communist misinformation. Official propaganda, in order to impress and intimidate the enemy, stresses communist superiority and the successes of the Soviet system. Misinformation stresses "antagonisms" and "conflicts" behind the Iron Curtain, in order to raise in enemy ranks expectations of communist collapse. Instead of adhering strictly, as does the doctrine, to the theory that revolution will destroy "imperialism," misinformation advances the idea of a peaceful transition to communism, and lulls the enemy with dreams of long-term "peaceful coexistence." The enemy remains inactive, and communism thus gains the time required for development.

This contrast in approach demands a subdivision of tasks. The official line is left to communists and ardent fellow-travelers. "Inspired" information, although sometimes traceable to Soviet sources, is circulated by non-communists. Seeming to come from circles believed in the West to be reliable, misinformation from non-communist sources renders great service to the Soviets. "Inspired" books have often paved the road to Western concessions.[2]

To increase the effectiveness of misinformation, communists correlate its themes with concrete trends of Western opinion. Views clashing with current sentiment are seldom inspired. Sentiments in the nature of "faith in international understanding" or "fear of war" are fertile soil for misinformation. Communism capitalizes on wishful thinking, that weakness shared by all men, who believe what they wish to believe more readily than the truth. It was wishful thinking that led public opinion, inspired by Moscow, to view the New Economic Policy of the twenties as evidence that Russia had abandoned communism, and the Stalinism of the thirties as a rejection of world revolution in favor of a national state. It was wishful thinking again which during World War II was largely responsible for the idea that after the war was over a liberal form of government would replace the Soviet totalitarian system.

Success of Propaganda

In the post-1945 expansion of communism from "one state" to a "world socialist system," a number of factors contributed to the increased success of inspiration and misinformation tactics: the constant friction between Western countries; the multiplication of political and intelligence services; a decline in the intellectual level of Western political leaders; severe censorship in Soviet countries; the entrance on the political scene of "professional anti-communism"; the abun-

1. Lenin's contacts with Americans (Raymond Robbins, Frank Arthur Vanderlip, Sidney Hillman, and others) illustrates this point.

2. For example, *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization*, by two respected Fabians, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, written exclusively from Soviet material; *La Nouvelle Russie*, by Ed. Herriot, which in 1922 preached contact with communism as a means toward its democratization; *Soviet Asia Mission*, nominally by Henry A. Wallace, but actually written by a communist (Andrew Steiger). One of the most spectacular cases was *Three Capitals*, by V. Shulgin, who was a sincere anti-communist yet quite unconsciously submitted the book for editing to the Soviet secret service in Moscow.

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dance of forgeries and fabrications.[3] New centers of misinformation were established, and the old ones stepped up output. Inspired material on Soviet problems originates at present from a variety of "primary" sources (Paris, London, Berlin, Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm, Hongkong, Tokyo and even Rio de Janeiro), with Belgrade and Warsaw (since October 1956) taking current precedence. Soviet misinformation services become even bolder as the Western press, in its contest for scoops, blindly accepts the sensational news. Soviet and Chinese censors, for example, known for their severity, readily permit the dispatch of incredible news reports about "conflicts" behind the Iron Curtain—reports which, if even half true, would be firmly suppressed.

West's Susceptibility

In certain countries the communist parties are now beginning to participate, contrary to former practice, in the spread of misinformation. These are usually parties which have met with failure in attempts to build up a substantial local following. The "best informed" on the Sino-Soviet "conflict" appear to be, for example, the communists in England, the United States, and some countries in Latin America. While prior to the war Soviet inspiration suggested the existence of conflicts within the Soviet Union, it has now enlarged the arena to the entire communist bloc. The intimation is that de-Stalinization is being followed by "democratic evolution," and that communism is bound to collapse through the development of revisionism, "national communism," deviations and friction in the top strata. The Soviet-inspired presentation to the West of "Titoism" and "Gomulkaism" is illustrative of the argument. There is no doubt that dependence of Western public opinion on communist-supplied data has increased the receptivity of the Free World to ideas of the "superiority of communism," as well as to the belief that "antagonistic contradictions between capitalism and communism" can be resolved by peaceful methods.

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Sino-Soviet relations, as a key problem in communist policies in Asia and toward the United States, have always occupied a central position in the communist inspiration program. Conditions for the circulation of Soviet misinformation on Asia were exceptionally favorable in the United States. Although America confronted important political issues in Asia, American public opinion maintained a detached attitude toward Asian developments. Basically, Americans were uninformed on China and Japan (and even on Russia), and scientific research in this field was neglected. For information on Asia, Americans usually fell back on material available in Europe or supplied by immigrants. Few efforts were made to analyze or confirm this material. The relative lack of interest of Americans in ideology and dialectics, and in the long-term history of peoples, made matters worse. Interdependence of historical development was seldom taken into account, and an inordinate importance was attributed to separate facts. Communism, however, as understood by Marxism-Leninism, develops by a lengthy process involving both advances and retreats; concentration on a single event inevitably distorts perspective.

This attitude on the part of Americans opened the doors wide to communist inspiration. The uncritical American tendency to oppose all trends felt to be reactionary, chauvinist or fascist further contributed to the success of the communist tactics. Americans stressed the necessity for an "objectivity" which, in the study of communism, is equivalent, at best, to a non-critical utilization of communist sources and data. Myths, sensations, and fictitious reports multiplied. These bred theories resting on false premises, which caused the American administration to misunderstand communist moves. The United States thus often found itself sympathizing, and even siding, with communist elements presented as "progressive" by Soviet inspiration.

China's Mis-History

For the communists, who believed they could profit from "imperialist war" in the Far East,[4] China has always been a first-rate weapon against "capitalist imperialism." Communist planning has always regarded Chinese revolution as a step to revolution in semi-dependent and colonial countries.[5] Chinese communism, as a party, appeared in 1921 and remained weak for some time thereafter. This explains Moscow's interest in the Chinese nationalist independence movement, rather than in the "proletariat." Concrete conditions, therefore, motivated Moscow's leadership over the growth of Chinese communism. The headquarters of the Chinese revolution were located for many years first in Russia and then elsewhere within the Soviet borders. The Soviet drive into Asia, the formation of Outer Mongolia into a satellite, and Soviet policies in Manchuria were

3. Among them may be mentioned books by non-existent individuals citing forged documents, sensational revelations by "rewriters," and compilations based on non-existent sources. They play a role of great importance in shaping Western public opinion. Some of the better known include: the writings of Budu Svanidze, non-existent nephew of Stalin; Litvinov's "diaries"; the "memoirs" of a "French governess" attached to the Stalin family, cited recently by a Washington commentator: *Khrushchev the Ukrainian*, by Victor Alexandrov (founded almost exclusively on non-existent documents). Their number is legion.

4. War between the United States and Japan was a premise of Soviet strategy under Lenin, as well as under Stalin: "American imperialism is the most dangerous to the toiling masses. . . . In the coming world war . . . American imperialism will play the leading role. . . . The American imperialists are going to miscalculate because they overlook China's historical role in Asia and on the Pacific. . . . Liberated China will become a magnet for all peoples of the yellow race. . . . China will become a major power on the Pacific to menace the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism. . . . The Kuomintang's most important task at the moment is to foster the revolution by exploiting antagonisms between the powers that encircle China. . . . America's advance in China threatens the very existence of Japanese imperialism. This danger may hasten the armed clash between the United States and Japan. . . ." (D. Manuilski at the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Nov. 22-Dec. 16, 1926, *Puti Mirovoi Revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1927, vol. I, p. 420-435.)

5. "The great events in China which are happening before our eyes, show the advance guard of the European proletariat very plainly what powerful reserves we have in the East. . . . The events in China will revolutionize the other countries in the East. . . . What the Russian revolution of 1905 did for Turkey, Persia, and China, the present great movement in China will do for Indochina, India, etc." (G. Zinoviev, *Pravda*, June 28, 1925).

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largely determined by the absence of a sizeable organization of Chinese communists. The weakness of the Chinese party led the Soviets to collaborate with the Kuomintang, which they viewed as a weapon to promote revolution and as a cover under which to construct the authentic communist movement in China.[6]

A survey of communist misinformation on Chinese problems in the years following 1918 would entail a complete review of the history of China and the Soviet Union over that period. Every shift in Moscow policy and every change in the Chinese political situation brought a new twist in communist inspiration. The campaign of "inspiration" on China, directed at concealing from the West the communist advance toward establishment of a Sino-Soviet monolith, may, however, be roughly subdivided into four main periods. They are, 1) 1918 to 1927; 2) 1927 to World War II; 3) World War II to the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic; 4) the period following the creation of the CPR.

Phases of the Revolution

The 1918-27 period was marked mainly by communist "collaboration" with non-communist groups (the Kuomintang). The official communist line (expressed by the Comintern at its Second Congress in 1920) called on Chinese revolutionaries to refrain from premature "sovietization."[7] Slogans of independence and national unity were advanced.[8] At the same time the Chinese Communist Party was strengthened and trained for the moment when it would assume leadership over the masses.[9] The warning not to skip the "stage of democratic revolution," and not to enter the road of "proletarian dictatorship" ahead of time, was again sounded in 1926, at the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Comintern Executive.

The transitory communist slogan that the peasants are "the basic deciding factor in the Chinese national movement" contributed to the creation of propaganda myths claiming that Chinese communists were merely "agrarian reformers." Further inspired by individual instances of deviation caused by the equivocal tactics of the Comintern and the Chinese communists, European and American commentators launched stories of an alleged "Chinese schism."

After severing relations with the Kuomintang in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party, obedient to instructions from Stalin and the Comintern, shifted to a revolutionary policy opposing the Kuomintang and "imperialists." In 1937, the Chinese Party, along with the entire international communist movement, adopted popular front tactics. It became clear, with the stabilization of the Chinese Party and the elaboration of a Chinese communist doctrine (mainly by

Mao Tse-tung), that the Chinese revolution was viewed by communism as a continuation of the Soviet Russian revolution, and the Chinese communist drive to power over China as a second stage toward a "world Soviet republic," in accordance with Lenin's precepts.

In this period the Moscow misinformation line minimized the significance of the development of communism in Asia, and encouraged support of policies profitable to the Soviet Union. Communist inspiration tried to show that:

a) "the sovereign republics" (the Far Eastern Republic, Outer Mongolia) are independent and democratic;
b) Chinese communists are agrarian reformers and the Chinese Communist Party a national party without international communist, Comintern, or Soviet affiliation;
c) Soviet and communist imperialism are non-existent, and there is no synchronized strategy of communist aggression;
d) Japan is an enemy common to China, the United States and the Soviet Union, and a war against Japan can gain political and economic advantages for the United States in Asia;
e) Collaboration with communism is profitable to America.

Even when detailed and concrete the non-communist publications subsequently devoted to this period of Soviet infiltration seldom discuss inspiration and misinformation as important aspects of Soviet infiltration. Nor do they note the success of Soviet inspiration in shaping American and world public opinion, and in impressing upon the minds of Westerners ideas which may prove fatal to the future of the Free World. Yet it was in this period that a major role in inspiration was played by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the periodicals, books, conferences and lectures which the IPR sponsored. The IPR, now forgotten by the general public, was a first-rate instrument of communist propaganda and misinformation, as well as a tool by which Soviet military intelligence got, via America, data on Japan, China, and Great Britain. The Institute was used by the communists "to influence United States public opinion," "to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the United States" and "to orientate American Far Eastern policies toward communist objectives."[10] Many organizations linked with IPR[11]

6. The success of this gradual preparation of China for the communist seizure of power inspired the Soviets to apply the same method with amendments on other occasions. One may trace, for example, elements of the Chinese experiment in the still embryonic Cuban "revolution."
7. The similarity of this line with theses recently launched by Moscow may indicate that countries now exist where premature "sovietization" would be undesirable to communism, as it would have been in China, where it might have aroused the West, including the United States, to immediate action. In this connection see footnote 6.
8. "The communists support every national revolutionary movement against imperialism." (Fourth Congress of the Comintern, 1922.)
9. "A twofold task confronts the communist and labor parties of the colonies and semi-colonial countries: on one hand they struggle for the most radical solution of the tasks of bougeois-democratic revolution directed toward winning over state political independence; on the other hand, they organize the workers and peasant masses for struggle for their social and class interests, utilizing thereby all the conflicts of interest in the national bourgeois democratic camp." (*Kommunisticheski Internatsional v Dokumentakh*, 1919-1932, Moscow, 1933, pp. 321-322.)
10. The Institute's activity over the 1925-50 period was examined in detail at Hearings held from July 25, 1951, to June 20, 1952, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Congress, 2nd session.
11. These include: Allied Labor News, *Amerasia*, American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, American Friends of the Chinese People and its official publication *China Today*, American-Russian Institute, China Aid Council, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and its official publication *Far East Spotlight*, Federated Press, The Friends of Chinese Democracy, Japanese-American Committee for Democracy, Russian War Relief, *Soviet Russia Today*, etc.

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were engaged in activity similarly serving communist objectives. Over a period of some 25 years (1925-50), about 5,000 persons worked, deliberately or as dupes, at supplying false information concerning Asia and Soviet Asian policy to the American people, and inspiring views desirable to the Soviet Union. The information was distributed through a number of channels and by many methods. Widely read books, pamphlets, and magazines were published, and articles and book reviews appeared in leading American journals. Soviet-inspired books published in those days are still in all libraries, public and university. Their influence on scientific research is disastrous. Persons now studying Soviet policies, China, or the Pacific area must work their way through a jungle of communist propaganda which continues to be submitted to the reader as "objective." Young specialists on Soviet and communist affairs often reveal, unfortunately, the influence of this "objective" reading material.[12]

Conditioned by this flood of inspired literature, American opinion more readily accepted the communist line stressed by openly communist publications. There was no shortage of communist material: it was circulated both by the American Party and by Soviet diplomatic agents, unofficial prior to 1933, and official after recognition.[13]

Wooing the U.S.

In the third period, which lasted until the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, communist inspiration centered on the United States, by then the principal target of misinformation. The communist aim was to influence the United States to participate in Chinese economic renovation, after having cleared China of Japanese occupation troops. Since aid to a communist group linked with Moscow might have been opposed in America, the communists tried to present Chinese communism as an independent national movement. Mao Tse-tung and Stalin played their part in the inspiration campaign. Following the "dissolution" of the Comintern (1943) for example, Mao Tse-tung insisted that the Third International had stopped interfering in Chinese affairs after 1935. He made this point on several occasions. Stalin, too, in 1944, asserted in a conversation with Mr. Averell Harriman that "the Chinese communists are not real communists . . . they are real patriots and they want to fight Japan." [14] In talks with Harry Hopkins, Stalin followed an identical line. So did other Soviet leaders (among them Molotov)[15] in talks with various Americans (*e.g.*, Patrick J. Hurley, Donald M. Nelson).

With the formation of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, the inspiration line underwent a change. The communists introduced the subject of "contradictions" between China and the Soviet Union, a theme still prominent in communist misinformation.

> "*Pravda* charged that the Chinese leaders suffered from the same 'infantile sickness of leftism' that Lenin denounced..."
>
> *Time*, June 27, 1960
>
> [*the truth is that* Pravda *has never charged this. N.G.*]
>
> "As for Soviet-Chinese relations in general, the President now feels there is tangible evidence that the two communist countries are having strong differences."
>
> *Washington Post and Times-Herald*, June 18, 1960

"Contradictions" are a complex, multi-faceted problem. The seizure of authority by communists, wherever it takes place, and the "construction of socialism" are always accompanied by struggle and conflict. Soviet history is permeated by the still unresolved conflict which separates the men in power from the people. In order to confuse the outside world, the regime often cloaks internal conflicts with misinformation and distortions. Internal contradictions are presented as external, and their social and ideological nature carefully disguised. Ideological opposition thus becomes "intelligence activity for the imperialist enemy." When the regime needs a respite or plans to strike at the morale or the material welfare of the West, the communists customarily launch fictitious rumors regarding non-existent internal conflict. Such were some of the past stories on the outbreak of revolutionary action in the population or on bitter battles raging among Soviet leaders. These served to tranquilize the West and appease its concern over the progress of communism.

Confusing the West

The postwar transition from "one state" to a "socialist system" intensified the contradictions inherent in communism. New conflicts of interest arose. While in the past, contradictions between China and the Soviet Union had been limited to the Party sphere, the formation of the Chinese Peoples Republic extended them to relations between two states. The communist objective is to resolve these contradictions as rapidly as possible, because only then can communism move to the next step in its program: the "final victory" over

12. Pro-communist literature on China which laid the base for a "scientific" approach to the study of the Pacific, includes: *China's Millions* and *Chinese Conquer China*, by Anna Louise Strong; *In Search of History*, by V. Sheehan; *China Shakes the World*, by J. Belden; *Two Years with the Chinese Communists*, by C. and W. Band; *Unfinished Revolution in China*, by I. Epstein; eleven books by O. Lattimore (among them *Solution in Asia* and *Situation in Asia*); *China's Wartime Politics* and *China's Crisis*, by L. K. Rosinger; *People on our Side*, by E. Snow; *Battle Hymn of China*, by A. Smedley; *Challenge of Red China*, by G. Stein; *New Frontier in Asia*, by P. J. Jaffe; *Report from Red China*, by H. Forman; *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution*, by T. C. Woo; *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, by Tang Leang-li, and many others. They constitute in some American libraries the only sources available on the Chinese problem.

13. The following is a partial list of direct communist propaganda on China published in the United States in that period: *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, by N. Bukharin; *Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic*, by Bela Kuhn; *Red China*, by Mao Tse-tung; *The Chinese Soviets* and *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, by V. A. Yakhontov; *Heroic China*, by P. A. Mif. These books were Stalinist. A distorted view of the Chinese problem was also supplied by Trotskyist literature, such as *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, by L. Trotsky and *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, by H. R. Isaacs.

14. *The China Tangle. The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*, by Herbert Feiss, 1953, p. 140.

15. Molotov presented the situation as follows: "The Soviet Government could bear no responsibility for internal affairs or developments in China for which at times it had been unjustifiably held responsible. . . . In part of that country the people were half starved and miserable; and thus they called themselves 'communists,' but they had no relation to communism; they used the name as a way of expressing their discontent over their condition; but if these were improved they would forget that they were 'communists'; and so if the United States helped these unfortunate people there would be fewer 'communists' in China. . . . The Soviet people would be very glad if the United States helped China . . ." (*Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought*, by Herbert Feiss, 1957, pp. 408-409.)

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capitalism. A proper understanding of Sino-Soviet conflicts of interest would strengthen the position of the Free World and point Western policies in the right direction.

To prevent correct appreciation of Sino-Soviet problems, communism has again turned to misinformation, the method tested with such success in the past. The principal objective of misinformation remains unchanged: a demoralization of the West. The United States is lulled by illusions that it should bide its time because "splits" and "conflicts" will bring disintegration of the world communist machine. American public opinion is pacified by hopes for a lengthy period of "peaceful coexistence." Rumors suggest Sino-Soviet conflict in planning, with Moscow intent on peace, and Peking on military action. Old theories, once sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations, that "schism" and ideological conflict are tearing Mao and the Kremlin apart have returned to the scene. Absurd "Kremlinology" is being supplemented by no less nonsensical "Pekinology."

Detecting the Truth

No private observer is in a position to trace all the channels of infiltration of Soviet misinformation into the West. Nor can one draw a line between intentional misinformation, on the one hand, and naive wishful thinking or competition for "scoops" on the other. Trotskyist circles (members of the Fourth International, which, hand in hand with Moscow and Peking, has been fanning revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) seem to have become one of the prolific sources of misinformation.[16] From a practical standpoint, the crux of the matter is the fact that the supply of misinformation to the American public could be prevented. The study of original documents rather than unverified translations, the application of scientific methods of research to both the Soviet and Chinese versions of Marxism-Leninism and Party history, and the abandonment of an atomistic approach to subjects requiring the study of long-term processes, would soon disclose the true nature of "inspired" information. Western commentators would then cease to interpret as "serious conflict" the normal discrepancies arising from the difference in the level of development reached by Soviet and Chinese communism, a factor always taken into consideration by the communists themselves. Nor would Western observers continue to overlook the fact that special tasks are performed by each member of the "world socialist system," so that there is a planned difference in the strategic lines followed by the Soviet Union and by China. As the situation stands at present, careful strategic synchronization by communism is often viewed in the West as a "contradiction."

The Summit Conference and the American electoral campaign brought a recrudescence of misinformation—a normal development, since Soviet inspiration intensifies at moments of crisis in the enemy camp. Sino-Soviet relations—both because of their critical importance and because of the West's ignorance concerning them—were the subject particularly selected for the occasion. The manner in which the avalanche of misinformation was greeted by American public opinion indicates that the communist move was a success. In the United States the campaign quickly aroused hopes for a split in the communist camps and a resulting possibility for an understanding with the Soviet Union.

A Nonexistent Schism

A careful study of the material forming the alleged grounds for concluding that there is a serious Sino-Soviet conflict proves the absence of any objective foundation for such a belief. There is no evidence to support the arbitrary announcements of commentators that Mao and Khrushchev differ in their theories concerning the path—peaceful or military—to revolution. My own direct examination of material issued in the past few months and over recent years—including the primary Soviet and Chinese Communist periodicals, the minutes of the Eleventh Session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions and of the Third Congress of Rumanian Workers, the speeches by Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung and other Soviet and Chinese political leaders—leads to the astonishing conclusion that *all* statements regarding the existence of serious disagreement between Moscow and Peking on foreign policy, war, peace, revolution, or attitude toward imperialism are an invention. *All* are the fruit of fertile imagination and unbased speculation.

There has been no Chinese attack

From High Places

"The Chinese communists have long been openly disgruntled with even the appearance of peaceful intent by the Soviet leaders . . ."

Department of State *Bulletin*, June 20, 1960 (Vice President Nixon's speech at SEATO meeting)

"[The Chinese] implicitly accuse Khrushchev of revisionism [and the Russians] accuse the Chinese implicitly of a left-wing deviation."

Problems of Communism, Nos. 3 and 4, 1960 (a publication widely read outside America as reflecting U.S. governmental views)

16. Pierre Frank, leader of the Fourth International, whose article on *"Les Divergences entre Chinois et Sovietiques"* appeared in Paris, in July, 1960, is, for example, an ardent propounder of the Sino-Soviet "conflict." So is Isaac Deutscher, the Trotskyist historian, whose article on "Khrushchev, Mao, and the Wolf of Chungshan" in *The Reporter* of August 4, 1960, is a concoction of rumors, gossip, fiction, and unfounded assumptions.

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on the Soviet communists, nor has there been any Soviet attack on the Chinese communists. There is no disagreement in the interpretation of Lenin's doctrine of war and peace. Nor has there been deviation by either party from the principles of communist strategy as expressed in the Moscow Declaration of November, 1957. Instead of imaginary attacks on Khrushchev's "pacifism," all important Chinese articles emphasize the unity of the socialist camp "headed by the Soviet Union." Instead of dramatized ideological conflict, the Soviet and Chinese press publish identical attacks against "revisionists."

The accompanying excerpts from the American press will illustrate the character of the misinformation circulated by leading newspapers and periodicals. Misinformation falls into two categories. In one instance, a false impression is produced through the utilization of clichés, adverbs or conjectural terminology, which passes unnoticed by the reader and turns a speculation into an accepted fact. The second type of misinformation is a direct distortion of truth. The examples cited in boxes include both types.

All the News . . .

"There are presumably large numbers in the Soviet elite who know that the headquarters of contemporary 'left sectarianism' is in Peiping . . ."
New York Times editorial, June 14, 1960

"There has been speculation since the abortive summit conference . . . that Mr. Khrushchev's power and policies were being threatened by Stalinist elements inside the Kremlin—backed according to reports by the powerful communist party of China . . ."
New York Times editorial, June 26, 1960

"Last week Mr. Khrushchev . . . ridiculed the views repeatedly advanced by the Chinese . . ." [*Khrushchev did not. N.G.*]
New York Times editorial, June 28, 1960

Kremlinology Unchecked

One could go on for ever. Prominent political figures, impressed by the misinformation received, become victims of the wishful thinking of public opinion, and are led to support most questionable theses.

Day after day, false material, at times incredibly naive,[17] poisons public opinion in the United States. Day after day, the unsophisticated reader is told that "the struggle . . . between Red Chinese chief Mao Tse-tung and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has reached unforeseen proportions." (*Washington Post,* Aug. 17, 1960.) American periodicals are seconded by the European press. Serious publications (the *Economist,* the London *Observer*) seriously discuss the ideological quarrels between Mao and Khrushchev.

Nothing is done in the United States to counteract this deluge of misinformation. (The true nature of the inspiration campaign has been exposed, however, in Europe, by the Paris magazine *Est & Ouest,* a publication of small circulation but tremendous value.[18] The significance of the campaign becomes clear when the stories on the Sino-Soviet conflict are linked with the misinformation current on internal Soviet affairs ("Kremlinology").

Experts on the Kremlin dream up influences of military cliques, conflicts between Khrushchev and Suslov, and the regular "disgrace" of Mikoyan[19]. The effect is to conjure up in the mind of the Western reader a Khrushchev with a new personality, an attractive peaceful individual supporting democratic views. The natural conclusion is that the West should meet him half-way to prevent his replacement by "Stalinists" and warmongering marshals. (Depending on the point the author wants to make, the "marshals" turn either "tough" or "soft.")

Such a line of thought is intensified by the misinformation on Peking. Khrushchev stands out as the kind, friendly "centrist" against the fierce "leftwinger" Mao, intent on starting another war. It is imperative, says inspiration, for the United States to seek understanding with the Soviet Union,[20] represented by "peaceful" Nikita, even, perhaps, at the price of a few concessions. . . .

The flood of communist-inspired misinformation on Sino-Soviet relations is reminiscent of that almost forgotten era dominated by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The present situation presents, however, many more dangers. In the good old IPR days, the problem was only China and American authority in Asia. Today it is the world.

17. The extent of absurdity reached may be judged from a news item *(Washington Post,* July 31, 1960), announcing that "Soviet seeks to shift Troublesome Molotov," which has Molotov conspiring with Mao against Khrushchev and Khrushchev failing in his efforts to separate Mao from Molotov by . . . assigning the latter to a European Soviet embassy!

18. See *"D'un Prétendu Conflit Doctrinal entre le PC Sovietique et le PC Chinois,"* by Branko Lazitch in No. 239 of June 16-30, 1960, and *"Khrouchtchev: Fiction et Réalité,"* by Boris Souvarine in *Est & Ouest* No. 240 of July 1-15, 1960, as well as the special issue of *Est & Ouest* devoted to China in March, 1960, Nos. 232-233.

19. Most vivid in this respect are the romantic meanderings of Alexander Metaxas in *The Nation* of July 20, 1960. His article is a hodgepodge of "Soviet marshals," symbolizing "eternal Russia" and opposed to the "adventurous" policies of Peking; Kremlin "battles" between the "partisans of a Western rapprochement and those of the 'alliance with China at any price' "; Khrushchev's "urgent" need for understanding with the West; "marked" Sino-Soviet economic rivalry, and . . . a "possibility" ("it is quite possible," says Mr. Metaxas) that "after November, a sort of rivalry may arise between Moscow and Peking, each seeking the favors of the next United States government. . . ."

20. The necessity for American-Russian alliance against China was stressed particularly in a *Saturday Evening Post* (March 19, 1960) article, a masterpiece in the compilation of hearsay to prove the existence of Sino-Soviet differences. The article is a major contribution to the world of unfounded conclusions. "Possibilities," "rumors," "hints," and "hypotheses" serve as background. The credulity of the author may be judged from his citations. He takes at face value statements by "Russians" ranging from a "Soviet general in civilian dress" to a "close associate" of Khrushchev, all of whom seem impelled by an irrepressible desire to confide in an American.

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THIS SYMPOSIUM
IS PUBLISHED BY
NATIONAL REVIEW,
A WEEKLY JOURNAL
OF FACT AND OPINION,
WITH OFFICES AT
150 EAST 35TH STREET,
NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

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